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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Credit card
1.1.1 The credit card culture and market
Credit cards have become one of the most popular consumer credit products. According
to the Encyclopedia Britannica, ”The use of credit cards originated in the United States
during the 1920s, when individual firms, such as oil companies and hotel chains, began
issuing them to customers for purchases made at company outlets. The first universal
credit card, which could be used at a variety of establishments, was introduced by the
Diners Club, Inc., in 1958”. There are several reasons accounting for the success and
popularity of credit cards. Firstly an increasing number of consumers has a propensity
to spend their future income since the late 80s and thus there is a surge on the demand
of retail credit. Besides, it is more convenient to using a credit card for shopping than
to use cash. The new online shopping era also provides a new platform for credit card
development. Credit card issuers, who earn from the merchandisers fee and interest fee,
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have actively promoted the use of credit cards. They introduce cash reward programs,
zero-balance-transfer offers or airline mileage schemes to increase their market share. In
short, credit cards have become an important asset of consumers, merchandisers and card
issuers.
While the general public may believe credit cards are so widely accepted and therefore
will replace other traditional payment means soon or later, credit card issuers indeed face
many challenges. First there is intense competition. Having a number of credit card
products, it is important for lenders to make the right operation decisions in order to
sustain their position in the market. For example, it is critical to decide a proper annual
percentage rate (APR). This APR changes the loss and gain of the credit card portfolios.
An over-priced APR drives many customers away; conversely, a low APR reduces the
profit and increases the expected default. Other than competition driven by other credit
card issuers, credit cards have been gradually replaced by other payment cards, such
as debit cards or stored value smart cards. Consumers do not need to check or repay
their monthly balance bill when using these payment cards. This is thus more convenient
especially for consumers having enough capital in their saving accounts.
Although the growth of the credit card market has slowed down in the last few years,
the credit card market is still very attractive to credit card issuers and therefore lenders
have different strategies to attract new customers or strengthen the relationship with
current customers. In this thesis, we look at the most traditional operational policy:
increase the credit limit of their current customers. This policy is still widely used by
card issuers. A general belief verified by Soman and Cheema (2002) is that increasing the
credit limit of a credit card raises the credit card owner’s propensity to spend. Consumers
assumed lenders have some sophisticated models, which are used to determine appropriate
credit limits, but that is not the case in reality.
So how do lenders currently decide on what credit limit to offer a credit card customer?
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Often they use classification tree and the return/profit matrices (Trench et al., 2003;
Lucas, 2007). Details are described as follows: Lenders require data from past campaigns
and use these data to estimate the expected results (expected profit or expected default
rate) of adjusting the credit limit. In addition, data related to customer behaviour (such
as repayment or purchasing records) and external data (such as credit bureau or marketing
data) are used to segment customers into different groups. Finally, organizational data
relating to the lender’s constraints (e.g. budget or maximum expected default) are also
required to set up the decision model.
Using these data, lenders often segment borrowers into different groups with a clas-
sification tree and then calculate the corresponding risk/return matrix, i.e. they agree
credit limits for each combination of risk band and average balance, which is considered
a surrogate for the return to the lender from that customer. This approach is static in
that it does not consider whether or how the customers default risk and profitability to
the lender will change over time. Nor is there any model to guide what are the optimal
credit limits to choose. Lenders have advocated a sequential model rather than the static
model (Trench et al., 2003; Lucas, 2007) since the sequential model is able to monitor the
change of credit card consumer’s lifetime value. Moreover, the credit limit given to each
of these risk/reward groups is usually a subjective judgment.
In the last few years lenders began to investigate how to model the problem so as to
obtain optimal credit limit policies or optimal interest rate to charge (see Trench et al.
(2003)). Their model though does not consider that if the economic situation changes
then both the risk and reward of the credit card borrower is likely to change.
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1.1.2 Motivations
In this thesis, we propose using Markov Decision Processes (MDP) to improve the credit
limit decision. MDP models provide a way of making sequential decisions by considering
the evolution of a customer’s behaviour over time. It also allows one to calculate the
profitability of a credit card customer under the optimal dynamic credit limit policy. One
critical condition for using MDP models is having enough data to estimate the chance of
transitioning from one state to the others. In the credit card industry consumers records
can typically provide over a million observations. This is therefore a viable model to be
applied in real credit card pricing models.
We aim to build the MDP model based on the behavioural score. Behavioural scores
are used by almost all lenders to assess credit card accounts’ default risk. Most lenders
have been keeping consumers’ behavioural scores for a number of years. Particularly with
the advent of the new Basel Accord, lenders are required to keep such data for five years
and are encouraged to keep it throughout the whole economic cycle.
Two credit card datasets, one from Hong Kong and one from the United Kingdom, are
used throughout this study. The following two sections present the economy and credit
card usage rate in these two countries so as to provide some background information for
reference.
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1.2 Hong Kong
1.2.1 The economy after 1997
Our data covered the period from 2002 to 2007 but we present an overview of the HK econ-
omy since 1997. Although these two events were not related, shortly after the sovereignty
of Hong Kong returned to China, came the Asian financial turmoil, during which spec-
ulators targeted HK with a double market play (the HK currency system and the stock
market). The Hang Seng Index, which is the stock market capitalization weighted stock
market index representing the 40 largest listed companies in Hong Kong, registered a
year-on-year drop of 52.2% in February, 1998. The Hong Kong Government countered
this speculative act by intervening in the stock market. However, weakening external
exports and local consumption resulted in a sluggish economy. The year-on-year Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) registered a negative growth in November, 1998 and that was
the beginning of the deflation period, which lasted for six years. The Hong Kong economy
shone for a while during the e-commerce era in 1999, during which the Hang Seng Index
increased by 92% in August, 1999. The myth of e-commerce, however, burst later that
year and the Hong Kong economy was marching into recession in 2000. According to the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there were 73, 000 residential mortgage loans in negative
equity which accounted for 16% of the total residential borrowers, and the unemployment
rate reached 5.1% in 2001. During 2001 to 2003, there was lack of momentum to change
the local economy. What further intensified the worsening economy was the outbreak
of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in March, 2003. The Gross Domestic
Product registered a year-on-year plunge of 7.5% in the second quarter of 2003. In June
2003, the number of residential mortgage loans in negative equity was over 100, 000 and
the unemployment rate jumped to 7.9%.
The recovery of the HK economy is mainly due to the booming China market and is
5
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Hong Kong macroeconomics
benchmarked by the new visa policy where mainland Chinese visitors can enter Hong Kong
without traveling visas. In 2004, mainland visitors accounted for 30% of the total visitors
and boosted the retail industry. By the end of 2004, the economy of HK finally resumed
its momentum resulting in a year-on-year GDP growth rate of 8%. The economy of HK
had gradually integrated with the China market and Hong Kong had become the financial
center of mainland China, shown by the increasing number of mainland companies listed
in the Hong Kong Exchange Board. All key macroeconomics indexes registered a strong
growth over 2006. In 2007, there were less than 2, 000 residential loans in negative equity
and the government surplus was HK$50 billion (a rough average of US$95 per headcount).
1.2.2 The credit card market
Just like many other developed countries, the credit card culture has taken hold in Hong
Kong since the 90s, although there is lack of official statistics about the credit card market
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in the 90s. According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there were 9,217,000 credit
cards in circulation in the fourth quarter of 2001 and on average every adult had 1.79
credit card1. From the second quarter to the fourth quarter of 2001, the delinquency rate
registered a growth from 1.28% to 1.73%. A substantially high credit card charge-off ratio
was recorded from 2001 to 2003. In the second quarter of 2002, there was a 6.5% fall in the
number of credit cards in circulation. The credit card market gradually stabilised since
the fourth quarter of 2004. From 2004 to 2007, the number of credit cards in circulation
has increased continuously and the delinquency and charge-off ratio has remained lower
than 1%.
Time No. of Rate of Total receivables Average Delinquent Delinquency Charge-off Charge-off
credit cards* increase at period-end receivables amount ratio % amount ratios %
Q4 2001 9217 - 62050 6732.13 796 1.28 1268 2.14
Q2 2002 9488 2.94 60260 6351.18 1045 1.73 2055 3.41
Q4 2002 8865 -6.57 59247 6683.25 756 1.28 2237 3.78
Q2 2003 8732 -1.5 53985 6182.43 688 1.27 1574 2.9
Q4 2003 8784 0.6 56305 6409.95 519 0.92 1129 2.05
Q2 2004 8933 1.7 53707 6012.2 343 0.64 721 1.34
Q4 2004 9276 3.84 59256 6388.1 259 0.44 534 0.94
Q2 2005 9558 3.04 56992 5962.75 231 0.4 465 0.82
Q4 2005 10095 5.62 68056 6741.56 250 0.37 433 0.68
Q2 2006 10623 5.23 62905 5921.59 251 0.4 510 0.82
Q4 2006 10937 2.96 72211 6602.45 269 0.37 535 0.78
Q2 2007 11320 3.5 69114 6105.48 276 0.4 564 0.83
Q4 2007 11559 2.11 76886 6651.61 269 0.35 504 0.68
Average receivables = Total receivables/No. of credit cards
Total receivables, delinquent amount and charge-off amount are presented in HK$ million.
An account is defined as delinquent if the delinquent dates is more than 90 days.
”‘*”’ in ’000
Accounts is called ”‘Delinquency”’ if it is in arrears for more than 90 days but has not been charged-off by the lender.
Table 1.1: The HK credit cards statistics
One general perception about delinquency and charge-off ratios is they are correlated
with the overall economy. It is believed that a deteriorating economy boosts the default
1According to the statistics of the 2001 Census provided by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics
Department, there were 5,148,653 residences in age 20 or above.
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rate. Checking the credit card statistics in Table 1.1, the charge-off ratios during Q4 2001
to Q2 2004 (which roughly covered the recession period) were higher than those of during
Q2 2005 to Q4 2007 (which was the good time). Moreover, the credit card data show the
credit card take-up rate is moving in the same direction with the economy. This shows the
importance of incorporating macroeconomic measurements in credit card pricing models
if one would like to understand the behaviour of credit card borrowers.
1.3 United Kingdom
1.3.1 The economy after 1997
Figure 1.2: Overview of the United Kingdom macroeconomics
The UK sample data consisted of credit card data from 2001 to 2004. Here we present
the economy of UK covered by this period from 1997 to 2007 as an overview. Unlike the
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economy of HK, the UK market was rather stable over the review period. During 1997
to 2004, a mild inflation with values less than 2% was registered. During the period,
the year-on-year GDP growth remained less than 4%. After 2005, the year-on-year CPI
values have gradually increased due mainly to the rising fuel cost.
1.3.2 The credit card market
Unlike the HK market, we cannot find any source of information about the delinquency
ratio or charge-off rate of the UK credit card market. The UK credit card statistics
presented in Table 1.2 are provided by The UK Payments Association (APACS). It shows
the volumes of total payments and the values of total payments for cash, cheque, debit
card and credit card from 2000 to 2006. For example, the first row indicates the number
of cash transactions were 28,910 millions and increased by 9% in 2000 compared to the
year before.
Year
Cash Cheque Debit card Credit card Total excluding cash*
Number % change Number % change Number % change Number % change Number % change
Volumes (in millions)
2000 27910 9 2526 -4.8 2337 13.3 1577 6.9 9887 4.9
2001 27575 -1.2 2401 -4.9 2696 15.4 1695 7.5 10475 6
2002 26459 -4 2247 -6.4 2994 11.1 1825 7.7 10970 4.7
2003 25678 -3 2110 -6.1 3364 12.4 1952 7 11665 6.3
2004 24667 -3.9 1966 -6.8 3690 9.7 2049 5 12496 7.1
2005 23968 -2.8 1845 -6.2 4084 10.7 2007 -2.1 13270 6.2
2006 23069 -3.7 1702 -7.8 4512 10.5 1996 -0.6 13782 3.9
Year
Cash Cheque Debit card Credit card Total excluding cash*
Value % change Value % change Value % change Value % change Value % change
Values (in £billion)
2000 261 2.3 1903 -0.4 76 17.5 85 12.3 4011 4.5
2001 268 2.4 1881 -1.2 95 24.9 94 10.2 4266 6.4
2002 267 -0.2 1830 -2.7 108 13.6 103 10.1 4459 4.5
2003 272 2 1772 -3.2 130 21 113 10 4625 3.7
2004 273 0.2 1720 -3 150 15.1 123 8.3 4921 6.4
2005 272 -0.2 1651 -4 171 13.7 124 1 5146 4.6
2006 274 0.8 1620 -1.9 195 14.2 126 1.5 5394 4.8
”‘*”’ including other storage cards.
Table 1.2: The UK credit cards statistics
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The UK credit card statistics show that the use of cheque and cash have gradually
decreased. On the contrary, the use of plastic card has increased, both in value and
volume. It is noticeable that the use of debit card grew sharply. The credit card market is
still here to stay but the increment slowed down since 2005. As mentioned, the competition
from other plastic cards is one of the challenges faced by the lenders.
1.4 Scope of the study
The objective of this study is to explore the use of Markov Decision Process (MDP)
models to support the decision of what credit limit to set for a credit card account so as
to maximize the profitability of the account over time. The behavioural score is included
in the model’s state space. This score is calculated by lenders to assess the default risk
of a borrower. One advantage of including this behavioural score in the state space is
that the model can be used by almost every lender since this score is universally used in
the credit card industry. Besides, the model is able to monitor the default risk and this
means a more conservative policy as default risk is involved in the decision.
There are many technical issues about using MDP models in making credit limit
decision that have not been addressed in literature. The first is coarse-classifying the state
variables. It is common in the consumer credit industry to classify continuous variables
into discrete bins. Coarse-classifying the state variables reduces the size of the state
space and thus ensures the model’s robustness. Another technique in building a MDP
model is to look at the order of the Markov Chain. A Markov Chain is called first order
Markov if the model’s migration depends only on the current status and is independent
of the history. Similarly, a n-th order Markov chain requires that the customer migration
depends on the current and the previous n − 1 periods of history. A general perception
is that the accuracy of the model improves with the order of the model. However, the
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weakness of incorporating more history in the state space is that it reduces the model’s
robustness. Indeed, coarse-classifying and the choice of order are two inseparable issues
in defining the MDP model. We will present the details in Chapter 3.
MDP models require numerous data to estimate the transition matrix but this is in
general not a problem for the credit card application. The only problem is that the number
of movements directly into default from some states is so low (quite possibly zero) that
the resultant estimates of zero transition probability of default may affect the structure
of the Markov chain. This affects the robustness of the MDP model. This problem of
estimating default probabilities in low default portfolios is also recognized in the new
Basel Accord. In Chapter 4, we show how one can use conservative estimators for the
probability of default for those low default credit card accounts.
The behavioural score band transition matrix has an analogy with the corporate credit
rating transition matrix. Since the 90’s, there are a number of studies in corporate risk
research. One main focus is to look at the impact of economy on credit rating transition.
Moreover, central to the new Basel Accord is incorporating the economic environment
into credit risk models. In Chapter 5 we present how one can put the macroeconomics
measurements into our model and thus can look at the economic environment when one
considers adjusting the credit limit of current credit card holders.
In this thesis we use two credit card datasets, one for HK and one for the UK, to
generate the empirical results. Since HK experienced a severe economic downturn during
2002 to 2004, it is interesting to see whether and how the economic environment changes
the credit migration pattern and credit limit policies. On the other hand, the economic
landscape of UK is rather stable over the sampling period. We present some insights
about the use of macroeconomic measurements for our model in Chapter 5.
Splitting the population based on their repayment history is presented in Chapter
11
6. In the credit card industry, borrowers are classified as transactors or revolvers where
a transactor makes full repayment and a revolver carries part of his/her balance to the
next month. Revolvers are more profitable than Transactors since lenders earn both
interest charges and merchant fee from them. Different borrower types not only change the
profit but it is also the fact that Transactors and Revolvers have diverse credit migration
patterns. Therefore, it is more sensible to split the dataset by borrower type.
Our model provides insights into the interactions of customer lifetime value, be-
havioural score and economic environment. This study provides a mechanism to inte-
grate default risk and operational decisions that can be readily applied in the credit
capital management.
1.5 Research Questions
In particular, the research questions for this study are:
1. How can lenders use MDP models to adjust the credit limit of current credit card
holders?
2. How can lenders use behavioural score as the key parameter in a credit limit decision
model?
3. How can lenders incorporate the economy into a credit limit decision model?
4. What is the impact of the economy to the credit card holders’ default risk?
We would like to emphasis that there are several reasons of choosing behavioural score
as the key parameter. Firstly, behavioural score is the most popular risk indicator used by
almost every lenders. Also, it properly captures the repayment behavioural of credit card
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holders over a period of time. Therefore one can use this single parameter to summarize
the behavioural of each card holder as well as build a robust model. Moreover, this model
is able to link the default risk (i.e. the behavioural score) and the credit limit decision in
a model. Furthermore, building a transition matrix with behavioural score band has an
analogy to the corporate credit rating transition. Thus we can compare our result with the
corporate risk rating studies. Nevertheless, lenders would not generate the behavioural
score for new credit card applicants and therefore the use of this model is limited to the
current credit card accounts.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we review the literature on the application of Markov Decision Processes.
MDP models have been studied extensively and the aim of this chapter is not to give
complete coverage of MDP applications but rather to highlight some applications for
illustration. This thesis proposes the use of MDP models in managing credit limits, and
thus in the third section we review the relevant literature. We formulate an MDP model
where the Markov chain is driven by the credit card accounts’ behavioural score migration.
There is limited research in the area, whereas many authors have examined bonds’ credit
rating migration. In the last section we review this literature as a reference.
2.1 The basic components of a Markov Decision Pro-
cess
A decision maker or controller faces a problem of influencing the behaviour of a probabilis-
tic system as it evolves through time (Puterman, 1994). During these time periods, the
decision maker has to make decisions (or actions) to change the behaviour of this proba-
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bilistic system. The point of time when he makes a decision refers as the decision epoch.
The decision maker has to know some information about the (current or past) behaviour
of the system. This behaviour of the system is called the state in MDP’s jargon. For each
state, there are number of possible actions that can be chosen by the decision maker and
the set that consists of all these actions is called the action set. After the decision maker
makes a decision, there is an outcome (or utility) and it is called the reward. The state
of the system at the next decision epoch is determined by the transition probability which
is conditional on the current state and the chosen action. Prior to define a MDP model
mathematically, we introduce some notations as follows:
T is the set of possible planning horizon of the problem (indexed by
t = 1, 2, . . . , T where T = |T |)
S is the set of states for the system (indexed by s = 1, 2, . . . , S where
S = |S|)
As is the decision set for state s
pt(s
′|s, a) is the probability of the system changes next stage to s′ if the
current stage is t, state is s and decision a is chosen. We call this
as the transition probabilities
rt(s, a) is the reward at time t if one applies decision a to state s
Vt(s) is the value function of the system at state s at time t
A general representation of the equation would be as follows:
Vt(s) = max
a∈As
{
rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s
′|s, a)Vt−1(s′)
}
,∀s ∈ S (2.1)
The right-hand-side of (2.1) is the expected value over the next t periods if one selects
action a at the end of the time period t for a system with state s. The reward function to
the decision maker at the end of t is rt(s, a). The reward on the remaining t−1 periods is
Vt−1(s′) if the state at the beginning of the next time period is s′. The chance of moving
from the current state to s′ is pt(s′|s, a) and thus the expected reward of moving from s
to s′ is pt(s′|s, a)Vt−1(s′). The total expected profit at the remaining t− 1 periods is the
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sum of the expected reward from all the possible state s′, i.e.
∑
s′∈S
pt(s
′|s, a)Vt−1(s′). The
left-hand-side of (2.1) is the value function which measures the overcome outcome from
the current time period to the end of the planning period. For more details about the
MDP model, please refer to Puterman (1994).
2.1.1 Stationary or Non-stationary
One way to classify the MDP model is whether it is a stationary or non-stationary model.
That is to say whether the reward function or transition probability depends on time t, i.e.
the reward function and transition probabilities are identical across the whole planning
horizon. If it is a stationary model, the transition probability and the reward function
are re-defined as:
p(s′|s, a) is the probability of the system changes next stage to s′ if the
current state is s and decision a is chosen.
rt(s, a) is the reward if one applies decision a to state s.
In real application, it is more common to use a stationary model. This is mainly
because a non-stationary model requires a substantial amount of data to estimate the
parameters (i.e. the transition probability and the reward function) which is inadmissible
in most real application. Therefore, just like many authors (White, 1985, 1993), we use a
stationary model to formulate the credit limit decision problem.
2.2 General MDP applications
The root of the MDP model can be traced back to the 1940s, when it was developed as a
mathematical model for making stochastic sequential decisions during the Second World
War (Puterman, 1994). The model was not published until the 50s due to the wartime
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security requirements. Since then, MDP models have been developed into the most suc-
cessful sequential decision modelling technique. Until now researchers have continuously
applied MDP models in new areas such as internet auction modeling, wireless network
planning etc. For a more extensive study, we recommend readers refer to Puterman
(1994), White (1985) and White (1993).
A survey conducted by White (1993) has summarized the objectives and results of
around one hundred MDP application papers. These applications cover population har-
vesting, agriculture, water resources, inspection, maintenance and repair, purchasing,
inventory and production, finance and investment, queues, sales promotion, search, mo-
tor insurance claims, overbooking, epidemics, credit, sports, patient admissions, location,
design of experiments and general applications. This shows the diversity of MDP appli-
cations.
White (1993) also generalizes some problems of applying MDP in the real world. The
first is the Markovian assumption, which assumes the transition probability depends only
on the current state. Mathematically, this means
p(st+1|s0, s1, . . . , st−1, st) = p(st+1|st). (2.2)
White (1993) suggests this assumption constitutes one of the greatest barriers of applying
MDP in reality. A second concern is the infinite horizon of the model. Mathematically, one
can prove that there exists an optimal policy for infinite-horizon MDP models. However,
it is quite unrealistic to use the optimal infinite-horizon policy in real applications, since
the Markovian assumption is likely to hold for a limited period of time only. The optimal
solution is, however, just a reference for long term planning.
Two other survey studies conducted by White (1985, 1988) review papers on real MDP
applications. ”‘Real”’ is used because the reviewed papers were actually implemented, or
at least had an effect on the actual decisions taken.
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2.3 Credit limit decision using MDP models
A credit card is a revolving credit product and therefore persistent monitoring of con-
sumption patterns can reduce default rates, increase the profitability, and enhance the
customer-company relationship. It is common for lenders to use mathematical models
to look at a consumer’s consumption pattern and migration behaviour in the credit card
industry. In the literature, however, there are limited studies that can be used by credit
card lenders directly.
The study by Bierman and Hausman (1970) is the first to use MDP models to make
sequential decisions on the credit amount offered. In their paper, they formulate a model
such that the creditor makes a decision on whether to offer y amount of credit to a bor-
rower. They assume that y is measured in terms of a multiple of some standard amount.
For example, y = 0.5 represents offering one-half of the standard amount of credit. Bier-
man and Hausman assume that the amount of credit offered, y, and the probability of
repaying the standard amount, p, have an exponentially declining relationship. Then, the
probability of repayment given y amount is granted at time t is P (repayment|y) = py.
If the event of repayment follows a Beta prior with parameters (r, n) at time t, one
can use (r, n) as the state variables at time t in a MDP model and the corresponding
probability of repayment is therefore py =
(
r
n
)y
given credit amount y is offered. Suppose
ft+1(p|r, n; y) is the revised probability distribution for p when credit amount y has been
extended and collected, assuming the prior distribution on p at period t is ft(p|r, n).
Then as shown by Bierman and Hausman (1970), these two density functions possess the
following relationship
ft+1(p|r, n : y) = ft(p|r + y, n+ y) (2.3)
where ft+1(p|r, n : y) ∼ Beta(r + y, n + y). Thus, the state variables of the MDP model
at t+ 1 can be updated as (r + y, n+ y).
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However, if there is no repayment at time t, then (2.3) does not hold anymore. There-
fore, to simplify the model formulation, they assume that after any non-repayment period
the expected payoff of a borrower is zero and the lender will not offer any credit to this
borrower in the future. The credit concept in credit card industry is somewhat different
however. Lenders normally do not terminate a credit card account after the first non-
repayment. Moreover, Bierman and Hausman (1970) assumes the account either pays
back the full amount at the end of the period or pays nothing at all. This is obviously
not valid in the credit card industry.
There are various modifications on the Bierman-Hausman model (see review by Rosen-
berg and Gleit (1994)). Dirickx and Wakeman (1976) show it is still possible to calculate
the expected future payoff if there is no repayment at a time period. The difference is
that the prior distribution of the probability of repayment does not follow the Beta dis-
tribution. The computation, however, is very time consuming and complicated in the
sense that it is hard to apply in reality. Srinivasan and Kim (1987) investigates the cash
flow timing assumption. The Bierman-Hausman model has a unrealistic assumption in
which a lender is able simultaneously to collect its receivables and extend the credit limit.
This means a lender receives the payment from a borrower at time t and then this lender
can adjust the borrower’s credit limit at time t immediately. However, in reality, it takes
some time (likely it takes one time period) for the lender to update the credit limit.
The modification suggested by Srinivasan and Kim (1987) introduces parameters to bring
cash flow timing into consideration. Nevertheless, all of these models assume a stationary
environment and none explored the external economic environment.
Trench, Pederson, Lau, Ma, Wang, and Nair (2003) present a MDP model tailored
for credit card products. They apply MDP models with the objective of adjusting a con-
sumer’s credit card limit or annual percentage rate (APR) to manage the characteristics
of consumer lifetime value. They assume a stationary environment. Moreover, their state
space does not include the behavioural score, which has become the established way of
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assessing the default risk of a borrower, and is used by almost every lender. This be-
havioural score, as we are going to show in the later chapters, is the key state variable.
Trench et al. (2003) have not incorporated external environment (i.e. economy) into the
model whereas we believe this is essential as promoted by the new Basel Accord.
2.4 The credit transition probability
Not many studies have examined consumer credit risk, whereas numerous studies have
examined the behaviour of bond credit migration. Here in this section, we are going to
review these studies. The rating of a bond is assessed by rating agencies such as Moody’s
or Standard & Poor’s and is published on a periodical basis, depending on the type of
bond. The evolution of a bond rating is important to investors because any possible
events, such as downgrade, upgrade, or default, change the bond pricing.
2.4.1 Using the maximum likelihood estimation method to de-
termine the transition matrix
If one is given the transition history of R customers over T periods of time, then the
question is how one can estimate the transition probability pij of transiting from state i
to state j via these R customers’ transition records. The simplest approach is to assume
the transition probabilities from one state to another are the same for all time periods, i.e.
the chain is stationary. Let ni(r) be the number of times that state i appears in the rth
customer’s transition history during times 0 to T − 1 and let nij(r) be the total number
of times customer r transits from state i to state j during time 1 to T . Bartlett (1951)
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and Hoel (1954) showed that the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of pij is
pˆij =
∑
r∈R
nij(r)∑
r∈R
ni(r)
(2.4)
Indeed, this is the historical average of all transitions. We refer to the transition matrix
obtained by this method as an unconditional transition matrix.
2.4.2 Looking at the heterogeneity of credit migration
In the early study it was common to assume the bond rating migration follows a discrete
stationary Markov process. That is to say the future rating of a bond depends only on
the current rating, and bonds having the same current rating have the same probability of
default, upgrade or downgrade. The estimation though is done by the MLE method. Since
the early 90s, however, authors have started to document the fact that there are evidently
sources of heterogeneity in rating migration. Many researchers find credit migration
depends on the age of a bond. Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff (1989) investigate the aging
effect in the high-yield bond market (bonds that are rated below investment grade at
the time of issue). Their analysis looks at the high-yield bonds’ default percentages with
respect to bond age. They conclude that the probability of default of a bond for the
first several years after issue is lower. Using the average default probability substantially
under-estimated the default probabilities of older bonds. Altman and Kao (1991) find
this rating drift not only appeared in the high-yield bond category but in all rated bonds.
A second source of heterogeneity is rating momentum. Altman and Kao (1992) show
credit rating exhibits significant path dependency such that a bond has a higher mobility
if it recently had a rating change. Cantor and Fons (1993) investigate the same context
and draw a slightly different conclusion. They test two hypotheses (1) Prob(Upgrade
within one year|the bond had been upgraded recently) ≤ Prob(Downgrade within one
year|the bond had been upgraded recently); (2) Prob(Downgrade within one year|the
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bond had been downgraded recently ≤ Prob(Upgrade within one year|the bond had been
downgraded recently). For most of the bond grades, the test rejects the first hypothesis
and thus shows that statistically a downgraded bond is more prone to having a subsequent
downgrade within one year than an upgrade. The drift in downgrade credit rating is more
prominent in default bonds, as shown by Fons (2002). They look at ratings of firms that
do eventually default. The results show many of these firms were in the speculative
grade (Ba2) five years before default, and the rating had decreased every year. In a more
recent study conducted by Hamilton and Cantor (2004), the drift of a credit rating is still
preserved.
Many authors have proposed that change in the economy changes the stability of
credit transitions. Wilson (1997a,b) and Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000) are one
of the first empirically to investigate in this context. They use the business cycle as an
explanatory dummy variable (i.e. recession or expansion) in the ordered probit model to
investigate the impact of the economy. Their results show upgrade, downgrade and de-
fault probabilities are associated with the macroeconomics. Bangia, Diebold, Kronimus,
Schagen, and Schuermann (2002) also find evidence to support the same rating migration
pattern. The latest development in modeling is the use of duration analysis, since duration
models can capture censored observations (i.e. those not yet default, upgrade or down-
grade cases). Kavvathas (2001) and Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) use duration analysis
with time-dependent macroeconomic covariates to forecast the upgrade, downgrade and
default probabilities. In summary these papers support the proposition of ”credit rating
drift with macroeconomics”.
In these studies, the economy is introduced by a dummy explanatory variable to in-
dicate whether the economy was in recession. Not many authors use macroeconomic
measurements as explanatory variables to investigate credit migration. The study con-
ducted by Figlewski, Frydman, and Liang (2006) is one of the first to address the issue.
They apply a duration analysis model to look at the US corporate bond migration, of
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which rating upgrade, rating downgrade and default are the observed events and macroe-
conomics measurements, including interest rates, inflation, GDP growth etc, are the set
of time-varying covariates. This framework provides a mechanism to obtain precise coef-
ficient estimates for pricing.
One may not be surprised that industry effect and country of domicile are also the
source of heterogeneity in credit rating migration. The methodologies used to examine
these effects are similar to those used for examining the impact of business cycle: the
ordered probit model (Nickell et al., 2000), and duration analysis (Chava and Jarrow,
2004; Kavvathas, 2001).
2.4.3 More than one Markov chain
Another way of incorporating the population heterogeneity is via the mover-stayer model.
Originally introduced by Blumen, Kogan, and McCarthy (1955), Frydman, Kallberg,
and Kao (1985) look at the suitability of using the discrete-time mover-stayer model in
modelling the payment behaviour of revolving credit accounts. The idea is the credit
accounts can be classified into two categories, stayer or mover, with respect to their
payment behaviour during the discrete-time planning horizon. The credit migration of
these two types of accounts are different and thus the population’s credit migration is a
mixture of two independent Markov chains. The transition matrix with respect to the
stayer’s Markov chain is assumed to be an identity matrix. Suppose the transition matrix
of those of mover’s is M , then the transition matrix of the stayer-mover model is
P = SI + (I − S)M (2.5)
where S = diag(s1, s2, . . . , sN) represents the proportion of stayers in state i. The question
here is how to estimate S and M from the samples? Or in other words, how one can
distinguish movers from stayers? Suppose we have the monthly credit and repayment
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record of R customers across a planning horizon T . If the rth customer had stayed
in the credit status i across the whole sampling period, this customer can either be a
stayer in state i or a mover who has stayed in state i for time period T . In another
paper Frydman (1984) show that there is a recursive method to compute the maximum
likelihood estimators for M and S. Frydman et al. (1985) compare the stationary and
non-stationary Markov chain models with the mover-stayer model empirically. The results
show that mover-stayer model that provides a much better description of the data than
do Markov chain models.
A continuous-time analog of the discrete-time mover-stayer model is studied by Fryd-
man and Kadam (2004), in which they model bond rating migration as a continuous-time
stochastic process. Again, the bond rating migration embeds two Markov chains. The
first evolves according to some infinitesimal generator Q, and that is the Markov chain
with respect to the movers. The other’s transition probability matrix is an identity ma-
trix I. The transition probability matrix, P (t), of this continuous mover-stayer model on
state space S is then defined as
P (t) = SI + (I − S)exp(tQ), t ≥ 0 (2.6)
The algorithm to estimate the parameters in the above equation is presented in Frydman
(2005). The results indicate the proposed mixture model statistically dominated the
conventional Markov chain model, and it is possible for two individual observations with
the same credit rating to have a substantially different future rating distribution.
This literature suggests credit migration is not a pure Markov process. Some kinds
of heterogeneity, which could be the age of the bond, the business cycle or industry, are
preserved in the population. However, as far as we can ascertain, there are no studies
which investigate consumer credit migration, and so no one has examined heterogeneity
in consumer credit rating migration.
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2.4.4 Bayesian approach
Estimating the probability of default of a loan in the next year has become a necessity
for financial institutions that are intending to operate under the new banking regulatory
framework called the Basel Accord. Another recent research development in estimating
the transition probability, especially for the estimation of the probability of default (PD),
is the usage of Bayesian approaches. The maximum likelihood method builds on the
assumption that the event (which is the default if one is examining the PD) follows
a distribution. However, for data with sparse entries, this assumption is hardly valid.
Statisticians suggest the use of the maximum likelihood method to estimate the sparse
PD entries results in large estimation errors since the maximum likelihood estimator
is suitable for a frequentist estimation framework (i.e. for a dataset that consists of
numerous observations). On the other hand, the Bayesian approach only assumes a prior
distribution for the parameter and this distribution can be changed by learning from the
data. Another advantage for using Bayesian method to estimate the default probability is
that it requires a specification of a prior PD, which provides a mechanism to incorporate
expert knowledge. Kadam and Lenk (2008) model the changes in credit rating with a
discrete space, continuous time, stationary Markov process of which the time spent in a
state is not fixed but it is exponentially distributed. They use the Bayesian approach to
estimate the credit rating transition matrix. Just like many other authors, Kadam and
Lenk (2008) find heterogeneity migration in different industries and countries. Although
Bayesian inference is supported by mathematical theory, it can take a lot of computation
time to find the estimates. Stefanescu, Tunaru, and Turnbull (2007) develop a statistical
model without imposing the Markovian assumption on the transition matrix as they
believe ”there is considerable evidence support (see the references in the next section) that
the Markovian assumption is unrealistic for rating transitions”. Their model proposes the
default probability depends conditionally on a systematic factor (such as a macroeconomic
measurement) and the state of the borrower. The conditional probability follows a certain
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distribution which depends on the distribution of the idiosyncratic term (a rating class
dependent correlation factor). Stefanescu et al. (2007) use the Bayesian framework to
estimate the posterior default probability. By using out-of-sample testing, the proposed
Bayesian framework generated closer default rates than the traditional latent model.
2.4.5 Low default portfolios
The new Basel accord has highlighted the need to study low default portfolios (LDPs).
The Accord requires lenders to estimate PDs that are long run, forward looking expected
default rates for each grade in each borrower rating model, with an appropriate margin
of conservatism (Benjamin, Cathcart, and Ryan, 2006) even if the default rate is low. In
credit card portfolios, accounts having good repayment records and so high behavioural
scores are possible LDPs. There is no rigid definition on these portfolios. It depends on
the lender, the regulator, the type of product or the country of domicile of the lender.
However, a common property is one hardly finds any default cases in LDPs. One may not
be surprised to have zero or a very low number of defaults in a LDP. Calculating the PDs
of LDPs using historical averages inevitably underestimates the potential default risks.
Thus, it is necessarily to further explore the estimation of default probabilities of LDPs.
Pluto and Tasche (2006) advocate estimating the PDs of the LDPs by using the concept
of confidence intervals and making use of the relationship of each grade level.
To begin the discussion, we first introduce some notations. Suppose
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J = number of classes of low default portfolios (indexed by j =
1, 2, . . . , J)
n(j) = total number of observations in the jth class of low default portfolios
n = total number of low default portfolios (i.e.
∑
j n(j))
pD(j) = the default probability of the jth class low default portfolios
D = number of default cases (which is predefined by the lender subjec-
tively)
The credit rating increases in j that is to say the jth class LDP has a better credit
quality than the (j-1)th class LDP. Moreover, the (j-1)th class LDP is more likely to
default than the jth class, i.e.
pD(j) ≤ pD(j − 1),∀j = 2, . . . , J (2.7)
We specify the PD estimators lies at the confidence region at γ level. According to Pluto
and Tasche (2006), there are three methods to estimate this pD(J).
1. No default and default events are independent
We begin by estimating the default probability, pD(J), of the Jth class of LDP (i.e. the
one with the highest credit quality). Pluto and Tasche (2006) propose the ”most prudent
estimation” of the value of pD(J) such that the default probabilities of all classes are
equal, i.e.
pD(1) = pD(2) = . . . = pD(J) (2.8)
Then the probability of observing not a single default in the Jth class of LDP is (1 −
pD(J))
n. Since we assume the estimator of pD(J) lies in the confidence region at level γ,
then mathematically
1− γ ≤ (1− pD(J))n (2.9)
The set of pD(J) satisfied the inequality (2.9) gives a chance for no default observation
no less than 1− γ. Since our objective is to find the most prudent estimator, we pick the
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value within this interval such that it gives the lowest probability of having no default
observation, i.e.
1− γ = (1− pD(J))n (2.10)
We can thus solve (2.10) to obtain pD(J). Then we proceed to estimate the default
probability of the second highest class, i.e. pD(J − 1). Again, Pluto and Tasche assume
that the default probability, pD(J − 1), preserves the following property:
pD(1) = pD(2) = . . . = pD(J − 1) (2.11)
Then, using the same concept, the estimator of pD(J − 1) is obtained by solving the
following equation:
1− γ = (1− pD(J − 1))(n−n(J)) (2.12)
In general, the following equation is used to estimate the probability of default for the
1st, 2nd, . . . (J-1)th class of the LDP portfolios,
1− γ = (1− pD(j))
(n−
J∑
k=j+1
n(k))
,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1 (2.13)
2. Few defaults and default events are independent
The second method is to assume that there are few defaults and these defaults are in-
dependent. There are only two possible outcomes for this default event: default or not
default. One therefore can assume that each event follows a Bernoulli distribution. If one
assumes (2.8) holds, then the probability of having no more than D defaults is
D∑
k=0
n
k
 pD(J)k(1− pD(J))n−k
Similar to (2.10), the estimator of pD(j) can be found by the following:
1− γ =
D∑
k=0
n
k
 pD(J)k(1− pD(J))n−k (2.14)
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For the rest of the LDP, one can use the following general form to estimate the default
probability
1−γ =
D∑
k=0
n−
(
J∑
m=j+1
n(m)
)
k
 pD(j)k(1−pD(j))n−
(
J∑
m=j+1
n(m)
)
−k
,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , J−1
(2.15)
3. Few defaults and correlated default events
The third model proposed by Pluto and Tasche is to address the possible time-dependent
correlation factor within the spirit of the best-known Merton’s Value-at-Risk (VaR) model.
To look at the most prudent estimation of the default probabilities of LDP for any given
confidence level γ, one has to look at
1− γ ≤ P [No more than D defaults observed] (2.16)
The assumption of this model is that there are several default events and there is a
systematic correlation factor St driving these events in period t. Therefore, the right-
hand-side of (2.16) is equivalent to look at
D∑
l=0
E[P [Exactly l borrowers default|St, . . . , ST ]] (2.17)
VaR model looks at the asset value of each portfolio to estimate whether the asset is
defaulted. Assume the asset value of the jth portfolio is Vj,t and it follows a standard
normal distribution. Then the VaR model says this asset is defaulted if Vj,t ≤ c, where c
is a real number. Since Vj,t is normally distributed, then so as c (Freund, 1992). One can
determine the threshold c by
c = Φ−1(p) (2.18)
where p is the PD of the value of the jth portfolio falls below c. Note that this p is the
parameter we are interested in.
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If besides the systematic factor St, there is an idiosyncratic component, ξj,t, for a low
default portfolio j at time t, then the asset value of the jth portfolio is:
Vj,t =
√
ζSt +
√
1− ζξj,t (2.19)
where St and ξj,t follow the standard normal distribution and ζ is the correlation between
different portfolios (Merton, 1974). The systematic correlation is time dependent and it
is identical for all portfolios at time t. One can assume that this St is the macroeco-
nomic variable at time t. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic factor is different for each
portfolios j (for example: the risk factor for the jth portfolio).
By using (2.18), one can expand the default probability of an individual LDP as
P [the jth portfolio defaults|St, . . . , ST ]
= P [ min
t=1,...,T
Vj,t ≤ Φ−1(p)|St, . . . , ST ]
= 1− P [Vj,1 ≥ Φ−1(p), . . . , Vj,T ≥ Φ−1(p)|St, . . . , ST ]
= 1− P [ξj,1 ≥ G(p, ζ, S1), . . . , ξj,T ≥ G(p, ζ, ST )|St, . . . , ST ]
= 1−
T∏
t=1
(1−G(p, ζ, St)) (2.20)
where the function G is defined by
G(p, ζ, St) ≡ Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√ζSt√
1− ζ
)
. (2.21)
If ζ = 0, then G(p, 0, St) = Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√0St√
1−0
)
= Φ (Φ−1(p)) = p. If ζ = 1, then G(p, 1, St) =
Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√1St√
1−1
)
= Φ (∞) = 1. So the function G(p, ζ, St) lies in the interval [p, 1]. That
is to say the function G gives the probability such that the jth portfolio is not defaulted.
If we define pi(S1, . . . , ST ) ≡ 1−
T∏
t=1
(1−G(p, ζ, St)), then (2.17) equals to
D∑
l=0
E[Exactly l borrowers default|St, . . . , ST ]]
=
D∑
l=0
n
l
E[pi(S1, . . . , ST )l(1− pi(S1, . . . , ST ))n−l] (2.22)
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To find an estimator for the default probability, one can thus solve the equation
1− γ =
D∑
l=0
n
l
E[pi(S1, . . . , ST )l(1− pi(S1, . . . , ST ))n−l] (2.23)
The approach is to simulate all the possible values with respect to (S1, . . . , ST ) and
then estimate the value of the above equation.
Pluto and Tasche (2006)’s paper has been referenced as a prominent study in the
Basel context. There are some extensions of the work over the last few years. The UK
regulator (Benjamin et al., 2006) has extended the discussion by looking at the challenges
of applying Pluto and Tasche (2006)’s work, including the cutover from LDP to non-
LDPs, and the choice of confidence level. However, the paper still has not examined
the impact of the economy, whereas the new Basel accords have stated clearly that data
history should cover an economic downturn.
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2.5 Conclusion summary
In summary, we find there is research opportunity in the following areas:
1. There is limited research in investigating the migration pattern of consumer credit
risk. It remains an open question whether the migration pattern preserves the
Markovian assumption or consists of some sources of heterogeneity.
2. There is lack of literature investigating the impact of macroeconomic factors on
consumer credit risk and consumption behaviour.
3. Although there are few sequential decision models for credit card products have
been developed, there is still room for improvement with respect to the Markovity
of the model, the way they deal with low default portfolios, and the incorporation
of external factors.
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Chapter 3
The Basic MDP model
In this chapter we construct a basic MDP model for making sequential credit limit de-
cisions. The focus of this chapter is to look at the basic techniques, including coarse-
classifying and order selection, in applying the model to real-life credit card data. We
tested the model performance and these techniques with a real-life credit card data set.
3.1 The model
Consider a discrete state, discrete time discounted Markov Decision Process with decision
epochs T (indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) based on a state space S. We use behavioural score
as our key state variable in this study. Every month lenders calculate this behavioural
score for every borrower. This score shows how likely the borrower is to default in the
near future, usually a period of twelve months. Lenders use many variables, including
application-form characteristics, credit bureau data, and repayment and usage behaviour
of the borrower, to generate this score. These data are obtained from a sample of histories
of customers as follows. Lenders choose a particular point of time as the observation point.
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A period preceding this point, usually is around twelve to eighteen months, is chosen as
the performance period, and the corresponding characteristics (the repayment history
and credit bureau data) are collected. A period of time after the observation point,
usually twelve months, is chosen as the outcome period. The score is calculated based
on a borrower’s status at the end of the outcome period. Lenders usually apply logistic
regression to predict the status of the borrower at the end of the outcome period (default /
not default) using characteristics collected during the performance period. The weighted
sum of these characteristics is taken as the behavioural score score, and the probability
that the borrowers will default (PD) in the outcome period is related to the score by
log
(
1− PD
PD
)
= score
under the logistic regression model. The higher the score, the lower the default probability.
The second state variable in this study is credit limit as it is obvious that borrowers
with different credit limits have heterogeneous behaviour. We split the behavioural score
and credit limit into discrete bands (the reason will be explained in the following sections).
Therefore, each state in the state space consists of two parts-which behavioural score band
the borrower is in, and what is the borrower’s current credit limit band.
The state space thus consists of the current credit limit band represent by L (indexed
by l = 0, 1, . . . , L) and the current behavioural score band I (indexed by i = 0, 1, . . . , I).
In our model the actions are limited to keeping the credit limit as is this period or raising it
to a higher limit band. This policy of not decreasing credit limits is used by many lenders
but the methodology we will describe will not change if this restriction is dropped. Thus
with this limitation the action set is defined as Al = {l′ : l ≤ l′}.
Two further elements need to be defined to complete the Markov decision process
model. Let p(i′|l, i) be the probability that if l is the current customer’s credit limit band
and the customer is in behavioural score band i, then the next period the customer will
be in behavioural score band i′. Secondly let r(l, i) be the profit obtained in the current
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period from a customer with credit limit l and in behavioural score band i.
The objective is to maximise the discounted profit obtained from the customer over
the next t periods where the discount factor λ describes the time value of money. This
leads to the following optimality equation for Vt(l, i), the maximum expected profit over
the next t periods that can be obtained from an account which is currently in behaviour
score band i, and with a credit limit of l:
Vt(l, i) = max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)]} (3.1)
The right-hand-side of (3.1) corresponds to the profit over the next t periods if we change
the credit limit to l′ from l at the end of the current period for an account with behavioural
score state i. We assume it takes one time period for the borrower to become aware of a
change in the credit limit as this is usually included in the monthly balance statement sent
to the customer. Removing this delay makes no difference to the methodology though
of course the optimality equation will be slightly different. The profit to the lender from
the credit card at the end of the current period is r(l, i). The p(i′|l, i) is the probability
that the behavioural score changes next month to band i′. In that case, the profit on
the remaining t − 1 periods is Vt−1(l′, i′). The discount factor λ is introduced because
the subsequent profits in the remaining t − 1 periods actually occur one period after
those used in calculating Vt−1(l′, i′), since that assumes the t− 1 periods start now. The
optimality principle says that the optimal decision l′, is the one that maximizes this sum
of the future profit, where credit limits can only remain the same or be increased. Note
that V0(l, i),∀l, i is the boundary condition, that is the customer’s profit value at the end
of the planning horizon. In the later section, we solve equation (3.1) by looking at the
optimal solution for an infinite horizon MDP, i.e.
V (l, i) = max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)V (l′, i′)]} (3.2)
Therefore, we do not need to specify the boundary condition in this study.
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3.1.1 Properties
There are some properties which one might expect from (3.1), but these properties only
hold with the following assumptions:
A.1.
I∑
i′=k
p(i′|l, i+ 1) ≥
I∑
i′=k
p(i′|l, i), ∀l, i, k = 1, . . . , I
A.2.
I∑
i′=k
p(i′|l + 1, i) ≥
I∑
i′=k
p(i′|l, i), ∀l, i, k = 1, . . . , I
A.3. r(l, i+ 1)− r(l, i) ≥ 0, ∀l, i
A.4. r(l + 1, i)− r(l, i) ≥ 0, ∀l, i
A.1 says the higher the current behavioural score, the greater the chance of moving to
high behavioural scores. A.2 is a stochastic ordering property that says the higher the
credit limit the more likely the borrower is moving to high (good) behavioural scores. A.3
assumes the profit increases as the behavioural score increases. With the same behavioural
score, A.4 assumes that the reward in a state with credit limit l + 1 is higher than that
from a state with credit limit l.
One may not be surprised with assumption A.4. This is because a borrower with a
high credit limit are more likely to have a high income and essentially they spend more
than those with low credit limit. As the lender’s reward is roughly proportional to a
borrower’s monthly spending, the reward increases with the credit limit.
Nevertheless, it might not be reasonable for assumption A.3 to hold in reality. A
borrower with high behavioural score rarely has carrying balance. This is because their
financial status are good and thus it is very likely that they can repay their monthly
balance on time. Having no carrying balance means this borrower does not generate
profit for the lender via interest fee. Thus the lender earns merchandiser fees from this
borrower only. On the other hand, a borrower with low behavioural score is more likely
to keep an amount of carrying balance and has a high tendency to use his/her credit
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card. Therefore they generate both interest fees and merchandiser fees for the lenders
and essentially the profit should be higher.
As a theoretical overview, we first assume the above four assumptions hold to prove
the following Lemmas:
Lemma 3.1. If A.1 and A.3 hold, then Vt(l, i) is nondecreasing in i, ∀l, t.
Lemma 3.2. If A.2 and A.4 hold, then Vt(l, i) is nondecreasing in l, ∀i, t.
Proof. The proof of all lemmas are by induction on t. Assume the equations hold trivially
for t = 0. For Lemma 3.1, V1(l, i) = r(l, i) ≥ r(l, i− 1) = V1(l, i− 1),∀i. Thus the lemma
holds for t = 1. Assume Lemma 3.1 holds for t, by using
max{a1, a2} −max{b1, b2} ≥ min{a1 − b1, a2 − b2} (3.3)
Vt(l, i+ 1)− Vt(l, i) = max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i+ 1) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i+ 1)Vt−1(l′, i′)} −
max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
≥ min
l′∈Al
{r(l, i+ 1)− r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i+ 1)Vt−1(l′, i′)−
λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
≥ min
l′∈Al
λ{
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i+ 1)Vt−1(l′, i′)−
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
= min
l′∈Al
λ{
∑
i′
[p(i′|l, i+ 1)− p(i′|l, i)]Vt−1(l′, i′)}
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= min
l′∈Al
λ{p(I|l, i+ 1)− p(I|l, i)](Vt−1(l′, I)− Vt−1(l′, I − 1))
+
I∑
k=I−1
(p(k|l, i+ 1)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, I − 1)− Vt−1(l′, I − 2))
+
I∑
k=I−2
(p(k|l, i+ 1)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, I − 2)− Vt−1(l′, I − 3))
+ . . .
+
I∑
k=2
(p(k|l, i+ 1)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, 2)− Vt−1(l′, 1))
+
I∑
k=1
(p(k|l, i+ 1)− p(k|l, i))Vt−1(l′, 1)}
≥ 0
given (3.3), A.1, A.3,
I∑
k=1
(p(k|1, i+ 1)− p(k|l, i)) = 0 and the induction hypothesis.
Then we can prove Lemma 3.2. For t = 1, V1(l, i) = r(l, i) ≥ r(l − 1, i) = V1(l − 1, i),
thus the lemma holds for t = 1. Assume Lemma 3.2 holds for t,
we have,
Vt(l + 1, i)− Vt(l, i) = max
l′∈Al
{r(l + 1, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l + 1, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)} −
max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
≥ min
l′∈Al
{r(l + 1, i)− r(l, i) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l + 1, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)−
λ
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
≥ min
l′∈Al
λ{
∑
i′
p(i′|l + 1, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)−
∑
i′
p(i′|l, i)Vt−1(l′, i′)}
= min
l′∈Al
λ{
∑
i′
[p(i′|l + 1, i)− p(i′|l, i)]Vt−1(l′, i′)}
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= min
l′∈Al
λ{p(I|l + 1, i)− p(I|l, i)](Vt−1(l′, I)− Vt−1(l′, I − 1))
+
I∑
k=I−1
(p(k|l + 1, i)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, I − 1)− Vt−1(l′, I − 2))
+
I∑
k=I−2
(p(k|l + 1, i)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, I − 2)− Vt−1(l′, I − 3))
+ . . .
+
I∑
k=2
(p(k|l + 1, i)− p(k|l, i))(Vt−1(l′, 2)− Vt−1(l′, 1))
+
I∑
k=1
(p(k|l + 1, i)− p(k|l, i))Vt−1(l′, 1)}
≥ 0
given (3.3), A.2, A.4, the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.1.
These two lemmas say accounts with the highest credit limit and behavioural score
are the most profitability accounts. Nevertheless, we will show that there is no guarantee
that assumptions A.3 and A.4 hold in practice.
3.2 The UK credit card data
The first credit card dataset used in this study was provided by a UK major financial
institute. The dataset consists of 11 attributes, including our two state variables: credit
limit and behavioral score, and covers the period 2001 to 2004 inclusive.
3.2.1 Preprocessing, special accounts and sampling
Accounts opened after January 2001 or with missing values on the account opening date
were excluded since we wanted to analyze the behaviour of the cohort of credit card owners
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who were active in January 2001. We were also interested in the delinquent accounts as
one aim is to find the likelihood of credit card account jumping from a good status to a
delinquency status, which includes 180 days in arrears, charge-off and bankruptcy. We
also recognized cards could move to the Inactive or Closed states. Accounts classified
as Inactive (which is defined as credit card which have not been used in the previous
twelve months before the sample point) but having entries in the account balance were
deleted. We excluded other special accounts (such as Fraud, Stolen, Blocked etc) from
our study. The MDP model consists of three special account types: Bad (for 180 days in
arrears, charge-off or bankruptcy), Inactive and Closed. There were 50,797 cases in total
for analysis.
3.2.2 Deriving the account profit
One critical component in (3.1) is the profit function r(l, i). Every lender has his own
tailor-made formula to calculate the profit. Nevertheless, when filing the historical records,
some lenders drop this field to save storage space. This is the case for our data provider.
This lender provided the historical data but the profit value was not included in the list
of characteristics. We thus developed the following method to estimate the account’s
monthly profit.
Let f = the merchandiser rate (in %)
r = the monthly percentage rate (MPR) (in %)
Bt = credit account balance at the beginning of t
Nt = new purchase during t
Pt = repayment by the end of t
Balance at the beginning of t is the summation of balance at the beginning of t− 1 plus
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the new purchase during t− 1 minus the repayment by the end of t− 1,
Bt = Bt−1 +Nt−1 − Pt−1.
In general,
profit in period t− 1 = Nt−1f + (Bt−1 − Pt−1)r
= Nt−1f + (Bt−1 −Bt−1 +Bt −Nt−1)r
= Nt−1(f − r) +Btr
If we assume r = f , we have
profit in period t− 1 = Btr (3.4)
In reality, one can find credit cards with annual percentage rate (APR) from 6% to
48% while it is more common to find a credit card with APR 18% to 30%. So r is
roughly 1.5% to 2.5%. The merchandise fee f , also varies by merchandiser. For example,
the merchandisers fee of travel agencies is around 5%. However, the charges for other
retailers are roughly only 2% to 3%. Although f is usually higher than r in reality, as
they are in a close magnitude, we think the assumption r = f is acceptable.
So with this assumption the profit is a fixed fraction of the balance at the end of the
period. The field monthly balance is luckily available in the credit card dataset and thus
throughout the study we used the above estimation as the profit value.
3.3 Coarse-classifying
If we simply include all the state variables, behavioural scores and credit limits, into (3.1),
the size of the state space will be substantial. Therefore we divided these two variables
into a number of separate groups or bands in order to ensure our model’s robustness.
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This procedure is called coarse-classifying. A suitable classification is able to maximize
difference from one group to next and minimize the difference within a group. As we are
modelling the credit card accounts’ transition as a Markov chain, we can use the Chi-
square test to examine whether the split is good enough. With a good split one can get a
good approximation to the Markovian assumption. To check whether the Markov chain
satisfies this assumption, for every state, we are interested in whether the hypothesis that
the probability of moving from (lt, it) to it+1 is independent of the state at t − 1, i.e.
(lt−1, it−1). Define nt(lt−1, it−1; lt, it; it+1) to be the number of times that a credit account
was in state (lt−1, it−1) at time t − 1 followed by moving to (lt, it) at time t and it+1 at
time t+1. Similarly define nt(lt, it; it+1) to be the number of times that a customer was in
state (lt, it) at time t and then moved to behaviour score it+1 at time t+ 1. If we assume
the chain is stationary, the estimator for p(it+1|lt−1, it−1, lt, it) is:
pˆ(it+1|lt−1, it−1, lt, it) =
T−2∑
t=0
nt(lt−1, it−1; lt, it; it+1)
T−2∑
t=0
nt(lt−1, it−1; lt, it)
(3.5)
The Markovity of the chain corresponds to the hypothesis that p(it+1|1, 1, lt, it) =
p(it+1|2, 1, lt, it) = . . . = p(it+1|L, 1, lt, it) = p(it+1|1, 2, lt, it) = . . . = p(it+1|L, I, lt, it)
, for lt, it, it+1. To check on the Markovity of state (lt, it), we use the chi-square test
(Anderson and Goodman, 1957). Let
χ2(lt,it) =
∑
(lt−1,it−1)
∑
it+1
n∗(lt−1, it−1; lt, it)[pˆ(it+1|lt−1, it−1, lt, it)− pˆ(it+1|lt, it)]2
pˆ(it+1|lt, it) (3.6)
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where
pˆ(it+1|lt, it) =
T−1∑
t=1
nt(lt, it; it+1)
T−1∑
t=1
nt(lt, it)
(3.7)
and
n∗(lt−1, it−1; lt, it) =
T−1∑
t=1
nt(lt−1, it−1; lt, it) (3.8)
Anderson and Goodman (1957) showed that if the chain is Markov (3.6) has a chi-square
distribution with (I − 1)(L− 1)2 degree of freedom, where L is the number of credit limit
band and I is the number of behavioural score band.
A traditional approach is to start with a fine classification i.e. with more bands then
one really wants and then check if one can combine adjacent bands. Alternatively, one
can split the best split into two classes and then splitting one of these into two more until
it is not worth splitting further.
In this study, we coarse-classified the behavioural score and credit limit simultaneously.
That is we arbitrarily classified behavioural score into five categories. Then we coarse-
classified the credit limit. After we found some improvement on the chi-square value
(i.e. a split that generates a small chi-square value), we then stopped coarse-classify the
credit limit. We then used the latest credit limit split and then classified the credit limit
accordingly. Then, we start to coarse-classified the behavioural score. After obtaining
a good behavioural score split, we then stopped coarse-classifying the behavioural score
and then looked at the split of the credit limit again. This process repeated many times.
Here we only reported a summary of the coarse-classify process for illustration.
Initially, our attempt was to classify the credit limit into five bins: £0/missing, £1
to £2000, £2001 to £4000, £4001 to £6000 and £6001+. The chi-square value of this
segmentation was extremely large. We believe this is due to the grouping across consumers
who have a significant difference in the financial and consumption behaviour. We thus
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decided to further break down the credit limit to ten groups: £0/missing, £1 to £500,
£501 to 1000, £1001 to £1500, £1501 to £2500, £2501 to £3500, £3501 to £4500, £4501
to £5500, £5501 to £7500, £7501+. Upon generating the optimal policy by using this
credit limit, we found an unusual pattern on the last two credit limit groups. Studying
the transition probability and the profit value, shows that the behaviour of the last two
groups are very close to each other, with the optimal values almost the same. Thus we
decided to merge the last two credit limit groups to end up with the credit limit states
defined in Table 3.1.
Index Credit limit (in £) Account Description
0 Closed Closed
1 1-500 Limit 1
2 501-1000 Limit 2
3 1001-1500 Limit 3
4 1501-2500 Limit 4
5 2501-3500 Limit 5
6 3501-4500 Limit 6
7 4501-5500 Limit 7
8 5501 or above Limit 8
Table 3.1: List of credit limit status
The monthly generated behavioural score from the lender’s internal system ranged
from 200 to 780. Accounts with score lower than 365 were labeled as in risk. Apart from
this, there is no standard rule on classifying behavioural score into discrete bins. We
thus first counted the frequency of behavioural scores across four years, divided scores
into ten categories, and then allocated every behavioural score record to one behavioural
score category (so there are 50, 797 ∗ 48 counts in the frequency table in total). As in
finding bins for the credit limit, we monitored the improvement on the chi-square test.
The performance with ten behavioural scores was poor even if we aggregated some of
the behaviour categories. So we began with just 2 states - one that the account has
a behavioural score and the other that it has no behavioural entry. Then we split the
behavioural score into categories, in order to improve the model fit of the Markov chains.
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We found this was best when the behavioural score was split into four bands. There were
three non-behavioural score states - closed, inactive and bad. The behavioural score status
are presented in Table 3.2.
Index Behavioural score Account Description
0 - Closed
1 - Inactive
2 - Bad (bankruptcy or charge-off)
3 200-570 Risk Account
4 571-721 Score 1
5 722-742 Score 2
6 743-758 Score 3
7 759+ Score 4
Table 3.2: List of behavioural score status
We found using the second approach is more suitable for the behavioural score binning.
3.4 Choice of Order
A MDP is mth-order if the transition probabilities depend on which state the system is
currently in and was in for the previous m−1 periods. For a first order Markov chain the
transition probability depends only on the current state where for a mth-order Markov
chain the transition at time t depends on the states (it, it−1, . . . , it+1−m) that it occupied
for the last m time periods. So, the number of states increases exponentially in m as
there are |S|m states in a mth-order MDP. To test whether a chain satisfies the mth-order
Markovity assumption, one can use the chi-square test which is also used to check the
homogeneity of a contingency table (Anderson and Goodman, 1957) (as showed in the last
section). Test results showed that the transition probabilities in our dataset failed the chi
square test (chi-square value = 2357504, degree of freedom = 448, critical value1 = 498)
1at significant level α = 0.05
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which indicate the Markov chain is not first order. In reality, almost all applications fail
to satisfy the first-order Markovity assumption. Since there is a large amount of data it
is highly likely that the hypothesis that the system is a first order chain will be rejected.
This is because with so much data, one usually can improve the fit beyond what are
the narrow significance limits. What is more important is whether there is a significant
improvement in the fit, when one uses second or third order Markov chains. So, we tested
whether the process is second-order Markov i.e. we redefined the state so that it carried
the history of t − 2 and t − 1. Although there was an improvement on the chi-square
value (chi-square value = 490571, degree of freedom = 28672, critical value2 = 29067),
the hypothesis that the chain was a second-order MDP was also not justified. Using an
even higher order Markov chain increases the size of the state space exponentially and
so will affect the robustness of the model. So it is a trade off between improvements of
fit and increase in size of model. Like many other authors we found the improvement
when going to second order or higher order chains is not sufficient to warrant the loss
in robustness and simplicity. Therefore, we chose to use first-order to simplify the state
space as well as reducing the computational time, and the inaccuracy in doing this is not
much greater than using a second order chain.
3.5 Transition matrix, profit function and results
Table 3.3 shows the transition matrix of the credit card data set. The first and second
columns are the index for credit limit l, and behavioural score i at time t respectively,
and moving to behavioural score i′ corresponding to columns three to ten in the table.
Note that Bad and Closed are absorbing states and thus we do not show their transition
probability. The last column is the number of transitions corresponding to different initial
states (l, i). Table 3.4 shows the average account balance. Note that the account balance
2at significant level α = 0.05
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Credit limit Score Score at (t+1) (i’)
Row Count
at t (l) at t (i) Closed Inactive Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score4
Limit 1
Inactive 2.04 97.4 0.01 - 0.37 0.18 0.03 0.01 108864
Risk 5.72 - 23.58 27.86 42.86 - - - 140
Score 1 1.4 0.42 0.24 0.17 88.99 8.07 0.72 0.03 57788
Score 2 1.1 1.43 0.01 - 16.68 72.29 7.95 0.57 28246
Score 3 0.87 1.59 - - 4.74 28.06 58.74 6.03 9896
Score 4 1.02 0.16 - - 1.18 10.03 38.65 48.99 1876
Limit 2
Inactive 2.72 96.57 - - 0.56 0.15 0.01 0.01 220073
Risk 2.48 - 24.76 39.61 33.17 - - - 202
Score 1 1.09 0.92 0.28 0.23 85.22 9.91 2.31 0.06 53409
Score 2 0.81 3.09 0.01 - 11.44 73.46 10.23 0.99 45745
Score 3 0.69 2.65 - - 3.13 21.13 62.2 10.23 26438
Score 4 0.61 0.37 - - 0.94 4.18 30.6 63.33 10123
Limit 3
Inactive 2.34 96.27 - - 1.1 0.29 0.02 0.01 164251
Risk 4.49 - 27.76 37.15 30.62 - - - 245
Score 1 1.11 0.62 0.23 0.24 80.58 13.19 3.97 0.09 63390
Score 2 0.81 3.31 0.01 0.01 10.51 69.85 14.06 1.48 74790
Score 3 0.68 2.1 - - 2.96 20.49 61.68 12.12 59337
Score 4 0.67 0.23 - - 0.94 3.9 27.95 66.34 29234
Limit 4
Inactive 2.2 96.35 - - 1.03 0.42 0.02 0.01 184735
Risk 3.46 - 18.44 53.69 24.43 - - - 434
Score 1 1.12 0.46 0.18 0.21 80.18 13.89 3.87 0.13 97345
Score 2 0.88 2.68 0.01 - 10.63 67.75 16.25 1.83 114607
Score 3 0.84 1.52 - - 2.71 18 61.76 15.19 110722
Score 4 0.66 0.2 - - 0.8 2.58 23.28 72.51 79909
Limit 5
Inactive 1.71 96.33 - - 1.18 0.75 0.03 0.02 82648
Risk 2.99 0.38 28.36 44.78 23.51 - - - 268
Score 1 1.29 0.18 0.18 0.16 79.86 14.44 3.73 0.2 92950
Score 2 1.16 1.7 0.01 - 12.08 63.84 18.36 2.88 95216
Score 3 1.06 1.34 0.01 - 2.9 15.91 62.45 16.36 107810
Score 4 0.91 0.2 - - 0.79 2.05 16.34 79.74 112369
Limit 6
Inactive 1.88 96.18 - - 1.4 0.53 0.04 0.01 69422
Risk 4.55 - 29.1 35.91 30.46 - - - 220
Score 1 1.12 0.21 0.16 0.16 80.05 14.41 3.73 0.2 92302
Score 2 1.04 1.67 0.01 - 12.22 64.91 17.79 2.4 95278
Score 3 1.05 0.97 0.01 - 3.15 16.45 62.91 15.5 100804
Score 4 1 0.13 0.01 - 0.8 1.99 14.62 81.49 108687
Limit 7
Inactive 2.07 96.65 - - 0.79 0.47 0.04 0.01 97828
Risk 1.48 - 27.46 34.32 36.77 - - - 204
Score 1 1.07 0.34 0.15 0.15 79.46 15.16 3.41 0.3 91860
Score 2 1.08 1.42 0.01 - 12.1 64.43 17.65 3.34 98416
Score 3 1.17 0.9 0.01 - 3.03 15.28 61.6 18.05 105622
Score 4 1.17 0.13 0.01 - 0.67 1.67 10.09 86.29 179493
Limit 8
Inactive 1.47 96.57 0.01 - 0.43 1.38 0.13 0.05 38094
Risk 4.47 - 33.04 37.5 25 - - - 112
Score 1 1.28 0.03 0.19 0.08 76.18 18.6 3.17 0.51 102040
Score 2 1.37 0.22 0.01 - 11.15 64.08 18.7 4.5 138835
Score 3 1.32 0.74 0.01 - 2.51 12.23 61.17 22.06 172165
Score 4 1.28 0.08 0.01 - 0.5 1.28 7.07 89.82 489326
”‘-”’ represents there is no sample observation.
”‘0”’ represents the transition probability is less than 0.0005.
The transition probabilities of all absorbing states (Closed and Bad) are not shown in the table.
Table 3.3: Transition probability (in percentage)
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of Closed and Inactive accounts equals zero.
Credit limit Score at t (i)
at t (l) Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1 563 433 316 89 65 52
Limit 2 761 703 490 119 73 54
Limit 3 983 876 570 145 89 73
Limit 4 1658 1451 822 246 139 124
Limit 5 2234 2134 1229 522 235 194
Limit 6 3047 2891 1497 692 351 282
Limit 7 3605 3048 1745 830 467 361
Limit 8 5722 5480 3181 2187 1106 731
Table 3.4: Account average balance
We validated whether the transition probabilities of this credit card data set satisfied
the assumptions given in Section 3.1.1. We do not expect the assumptions hold in the
special accounts and thus we excluded the special accounts (i.e. Closed, Bad and Inactive)
for this validation. We recalculated the transition matrix and the results are presented in
column three to seven in Table 3.5. The cumulative row sums are presented in columns
eight to twelve in Table 3.5 to check the stochastic ordering properties of Assumptions
A.2 and A.1. For example, there are 8.99% accounts with Score 1 and Limit 1 moving to
a state with behavioural Score 2 or above in the next month.
Not all transition probabilities satisfy the assumption on A.2. For example, there
were 51.73% borrowers with Limit 7 and behavioural score band Risk moving to a state
with behavioural score 1 or above whereas there were 40% borrowers where Limit 8 and
behavioural score band Risk have the same movement. That implies Lemma 3.2 does not
hold in reality and so the optimal profit does not necessarily increase with credit limit.
All transition probabilities satisfy the assumption on A.1. To check whether Lemma
3.1 holds, however, we still need to validate assumption A.3. We calculate the profit
with r = 2 (i.e. we assume interest rate of 2% per month, which is around the norm
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Credit limit Score Row Percentage Cumulative row sum
at t - (l) at t (i) Score at t+ 1 Score at t+ 1
Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4 Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1
Risk 39.4 60.61 0 0 0 100 60.61 0 0 0
Score 1 0.17 90.85 8.24 0.73 0.03 100 99.84 8.99 0.76 0.03
Score 2 0 17.11 74.16 8.16 0.59 100 100 82.9 8.74 0.59
Score 3 0 4.86 28.76 60.21 6.18 100 100 95.15 66.39 6.18
Score 4 0 1.19 10.15 39.11 49.57 100 100 98.82 88.68 49.57
Limit 2
Risk 54.43 45.58 0 0 0 100 45.58 0 0 0
Score 1 0.24 87.21 10.14 2.37 0.06 100 99.77 12.56 2.43 0.06
Score 2 0 11.9 76.44 10.65 1.03 100 100 88.11 11.67 1.03
Score 3 0 3.24 21.86 64.34 10.58 100 100 96.77 74.92 10.58
Score 4 0 0.95 4.22 30.9 63.95 100 100 99.06 94.84 63.95
Limit 3
Risk 54.82 45.19 0 0 0 100 45.19 0 0 0
Score 1 0.25 82.18 13.45 4.05 0.09 100 99.76 17.58 4.13 0.09
Score 2 0.01 10.96 72.85 14.66 1.55 100 100 89.04 16.2 1.55
Score 3 0 3.05 21.07 63.44 12.47 100 100 96.96 75.9 12.47
Score 4 0 0.95 3.93 28.2 66.94 100 100 99.06 95.13 66.94
Limit 4
Risk 68.74 31.27 0 0 0 100 31.27 0 0 0
Score 1 0.22 81.6 14.13 3.94 0.13 100 99.79 18.19 4.07 0.13
Score 2 0 11.02 70.24 16.85 1.9 100 100 88.99 18.75 1.9
Score 3 0 2.78 18.43 63.25 15.56 100 100 97.23 78.8 15.56
Score 4 0 0.8 2.61 23.48 73.13 100 100 99.21 96.61 73.13
Limit 5
Risk 65.58 34.43 0 0 0 100 34.43 0 0 0
Score 1 0.17 81.18 14.68 3.8 0.2 100 99.84 18.67 3.99 0.2
Score 2 0 12.43 65.71 18.9 2.97 100 100 87.58 21.87 2.97
Score 3 0 2.97 16.3 63.98 16.77 100 100 97.04 80.74 16.77
Score 4 0 0.8 2.07 16.53 80.62 100 100 99.21 97.14 80.62
Limit 6
Risk 54.11 45.9 0 0 0 100 45.9 0 0 0
Score 1 0.16 81.26 14.62 3.78 0.2 100 99.85 18.6 3.98 0.2
Score 2 0 12.56 66.71 18.28 2.47 100 100 87.45 20.74 2.47
Score 3 0 3.21 16.79 64.2 15.82 100 100 96.8 80.01 15.82
Score 4 0 0.81 2.01 14.79 82.41 100 100 99.2 97.2 82.41
Limit 7
Risk 48.28 51.73 0 0 0 100 51.73 0 0 0
Score 1 0.16 80.7 15.4 3.47 0.3 100 99.85 19.16 3.76 0.3
Score 2 0 12.41 66.08 18.1 3.43 100 100 87.6 21.52 3.43
Score 3 0 3.1 15.6 62.9 18.43 100 100 96.91 81.32 18.43
Score 4 0 0.67 1.7 10.23 87.42 100 100 99.34 97.64 87.42
Limit 8
Risk 60 40 0 0 0 100 40 0 0 0
Score 1 0.08 77.33 18.88 3.22 0.52 100 99.93 22.6 3.73 0.52
Score 2 0 11.33 65.11 19.01 4.57 100 100 88.68 23.57 4.57
Score 3 0 2.56 12.48 62.46 22.52 100 100 97.45 84.97 22.52
Score 4 0 0.51 1.3 7.17 91.05 100 100 99.5 98.21 91.05
Table 3.5: Stochastic ordering for the credit card database’s transition matrix
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for standard credit cards). For Bad accounts, we assumed the loss equals to the account
balance (i.e. the lender loss £563 for a Limit1 default account). The values are shown in
Table 3.6.
Credit limit Score at t (i)
at t (l) Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1 -563 8.66 6.32 1.78 1.3 1.04
Limit 2 -761 14.06 9.8 2.38 1.46 1.08
Limit 3 -983 17.52 11.4 2.9 1.78 1.46
Limit 4 -1658 29.02 16.44 4.92 2.78 2.48
Limit 5 -2234 42.68 24.58 10.44 4.7 3.88
Limit 6 -3047 57.82 29.94 13.84 7.02 5.64
Limit 7 -3605 60.96 34.9 16.6 9.34 7.22
Limit 8 -5722 109.6 63.62 43.74 22.12 14.62
Notes: The monthly profit of Inactive and Closed accounts equals
to zero.
Table 3.6: Account monthly profit
Under the same credit limit l, the profit decreases in behavioural score i because a
Good consumer is more likely to be a transactor. Credit card borrowers are classified into
two groups: Transactors or Revolvers. A Transactor makes full repayment and a Revolver
carries part of its outstanding balance to the next month. Thus credit lenders only gained
interchange fees from the transactors. Revolvers, on the other hand, are found to be under
financial pressure and so have a low behavioural score i. They accumulate a lump sum
of debt on their credit accounts and generate higher profit to the lender who is receiving
both interest and interchange fees. This means A.3 does not hold and so neither does 3.1
in the Lemma.
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Credit limit Optimal Policy (Optimal Value)
at t Inactive Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
λ = 0.995 (number of iteration:934)
Limit 1 1(1039) 1(841) 8(2033) 8(1974) 1(1907) 1(1870)
Limit 2 6(885) 2(706) 8(2028) 8(1943) 8(1851) 8(1824)
Limit 3 6(889) 3(752) 8(2033) 8(1937) 8(1852) 8(1823)
Limit 4 6(891) 4(328) 8(2041) 8(1939) 8(1849) 8(1821)
Limit 5 6(893) 5(-141) 8(2053) 8(1947) 8(1843) 8(1816)
Limit 6 6(894) 6(-468) 8(2059) 8(1957) 8(1854) 8(1817)
Limit 7 7(788) 7(-560) 8(2069) 8(1960) 8(1851) 8(1815)
Limit 8 8(719) 8(-1943) 8(2098) 8(2000) 8(1864) 8(1822)
λ = 0.99 (number of iteration:663)
Limit 1 1(705) 1(594) 8(1556) 8(1497) 1(1428) 1(1392)
Limit 2 6(611) 2(473) 8(1552) 8(1470) 8(1382) 8(1349)
Limit 3 6(614) 3(497) 8(1555) 8(1465) 8(1382) 8(1347)
Limit 4 6(616) 4(106) 8(1564) 8(1466) 8(1378) 8(1345)
Limit 5 6(617) 5(-325) 8(1575) 8(1474) 8(1374) 8(1340)
Limit 6 6(618) 6(-660) 8(1581) 8(1482) 8(1383) 8(1341)
Limit 7 7(544) 7(-768) 8(1590) 8(1485) 8(1381) 8(1339)
Limit 8 8(501) 8(-2106) 8(1619) 8(1523) 8(1393) 8(1346)
Table 3.7: Optimal policy and valued generated for the credit card database
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3.6 Optimal policy
We implemented the value iteration algorithm3(Puterman, 1994) in MATLAB to generate
the set of optimal policies O(i, l). With ten credit limit states and eight behavioural score
states, the size of the state space is eighty in each time period. We use different discount
values to check the performance of the model. It took less than 1000 iterations to achieve
the optimal solution and the computation time was less than 10 seconds. Table 3.7
presents the result with discount value λ = 0.995 (a rough estimate with yearly inflation
rate 6%) and λ = 0.99 (a rough estimate with yearly inflation rate 12%). Also, the optimal
values of the corresponding optimal policy are presented in the brackets. For example,
the optimal policy for a state with Limit 1 and Score 4 is Limit 1 and the corresponding
optimal profit is 1870.
For inactive accounts, the optimal policy for s = (l, 1),∀l = 2, 3, 4, 5 is to increase the
credit limit to l = 6. This follows since the optimal value function V (6, 1) is the highest
among the inactive accounts. It gives some encouragement to start using the account,
but since there is no history of repayment does not go to the highest credit level. When
the account is in the Risk state, the optimal policy is to keep the credit limit unchanged.
The policy here is to keep the credit limit unchanged, because we cannot drop the limit,
which is what would be ideal. For the other states - with less risky behavioural score
values, the optimal policy is to move to the highest credit limit. The exception is those
in the Score3 and Score4 but with the lowest credit limit Limit1. In this case the limit
should remain unchanged. This is because the profit is very small with this credit limit
3As shown by Puterman (1994), there is an optimal policy for any discounted stationary MDP model.
One method to find this optimal policy is by the value iteration algorithm that says the value function
(3.1) will converge to the optimal value after a number of iteration. In each iteration, we compare the
value functions in two consecutive iterations (i.e. Vt and Vt−1). If the differences of these two functions
is less than a certain threshold (which we use a value 0.01) then the iteration can be stopped. Then the
policy that gives the value function Vt is the optimal policy.
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and the chance of moving to a lower behavioural score is substantial. The suspicion is
that accounts in this situation must have been unsatisfactory in the past for the credit
limit and the behavioural score to be so uncorrelated.
The reason that optimal policies of Score 1 to Score 4 accounts are all Limit 8 can
be explained by the probability of default. In the model, the default probabilities of
Score 1 to Score 4 accounts are low, therefore the expected loss given default (that is
the reward of moving to Bad), p(D|l, i)V (l, D) (where D indicates the account is Bad) is
very small and thus the model will not be aware the possible loss given default. Whereas
the default probabilities of Risk accounts are high, the model thus suggests keep these
accounts’ credit limit unchanged. These results show the model is rather sensitive to the
default probabilities.
Whereas if the lender applies these policies (i.e. increase the credit limit of Score 1 to
4 accounts to Limit 8) in a long run, it is possible that many of those starting with low
credit limit accounts (such as those Limit 1 to Limit 5) will be default. This is because
many of them are not capable to return their balance. In this case, the loss given default
of the lender will increase unexpectedly. This shows that this model cannot be applied
directly but adjustment should be done. We will further explore the adjustment in the
following chapters.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated how the Markov Decision Process model can be used to build
a model for adjusting credit card limits. The summary of the results and conclusions are
as follows:
• First-order MDP models can balance between achieving robustness and satisfying
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the Markovian assumption.
• A top down coarse-classifying approach has a more satisfactory performance over
the traditional bin-merging approach.
• The model considered in this chapter is a fairly simple one though illustrates that
applying MDPs to optimize credit card consumer lifetime value is viable.
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Chapter 4
Adjusting the probability of defaults
of low default portfolios
Here in this chapter, we are going to adjust the probability of default of the MDP model
in order to improve the model performance. In particular, we are trying to find the most
prudent estimator for the default probability. We are going to use Pluto and Tasche
(2006)’s approach to adjust the default probability. A detail review of their paper can be
found in Chapter 2.
4.1 Estimating the probability of Default
Suppose there are n(l, i) accounts in state (l, i) and D(l, i) of them move to default at the
next time period, assuming the Markov chain is stationary means the maximum likelihood
estimator pˆD(l, i) for the probability pD(l, i) is
D(l,i)
n(l,i)
.
In reality, default is a rare event, particularly for high quality portfolios. There may
be no examples in the data of transition from certain states (l, i) to the default state
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D. Thus it is possible pˆD(l, i) will be very small or even equal to zero. Putting such
estimates into the MDP model leads to apparent ”structural zeros” 1 which change the
connectedness of the dynamics in the state space. If the probability of default from a
given state is zero this can lead to unusual optimal policies because the system wants to
move to those apparently ”safe” states.
Transition Probabilities
Profit
Optimal policy (value)
Credit limit Score Excellent Good Default at t = 1
< 10000
Excellent 0.925 0.075 0 50 50000+ (204)
Good 0.75 0.25 0 80 50000+ (163)
Default 0 0 1 - -
[10000, 50000)
Excellent 0.98 0.0198 0.0002 80 50000+ (121)
Good 0.164 0.8333 0.0027 120 < 10000 (175)
Default 0 0 1 -5000 -
50000+
Excellent 0.9333 0.0653 0.0013 100 < 10000 (122)
Good 0.25 0.74 0.01 150 < 10000 (192)
Default 0 0 1 -40000 -
Table 4.1: A synthetic example
For example, suppose there are only three behavioural states: Excellent, Good and
Bad where Bad is the default state, three credit limit states, < 10000, [10000, 50000) and
50000+, and the corresponding transition probabilities and profit values are described in
column three to five in Table 4.1.
We used these transition probabilities and profit values to calculate the optimal policy
at t = 1 which is listed at the last column of Table 4.1. One can find that the optimal
policy for an account having credit limit 50000+ and Excellent behavioural score is to
reduce the credit limit to < 10000. This is because the default probability in a state
with credit limit < 10000 is zero. The MDP model regards < 10000 as a ”‘safe policy”’
which will not default at all. This state therefore is being chosen by the MDP model, as
illustrated in Figure 4.1 (where the arrow indicates the MDP model chooses to decrease
1An entry with a structural zero has an expected value of zero, which means that not only did no
observations in the dataset at hand fall into that cell, but in fact that no observation could fall into that
entry (Berger and Zhang, 2005).
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credit card holder’s credit limit from 50000+ to < 10000).
Figure 4.1: An unexpected optimal policy
4.2 Estimating the PDs of low default portfolios
One way to overcome this problem is to take a conservative estimate of the default prob-
abilities, rather than the maximum likelihood estimate. This possibility has been ex-
tensively discussed in the context of the Basel Accord where again bank regulators and
lenders have been considering the robustness of estimates of default probabilities in low
default portfolios.
We follow the approach introduced by Pluto and Tasche (2006) and extended by
Benjamin et al. (2006). Firstly we assume the transitions to default are monotonically
decreasing as the behavioural score increases, and so if the score bands are labelled with
I being the highest quality and there are r low default portfolios, so
pD(l, I) ≤ pD(l, I − 1) ≤ . . . ≤ pD(l, I − (r − 2)) ≤ pD(l, I − (r − 1)) (4.1)
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So a conservative assumption would be that
pD(l, I) = pD(l, I − 1) = . . . = pD(l, I − (r − 2)) = pD(l, I − (r − 1)) (4.2)
where I − (r− 1) is the most risky of the low default portfolios. The second conservative
assumption in this approach is not to use the MLE estimate of the default probability, but
rather take the lower confidence limit of the default probability. There are D accounts
(a subjective choice) defaulting in the next period from all the low default portfolios (the
number of low default portfolios is n ≡
I∑
m=I−(r−1)
n(l,m) accounts). It is assumed this
follows a Binomial distribution B(n, pD(l, I)). One chooses pD(l, I) to be the highest
probability of default, so that the corresponding lower γ-confidence limit is exactly D, i.e.
getting a lower number of default this D has a 1− γ probability of occurring, i.e.
1− γ =
D∑
k=0
n
k
 pD(l, I)k(1− pD(l, I))n−k (4.3)
This is how one can obtain the default probability of the (l, I) accounts. One chooses the
estimate pˆD(l, I) in this way for these states (l, I) where the number of actual defaults
Dt(l, I) is at or below same agreed value - which might be zero. One would like to use
MLE to obtain the estimates of the other transition probabilities pˆj(l, I), j 6= D from state
(l, I). However this would result in the sum of the transition probabilities being greater
than 1 and so instead one defines γ(l, I)pˆj(l, I),∀j 6= D where
γ(l, I) =
1− pˆD(l, I)∑
j 6=D pˆj(l, I)
(4.4)
For the rest of the LDP, one can use the following general form to estimate the default
probability
1− γ =
D∑
k=0
n−
(
I∑
m=i+1
n(l,m)
)
k
 pD(l, i)k(1− pD(l, i))n−
(
I∑
m=i+1
n(l,m)
)
−k
, (4.5)
for all i = I − (r − 1), . . . , I − 1
For states (l, i) where i = 1, 2, . . . , I − r, MLE are used to estimate all transition
probabilities.
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4.3 Empirical results
We tested the proposed low default portfolios adjustment with the UK data. We have
further segmented the population by card type since we want to reduce the heterogeneity of
the testing sample. This is based on the assumption that the consumption and migration
patterns of borrowers having the other credit card type (i.e. platinum card) are different
from those with Master card. Also the reason for restricting the sample to only Master
card customers was that they were a homogeneous segment but one where a wide variety
of credit limits were applied. The other part of the sample - Platinum card customers,
were essentially only given credit limit 5 or higher and so provided no information on
what happens with lower credit limits. Table 4.2 shows the transition matrix, Table 4.3
shows the adjusted PDs for the low default accounts and Table 4.4 shows the average
account balance. It is proposed to test the model sensitivity by varying r in (3.4) which
is the key factor of the MDP reward. Hence the first phase of the analysis has tested the
model with r = 6, 12, 24 and 30.
There is no standard in selecting the low default accounts. Benjamin et al. (2006) uses
20 default cases as the cutoff value in a corporate rating context. If the credit portfolio
has lower than 20 default cases from the sampling period, it is labelled as low default
portfolios. In all the credit limit bands the number of default cases in Score 2, Score 3
and Score 4 are less than 10, thus we classified them as low default accounts. We use
a confidence interval 95% in this study since we would like to use a more conservative
approach to estimate the probability of default.
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Credit limit Score Score at (t+1) (i’)
Row Count
at t (l) at t (i) Closed Inactive Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1
Inactive 1.44 97.94 - - 0.32 0.27 0.03 0.00 63100
Risk 6.42 - 24.77 29.36 39.45 - - - 109
Score 1 1.40 0.19 0.24 0.14 89.52 7.87 0.62 0.03 51653
Score 2 1.09 0.83 0.00 - 18.40 70.54 8.43 0.70 21772
Score 3 0.84 1.46 - - 4.85 27.38 58.23 7.24 7831
Score 4 0.91 0.11 - - 1.14 8.97 37.42 51.45 1761
Limit 2
Inactive 1.28 97.27 - - 0.29 1.07 0.08 0.01 23733
Risk 2.83 - 20.75 60.38 16.04 - - - 106
Score 1 1.21 0.08 0.29 0.13 87.33 9.26 1.61 0.09 33988
Score 2 1.06 0.87 0.01 - 16.08 64.18 15.44 2.36 17483
Score 3 0.76 1.90 - - 2.78 14.40 65.03 15.13 17296
Score 4 0.59 0.14 - - 0.90 3.02 31.10 64.25 9272
Limit 3
Inactive 1.36 96.71 - - 0.54 1.35 0.04 0.01 30090
Risk 5.00 - 22.00 48.00 25.00 - - - 100
Score 1 1.39 0.12 0.22 0.14 83.27 12.74 1.98 0.14 35643
Score 2 1.13 1.15 0.01 0.00 13.75 62.62 18.00 3.33 30150
Score 3 0.83 1.77 - - 2.51 13.28 63.55 18.05 38713
Score 4 0.69 0.11 - - 0.91 2.95 27.27 68.07 28151
Limit 4
Inactive 1.52 96.64 - - 0.41 1.40 0.03 0.00 50167
Risk 4.39 - 15.35 63.16 17.11 - - - 228
Score 1 1.34 0.10 0.17 0.14 81.73 14.36 1.97 0.19 61837
Score 2 1.25 1.07 0.00 - 12.21 63.26 19.08 3.14 60541
Score 3 1.01 1.50 - - 2.38 12.81 62.35 19.95 81534
Score 4 0.67 0.12 - - 0.76 2.06 22.69 73.70 77658
Limit 5
Inactive 1.57 96.63 - - 0.31 1.45 0.03 0.01 33519
Risk 4.58 - 30.53 46.56 18.32 - - - 131
Score 1 1.55 0.03 0.17 0.14 81.25 14.84 1.84 0.19 53314
Score 2 1.59 0.54 0.00 - 12.68 61.58 20.31 3.30 49378
Score 3 1.25 1.54 0.00 - 2.38 11.97 62.70 20.16 70709
Score 4 0.91 0.15 - - 0.79 1.75 19.08 77.32 79164
Limit 6
Inactive 1.52 96.79 - - 0.32 1.33 0.04 0.00 21802
Risk 6.80 - 28.16 45.63 19.42 - - - 103
Score 1 1.40 0.04 0.15 0.14 80.76 15.38 1.92 0.22 41814
Score 2 1.43 0.37 - - 12.77 63.35 19.34 2.74 40299
Score 3 1.24 1.30 - - 2.52 11.07 63.86 20.01 57049
Score 4 0.92 0.11 - - 0.82 1.54 17.34 79.27 68704
Limit 7
Inactive 1.88 96.42 - - 0.26 1.42 0.02 0.01 17647
Risk 2.60 - 20.78 50.65 25.97 - - - 77
Score 1 1.25 0.05 0.12 0.12 79.41 16.56 2.19 0.28 33897
Score 2 1.44 0.27 0.01 - 12.22 63.82 19.16 3.09 36900
Score 3 1.44 1.27 0.00 - 2.52 10.82 62.74 21.21 53228
Score 4 1.25 0.13 0.00 - 0.72 1.45 15.51 80.93 74951
Limit 8
Inactive 2.01 96.06 0.01 - 0.28 1.60 0.03 0.01 18828
Risk 4.55 - 42.42 37.88 15.15 - - - 66
Score 1 1.17 0.02 0.13 0.07 78.50 17.75 2.09 0.27 63345
Score 2 1.26 0.14 0.00 - 11.49 67.37 17.37 2.37 79939
Score 3 1.26 1.06 0.00 - 2.37 11.28 63.28 20.74 98351
Score 4 1.23 0.10 0.00 - 0.66 1.30 12.30 84.41 166070
”‘-”’ represents there is no sample observation.
”‘0”’ represents the transition probability is less than 0.0005.
The transition probabilities of all absorbing states (Closed and Bad) are not shown in the table.
Table 4.2: Transition probability of Master Card accounts (in percentage)
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Credit limit Score MLE Adjusted
Limit 1
Score 2 0.00459% 0.0218%
Score 3 0% 0.0160%
Score 4 0% 0.0151%
Limit 2
Score 2 0.0114% 0.0360%
Score 3 0% 0.0181%
Score 4 0% 0.0143%
Limit 3
Score 2 0.0133% 0.0304%
Score 3 0% 0.0133%
Score 4 0% 0.00944%
Limit 4
Score 2 0.00165% 0.00784%
Score 3 0% 0.00334%
Score 4 0% 0.00216%
Limit 5
Score 2 0.00405% 0.0157%
Score 3 0.00141% 0.00646%
Score 4 0% 0.00389%
Limit 6
Score 2 0% 0.00743%
Score 3 0% 0.00308%
Score 4 0% 0.00180%
Limit 7
Score 2 0.00542% 0.0248%
Score 3 0.00188% 0.0102%
Score 4 0.00133% 0.00555%
Limit 8
Score 2 0.00375% 0.0132%
Score 3 0.00102% 0.00590%
Score 4 0.000602% 0.00305%
The second column is the default probabilities calculated with maximum likelihood estimates.
The third column is the default probabilities calculated with adjusted PD method.
Table 4.3: Default Probabilities for Low Default accounts
Credit limit Score at t (i)
at t (l) Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1 375 364 327 109 73 50
Limit 2 740 732 572 252 88 64
Limit 3 1066 1077 737 259 106 79
Limit 4 1495 1561 939 369 159 133
Limit 5 2128 2176 1362 668 264 187
Limit 6 3056 2738 1666 918 390 271
Limit 7 3931 3844 1960 1171 503 344
Limit 8 5727 5721 3017 2121 982 728
Table 4.4: Account average balance (Master card only)
61
4.3.1 Optimal policy generated by value iteration
We used (3.1) to find the optimal credit limit for master card customers. To do so, we
implemented the model with the value iteration algorithm Puterman (1994) in MATLAB
to generate the set of optimal policies. It took less than 10 seconds to complete the
iteration process. We present the result with discount value λ = 0.995 (a rough estimate
with yearly inflation rate 6) in Table 4.5 for illustration. The third to the seventh column
present the optimal policies of using different profit values. The entry in column three and
row four is 273(7) which indicates, if the profit of an account in a state with Score 1 and
Limit 1 is 0.5% (=6%/12) of its monthly balance, the optimal credit limit policy is limit
7, the corresponding optimal value is 273. Since the optimal policies of using different
profit values are very similar, we only used the profit function of those calculated by APR
equals 24% to test the model performance of adjusting the default probabilities of the low
default portfolios, and results are presented in the last column of Table 4.5.
For inactive accounts, the optimal policy for s = (l, 1),∀l = 1, 2 is to increase the
credit limit to l = 3. This follows since the optimal value function V (3, 1) is the highest
among the inactive accounts. It gives some encouragement to start using the accounts
but since there is no history of repayment does not suggest going to the highest credit
level. For the inactive accounts with credit limit l = 3, 4, 5, 6, the optimal policy is to
keep the credit limit unchanged. This is because optimal value for s = (l, 1) is decreasing
in l with ∀l = 3, 4, 5, 6. Since the optimal value for s = (8, 1) is greater than s = (7, 1),
the optimal policy for both is to have credit limit l = 8. State i = 2 is when the accounts
are already bad, and so the policy is to close them down, and the value function reflects
the loss because the account has defaulted. When the account is in the risky state, i.e.
l = 3, the optimal policy is to keep the credit limit unchanged. The policy here is to keep
the credit limit unchanged, because we cannot drop the limit, which is what would be
ideal.
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APR Adjusted PD
Credit Limit l Score i 6 12 18 24 30 APR = 24
Limit 1
Inactive 143 (3) 337 (3) 532 (3) 726 (3) 920 (3) 718 (3)
Risk 23 (1) 253 (1) 483 (1) 713 (1) 943 (1) 706 (1)
Score 1 273 (7) 683 (8) 1093 (8) 1503 (8) 1913 (8) 1489 (8)
Score 2 292 (8) 676 (8) 1060 (8) 1445 (8) 1829 (8) 1429 (8)
Score 3 279 (8) 638 (8) 1002 (1) 1367 (1) 1733 (1) 1352 (1)
Score 4 274 (8) 628 (1) 987 (1) 1346 (1) 1705 (1) 1330 (1)
Limit 2
Inactive 145 (3) 341 (3) 537 (3) 733 (3) 928 (3) 725 (3)
Risk -265 (2) -92 (2) 82 (2) 256 (2) 429 (2) 250 (2)
Score 1 273 (7) 683 (8) 1094 (8) 1506 (8) 1917 (8) 1491 (8)
Score 2 290 (8) 671 (8) 1053 (8) 1434 (8) 1815 (8) 1417 (8)
Score 3 275 (8) 627 (8) 979 (8) 1331 (8) 1683 (8) 1315 (8)
Score 4 273 (8) 618 (8) 963 (8) 1308 (8) 1653 (8) 1292 (8)
Limit 3
Inactive 145 (3) 342 (3) 539 (3) 735 (3) 932 (3) 728 (3)
Risk -306 (3) -100 (3) 106 (3) 312 (3) 517 (3) 305 (3)
Score 1 276 (7) 686 (8) 1096 (8) 1506 (8) 1916 (8) 1491 (8)
Score 2 289 (8) 667 (8) 1045 (8) 1423 (8) 1801 (8) 1407 (8)
Score 3 275 (8) 626 (8) 977 (8) 1328 (8) 1679 (8) 1313 (8)
Score 4 272 (8) 617 (8) 961 (8) 1305 (8) 1650 (8) 1290 (8)
Limit 4
Inactive 137 (4) 321 (4) 504 (4) 687 (4) 871 (4) 680 (4)
Risk -466 (4) -257 (4) -48 (4) 163 (4) 372 (4) 156 (4)
Score 1 280 (8) 691 (8) 1102 (8) 1513 (8) 1924 (8) 1499 (8)
Score 2 290 (8) 667 (8) 1045 (8) 1423 (8) 1801 (8) 1407 (8)
Score 3 275 (8) 626 (8) 976 (8) 1327 (8) 1678 (8) 1312 (8)
Score 4 272 (8) 616 (8) 959 (8) 1303 (8) 1647 (8) 1289 (8)
Limit 5
Inactive 135 (5) 313 (5) 492 (5) 671 (5) 849 (5) 663 (5)
Risk -1089 (5) -929 (5) -769 (5) -608 (5) -448 (5) -613 (5)
Score 1 282 (8) 694 (8) 1107 (8) 1519 (8) 1931 (8) 1505 (8)
Score 2 291 (8) 669 (8) 1048 (8) 1427 (8) 1806 (8) 1411 (8)
Score 3 274 (8) 624 (8) 974 (8) 1324 (8) 1675 (8) 1310 (8)
Score 4 271 (8) 614 (8) 956 (8) 1299 (8) 1641 (8) 1284 (8)
Limit 6
Inactive 132 (6) 308 (6) 484 (6) 659 (6) 835 (6) 652 (6)
Risk -1443 (6) -1271 (6) -1100 (6) -928 (6) -756 (6) -933 (6)
Score 1 285 (8) 699 (8) 1113 (8) 1528 (8) 1942 (8) 1514 (8)
Score 2 293 (8) 675 (8) 1056 (8) 1438 (8) 1820 (8) 1422 (8)
Score 3 275 (8) 626 (8) 977 (8) 1328 (8) 1679 (8) 1313 (8)
Score 4 272 (8) 614 (8) 957 (8) 1300 (8) 1642 (8) 1285 (8)
Limit 7
Inactive 123 (8) 293 (8) 463 (8) 633 (8) 803 (8) 626 (8)
Risk -1450 (7) -1195 (7) -939 (7) -684 (7) -428 (7) -691 (7)
Score 1 289 (8) 705 (8) 1121 (8) 1537 (8) 1953 (8) 1522 (8)
Score 2 294 (8) 677 (8) 1060 (8) 1442 (8) 1825 (8) 1426 (8)
Score 3 275 (8) 626 (8) 976 (8) 1327 (8) 1678 (8) 1312 (8)
Score 4 271 (8) 612 (8) 954 (8) 1296 (8) 1637 (8) 1281 (8)
Limit 8
Inactive 123 (8) 293 (8) 463 (8) 633 (8) 804 (8) 627 (8)
Risk -3763 (8) -3615 (8) -3467 (8) -3319 (8) -3171 (8) -3323 (8)
Score 1 297 (8) 718 (8) 1139 (8) 1561 (8) 1982 (8) 1546 (8)
Score 2 300 (8) 690 (8) 1079 (8) 1468 (8) 1857 (8) 1452 (8)
Score 3 278 (8) 633 (8) 987 (8) 1341 (8) 1695 (8) 1326 (8)
Score 4 273 (8) 616 (8) 959 (8) 1302 (8) 1645 (8) 1288 (8)
Table 4.5: Optimal policy
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For the other states - with less risky behavioral score values, the optimal policy is to
move to the highest credit limit, in general. One exception is those in the high behavioral
score bands i = 6, 7 but with the lowest credit limit l = 1. In this case, the limit should
remain unchanged. This is because the chance of moving to a lower behavioral score is
substantial compared to consumers with higher credit limit but the same behavioral score
band. The suspicion is that accounts in this situation must have been unsatisfactory in
the past for the credit limit and the behavioral score to be so uncorrelated. However if
the APR is 6%, the optimal policy is to increase the credit limit to the highest level since
the reward of l = 1 is extremely small. The second exception is those in the behavioral
band i = 4 with credit limit l = 1, 2, 3 when APR is 6%. The optimal credit limit is to
increase up to l = 7. This can be explained by these accounts have a high potential to go
default. If the profitability is low, it is better to employ a more conservative policy. As
expected, if one adjusted the PDs of Low Default accounts, the optimal value is lower.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the use of adjusting PDs on LDPs method in building a MDP
model to adjust credit card limit. It turned out that in this case the optimal policy for
using a transition matrix with adjusting PDs was the same as those without. However,
a model built with non-zero PDs is believed to be a more robust model which avoids
constructing a structural zero MDP model.
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Chapter 5
Incorporating economic conditions
In this chapter we look at the interaction between credit migration and macroeconomics.
We introduce a MDP model with state variables describing the economy. This proposed
model is tested with a Hong Kong credit card dataset. Empirical results of the model
performance under different economic conditions are presented. This model is useful in
real-world applications as it is able to incorporate external factors into a credit card
pricing model.
5.1 Models
5.1.1 The MDP model
Consider a discrete discounted MDP model with decision epochs T (indexed by t =
1, 2, . . . , T ) based on a state space S. The state space consists of the current credit limit
represented by L (indexed by l = 0, 1, 2 . . . , L), the current behavioural score I (indexed
by i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , I). The current macroeconomic variables are represented by a 1×M row
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vector M, where M is the total number of macroeconomic variables used in the model.
As usual, we limit the actions to either keeping the credit limit fixed or increasing to a
new credit limit, since most credit card organizations do not want to drop a borrower’s
credit limit, and thus the action set is defined as Al = {l′ : l ≤ l′}. Define r(l, i,M) to
be the profit obtained in the current period by a credit account with a credit limit l, a
behavioural score i and macroeconomic variables M.
The objective is to construct a solution to the discounted profit optimality equation
where there is a discount factor λ describing the time value of money. This leads to the
following optimality equation for Vt(l, i,M), the maximum expected profit over the next
t periods that can be obtained from an account which currently has behaviour score i,
credit limit l and macroeconomic variables M:
Vt(l, i,M) = max
l′∈Al
{r(l, i,M) + λ
∑
i′
p(i′|i,M)∫
qt−1(U|M)Vt−1(l′, i′,U)dU} (5.1)
The right-hand-side of (5.1) corresponds to the profit over the next t periods if we change
the credit limit to l′ at the end of the current period for an account with a behavioural score
i and macroeconomic variables M . p(i′|i,M) gives the chance that this behavioural score
changes to i′, and qt−1(U|M) is the probability that the current macroeconomic variables
change to U. Each entry in the 1×M row vector U represents a macroeconomic variable
that can take any real value in (−∞,∞). The multiple integral includes all possible values
of the macroeconomic variables in the next period. The profit to the lender from the credit
card borrower in the current period is r(l, i,M) and the profit in the remaining t−1 period
is Vt−1(l′, i′,U) if the behavioural score changes to i′ and the macroeconomic variables
change to U. The definition of the discount factor λ and the explanation of the optimality
principle are the same as those presented in Chapter 3. V0(l, i,M), for all l, i,M, are the
boundary conditions of (5.1), i.e. the expected return of a customer at the end of the
planning horizon. In this study, we assume the boundary conditions equal to zero to
simplify the discussion. Whereas it is possible to set up different boundary conditions for
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different accounts (such as introducing penalty for accounts with low behavioural score
etc), we leave it for future research to understand the sensitivity of the model to these
boundary conditions.
Given a borrower currently in behavioural score state i, what change in the behavioural
score occurs in the next period and what is the impact of the macroeconomic variables on
this movement? We can estimate this impact by assuming i′, the state the account moves
to, is the outcome variable and the set of macroeconomic variables are the explanatory
variables in a regression model. As the outcome variable i′ is divided into different bands,
we analyse the relationship between the outcome and the explanatory variables using
logistic regression models (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Furthermore, the behavioural
score band i′ can be classified into two groups: ordered and unordered. In this case, we
need to use both multinomial and cumulative logistic regression models to analyze the
transition probabilities.
We assume in the model that p(i′|i,M) in (5.1) does not depend on the current credit
limit l. One might expect borrowers with different credit limits will have different be-
havioural score movements. If we define the transition probability conditional on the
current credit limit (as in (3.1)), the transition probability can capture the state migra-
tion better. However, if we define the transition probability conditional on credit limit,
behavioural score and macroeconomic variables, the transition probability will cover three
dimensions. In this case, the samples break down into very small sets, which complicates
our analysis. If we additionally include credit limit in our state space, it is feasible to
have borrowers having the same behavioural score but different credit limits going differ-
ent ways under the same economic conditions. This would mean considering second order
effects, where we initially wish to understand the impact of the economy on behavioural
score changes. In any event, one of the objectives for this study is to explore whether
the lender can use the behavioural score as a key parameter to determine credit limit.
The current definition already provides a precise and clear framework for considering the
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interaction between economy and behavioural score. Therefore we can use the current
definition to concentrate on our discussion of economic effects. We therefore leave the
possibility of using a transition probability conditional on current credit limit, current
behavioural score and current macroeconomic variables as an area for possible future
research.
5.1.2 The multinomial logistic regression model
In general, we can classify credit card accounts into three types. If a borrower has termi-
nated the credit card account without incurring any debt, this account is called a Closed
(represented by C) account. The second type is an Inactive (represented by T ) account
where the credit card account has not been active for a period of time. These Closed or
Inactive accounts generate a small monthly loss since every account incurs an operational
cost. An account that is neither Closed nor Inactive is termed Active (represented by A).
Active accounts bring profit, either gains or losses, to the lender, and thus accounts in
default or in arrears are also termed Active. We can estimate the relationship between
these account types and the impact of the economy through
log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
= β0(A,C|i,M) + Mβ(A,C|i,M) (5.2)
log
(
p(T |i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
= β0(T,C|i,M) + Mβ(T,C|i,M) (5.3)
log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(T |i,M)
)
= β0(A,T |i,M) + Mβ(A,T |i,M) (5.4)
Note that entries in the M × 1 column vector β(A,C|i,M) are the regression coefficients
corresponding to the macroeconomic variables M, similarly for β(T,C|i,M) and β(A,T |i,M).
The assumption in (5.2) is that the log of the ratio of the number of accounts in state i
which become Inactive to the number of accounts which become Closed is a linear function
of the macroeconomic variables. One can derive the outcome probabilities (listed below)
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by (5.2)-(5.4).
p(C|i,M) = 1
1 + exp
(
β0(A,C|i,M) +Mβ(A,C|i,M)
)
+ exp
(
β0(T,C|i,M) +Mβ(T,C|i,M)
)
p(A|i,M) =
exp(β0(A,C|i,M) +Mβ(A,C|i,M))
1 + exp
(
β0(A,C|i,M) +Mβ(A,C|i,M)
)
+ exp
(
β0(T,C|i,M) +Mβ(T,C|i,M)
)
p(T |i,M) =
exp(β0(T,C|i,M) +Mβ(T,C|i,M))
1 + exp
(
β0(A,C|i,M) +Mβ(A,C|i,M)
)
+ exp
(
β0(T,C|i,M) +Mβ(T,C|i,M)
)
It is simple to verify that the sum of the above equations is equal to 1.
5.1.3 The cumulative logistic regression model
The Active accounts include those with behavioural score and those which have just
defaulted. There is an obvious ordering of creditworthiness in such accounts, starting
with those in the highest behavioural score band, and going down the score bands to end
with the default accounts. Hence we can use cumulative logistic regression to exploit this
ordering.
Define P (j|i,M) ≡ ∑
k≤j
p(k|i,M) as the cumulative probability that a borrower cur-
rently with a behavioural score i moves to a behavioural state j or lower if the macroeco-
nomic variables take values M. The relationship between the transition probabilities and
the macroeconomic variables is estimated using the cumulative logistic regression models,
i.e.
log
(
P (j|i,M)
1− P (j|i,M)
)
= γ0(j|i,M) + MΓ(i,M), ∀j = 2, . . . , I − 1 (5.5)
In (5.5), the left-hand-side of the equation is the log of the odds of the expected number
of borrowers moving to a state with behavioural score band j or lower compared with the
the expected number of borrowers moving to a state with behavioural score band higher
than j. For different score bands j, the equation fits the same vector of coefficients Γ(i,M)
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but different intercepts γ0(j|i,M). This means the impact of macroeconomic variables is the
same for a state with initial behavioural score band i.
Note that for any Markov chain model, the row sum of the transition matrix must add
up to 1. Using pk(A|i,M) and P (j|i,M), we calculate the entries by
p(i′|i,M) = [P (i′|i,M)− P (i′ − 1|i,M)] p(A|i,M), ∀i, i′,M (5.6)
Since the intercept γ0(j|i,M) of the cumulative logistic regression model in (5.5) increases
in j, i.e. γ0(j+1|i,M) ≥ γ0(j|i,M),∀j (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000), the cumulative probability
also increases in j, i.e. P (j+1|i,M) ≥ P (j|i,M),∀j. Therefore the transition probability
in (5.6) must be non-negative since P (i′|i,M)− P (i′ − 1|i,M) ≥ 0.
5.2 The Hong Kong Data
5.2.1 Sampling and data preparation
The MDP model is applied to credit card data from a major Hong Kong financial insti-
tution. The data consist of the credit card histories and characteristics of over 1,400,000
credit accounts for each of 60 months (May, 2002 to April, 2007). Fields used in this
study are account balance, account repayment, credit limit, account written-off record,
behavioural score and credit limit changed-date.
There are three criteria for sample selection. First, because our interest is to look at
the impact of economy, the sample period should encompass both expansion and recession.
Second, a minimal sample size threshold has to be met at every month to ensure statis-
tical reliability of the estimates. Third, the sample should cover both new and current
customer’s migration behaviour to ensure the sample is representative.
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To achieve these criteria, we allow the sample to vary over time, incorporating new
credit card holders and including those defaulted or closed accounts. We extract random
samples every month and estimate that month’s behavioural score migration by looking
at the behavioural score of these accounts in the current month and the next month. This
procedure ensures that the sample size is always large enough to estimate the impact of
the monthly economy, and includes all special (defaulted, inactive or closed) accounts.
We would like to ensure the sample period consists of different economic conditions.
As generally agreed by economists, recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP
growth Knoop (2004). Looking at the quarterly GDP growth of HK (refer to the graph
in Chapter 1), recession in this study refers to the period from May 2002 to March 2004,
and expansion refers to the period from April 2004 to April 2007.
There is a field credit limit changed-date which shows the most recent date of the
account’s credit limit being adjusted. The consumption patterns of accounts having had
their credit limit adjusted recently are somewhat different from the others. These accounts
contribute a high profit and thus skew the values of the profit function r(l, i,M). So the
question here is whether we should exclude these accounts from our sample? However,
if we do so, there may not have enough special accounts in the samples since lenders
like to adjust the credit limit of special accounts (such as Inactive accounts). Special
accounts are interesting portfolios to look at and we would like to include them in our
study. We thus use a two-phase sampling method to ensure there is a certain number of
special accounts in the sample but also possibly minimize the impact of the current credit
limit policy. In the first-phase, we extract a random sample of 50,000 accounts over the
sampling period in each monthly dataset. We have checked that these samples include all
new, existing, inactive, in arrears, default and closed accounts from each month during
the sampling period. Then we look at the non-special accounts (not inactive, default,
in arrears, closed accounts) in the first-phase samples and replace those which are credit
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limit adjusted accounts1. The replacements are accounts having the same characteristics
(i.e. same credit limit and behavioural score in the same month) but whose credit limit
has not been changed in the last three months. A remark here is the field credit limit
changed-date can be used to understand the lender’s current policy. We can therefore
compare the model and the current policy and this would be included as a future research
of how to develop measurements to validate the performance of the MDP model. We
delete some of the ambiguous, missing and special accounts that we are not interested in
covering in this study, which account for less than 0.2% of the raw samples. We are left
with 2,994,584 transitions for analysis.
5.2.2 Special accounts and coarse-classifying accounts
Each month an account is given a behavioural score or possibly put in a special state. We
define a Closed account to include all accounts where the credit card service terminated
with zero account balance. A credit card account which has never been activated or has
not been used in the last twelve months is called Inactive. A credit card account which
was newly opened in the last two months before the sample point (and so does not have
enough data to merit a behavioural score) is called New. Since there is only small number
(less than 1%) of New accounts in the sample, we grouped them with the Inactive accounts
to simplify the discussion. A 3+ Cycle account is one in which the account has been in
arrears for 3 or more months but the lender has not yet written the account off.
There are four possible reasons to write-off an account, bankruptcy, charge-off, revoked
and 3+cycles delinquent. A written-off account is followed-up by the debt collection
department. Such written-off accounts may repay all, part or none of the outstanding
debt. Even when the account makes full repayment, the time spent in the collection
process is variable and could be several years. It is important to estimate the average
1Accounts’ credit limit have been increased in the past 3 months.
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future repayment amount of different default accounts because it affects the values of the
profit function in (5.1). There is very little research (Matuszyk et al., 2007) on estimating
the loss given default of revolving credit products. So we use a simple approach to compare
the debt repayment ratios. Define R ≡ Bt+1−Bt+24
Bt+1
where Bt+1 is the current balance of an
account at default in month t. The repayment ratio R is defined as the proportion of the
debt repaid to the lender after two years. For reasons of confidentiality, we cannot show
the exact repayment ratio, but the results showed one of the forms of default had a high
repayment ratio which was significantly different from the others. We call this default
account state Bad2, and group the rest of the three forms of written-off together into one
default state, called Bad1. So in our cost function the loss generated by accounts in Bad1
is higher than those of Bad2. In total we have five special behavioural score states.
We then divided the behavioural score and credit limit into different groups. We
used a classification tree to split the behavioural scores into ten groups. The target field
(or dependent variable) in the classification tree is the monthly profit of every borrower.
Thus this split is independent of the macroeconomic measurements, and we only take
an average on all economic conditions when we are splitting the behavioural score into
different bands. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not disclose the precise behavioural
score and credit limit bands. We use Score1 to Score10 to represent the behavioural score
where Score1 are those with lowest behavioural score and Score10 are those with highest.
Similarly, we split the credit limits into 10 groups and use Limit1 to Limit10 to represent
the credit limit with Limit1 as the lowest credit limit band.
5.2.3 Macroeconomic variables
There are a broad range of macroeconomic measurements whereas we only select those
closely related to the consumer market. The five macroeconomic variables used in this
study are listed in Table 5.1.
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Factors Description and data sources
Consumer price index (CPI) We use the month-on-month rate of change of the sea-
sonal adjusted consumer price index (CPI). CPI is
an indicator consolidating the prices of commodities,
petroleum, food and transportation. It is considered
a good index to show inflation in the economy.
Gross domestic product (GDP ) We use the quarter-to-quarter rate of change of the
seasonal adjusted gross domestic product (GDP).
GDP measures the total market value of goods and
services produced in a country. We include it as the
index for production of the overall economy.
Best lending rate (Int) We use the month-on-month difference in the Best
lending rate. Best lending rate is designed by the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority and it is used as a
basis reference for residential mortgage interest rates.
It reflects the financial stress of homeowners. We use
the month-on-month difference rather than the ac-
tual interest rate. What is important is the relative
position of someone compared to the previous time.
The month-on-month differences reflect recent mar-
ket changes, which are reflected in borrowers’ confi-
dence. As we use the lag of macroeconomic variables
in the model (details are explained in the next section),
this lag gives some indication of the interest rate po-
sition compared with when the credit card was first
issued/used.
Stock Return (Sto) We calculate the Stock return at month t by Stock =
ln(
Ht−1
Ht
) where Ht is the monthly closed value of the
Hang Seng Index.
Unemployment rate (Une) We use the month-on-month difference to measure the
labour market performance in Hong Kong. This mea-
surement reflects recent market changes, which are re-
flected in borrowers’ confidence.
Table 5.1: Description and sources of the macroeconomic factors
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We first test the importance of macroeconomic variables individually to understand
their impact. Consequently, we incorporate two or more macroeconomic variables into
the logistic regression model so as to look at the impact on the economy (referred to as
multivariate logistic regression models in the following discussion).
It is important to test whether the macroeconomic variables are highly correlated.
If we incorporate two highly correlated macroeconomic measurements in the regression
model, multicollinearity will be present. We explain the impact of multicollinearity as
follows. Hypothetically, we put two measurements X and Y into a multivariate regression
model to predict Z. The coefficient estimates of X and Y are βx and βy respectively. The
usual interpretation of these coefficient estimates is ”‘if we hold the variable Y unchanged,
Z increases/decreases βx units for a unit increase of X”’. However, if X and Y are highly
correlated, the assumption of ”‘if we hold the variable Y unchanged and a unit increase of
X”’ does not stay true. Although it will not reduce the predictive power of the model as
a whole, it is not cost-effective to put many correlated measurements into a multivariate
regression model. Therefore, it is better to avoid the presence of such correlation.
H0 : ρ = 0 (no correlation)
Factors CPI GDP Int Sto Une Mean S.D.
.0545 .1283 .0107 −.4658
CPI 1 (.6793) (.3286) (.9357) (.0002) .0267 .3178
.0626 .0747 −.3621
GDP 1 (.6346) (.5706) (.0045) 1.5350 1.5805
.0312 −.0575
Int 1 (.8132) (.6627) .0437 .1260
−.0358
Sto 1 (.7862) .0100 .0432
Une 1 −.0467 .1620
Table 5.2: Correlation analysis of the macroeconomic factors
The result of the correlation analysis is presented in Table 5.2. The null hypothesis
of this correlation analysis is ”‘there is no correlation between the measurements”’. We
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will not reject this hypothesis if the p-value is greater than 0.01. We observe that Une
is substantially correlated with CPI and GDP . It is thus more sensible to separate Une
from CPI and GDP . We cannot reject the null hypothesis between CPI and GDP ,
and thus these two macroeconomic measurements can be used as explanatory variables
in a multivariate logistic regression model. Stock can be used as a measurement in any
multivariate logistic regression model since it is not highly correlated with any others. As
shown in Table 5.2, Int is not highly correlated with any other measurements. However,
this interest rate is controlled by the financial authority, and we thus decided to exclude it
from the sub-models. Having the four measurements, we divide them into two sub-models
as listed below.
Model A: CPI, GDP, Sto
Model B: Une, Sto
5.2.4 The format and lag of macroeconomic variables
The impact of economic factors are not instantaneous and consumers likely take some time
to absorb or digest the consequence of a change. We thus allow the lag of macroeconomic
variables x to enter our transition matrix. There is no definite length or mathematical
formulation for lag variables. As a reasonable assumption, we use exponentially declining
weights on these lag variables (Figlewski et al., 2006). The lag macroeconomic variables
in month t are defined as
mt =
k+1∑
j=1
wjxt−j+1
k+1∑
j=1
wj
(5.7)
This is the weighted sum of the macroeconomic variables from month t − k to t with
weight w ∈ (0, 1], and the weighted value wj decreasing in j exponentially. The lag value
is the mean of the previous k months’ macroeconomic variables when w = 1, and a weight
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w close to zero implies (5.7) weights recent macroeconomic variables heavily. If k = 0,
the macroeconomic variable is independent of its historical values. We test several decay
factors: w = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1. A lag window of 12 months or less is used in our study
since consumers are far more sensitive to the economy than corporations. We test CPI,
GDP, Int and Une with k = 1, 3, 6, 12. The impact of stock market is believed to be
instantaneous, therefore we choose k = 1, 2, 3 for Sto.
5.3 Empirical results
We use the credit card data from May 2002 to April 2006 as training samples and those
from May 2006 to April 2007 as an out of time hold-out testing sample.
5.3.1 Unconditional transition matrices and profits
Score i Score i′ at t + 1 Row
at t Closed Inactive/New Bad1 Bad2 3+Cycle Score1 Score2 Score3 Score4 Score5 Score6 Score7 Score8 Score9 Score10 Count
Inactive/New 1.01 81.98 0 0 - - 0.04 0.53 5.04 3.21 1.69 0.82 1.44 1.2 3.03 173635
3+Cycle 31.08 - 29.05 4.5 2.93 0.45 12.16 19.37 0.45 - - - - - - 444
Score1 2.35 - 30.97 5.55 3.16 14.5 40.55 2.81 0.11 - - - - - - 2848
Score2 1.24 0 1.81 0.85 0.61 3.82 65.77 25.4 0.5 0 - - - - - 48634
Score3 0.61 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.18 4.45 78.14 15.3 0.54 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 312913
Score4 0.58 0.21 0.04 0.02 - 0 0.19 8.69 75.38 10.27 1.5 1.36 1.48 0.21 0.08 486989
Score5 0.56 0.28 0.02 0 - - 0.03 2.22 12.37 59.82 7.01 5.85 7.03 3.67 1.12 269203
Score6 0.66 0.62 0.01 0 - - 0.02 1.24 5.84 13.42 52.74 7.29 12.25 2.74 3.16 131118
Score7 0.53 0.37 0.01 0 - - 0.01 1.05 4.85 10.26 7.08 50.47 10.61 10.69 4.07 137946
Score8 0.32 0.18 0.01 0 - 0 0 0.59 2.8 4.49 6.59 6.06 62.48 9 7.48 261466
Score9 0.28 0.11 0.01 0 - - 0 0.35 1.72 2.24 1.44 6.15 8.51 69.43 9.76 252975
Score10 0.19 0.01 0.01 0 - - 0 0.16 1.25 0.66 0.53 1.01 6.3 7.2 82.68 317098
”‘-”’ represents there is no sample observation.
”‘0”’ represents the transition probability is less than 0.0005.
A bold value indicates the transition frequency is greater than 50% .
The transition probabilities of all absorbing states (Closed, Bad1 and Bad2) are not shown in the table.
Table 5.3: Unconditional transition matrix (in percentage)
Table 5.3 shows the unconditional transition matrix for all the training samples. Each
entry represents the sample frequency of accounts with initial behavioural score band i
(indexed by the first column in the table) moving to a state with behavioural score i′
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(indexed by the second row in the table) divided by the total number of accounts with
initial behaivoural score band i (given in the last column of the table).
This transition matrix is mainly dominated by the diagonal entries. This excludes
3+Cycle accounts of which 31.08% move to Closed and 29.05% move to Bad1. Accounts
with a behavioural score state Score1 are more likely to move to a state with Score2
(40.55%) or Bad1 (30.97%). The volatility of score transition is clearly higher for accounts
with Score 5 to Score 8, since the percentages of these accounts remaining in the same
behavioural score band are less consistent.
Limit1 Limit2 Limit3 Limit4 Limit5 Limit6 Limit7 Limit8 Limit9 Limit10
Closed 10.28 17.56 54.38 98.41 5.74 59.78 140.01 55.35 104.78 298.31
Inactive/New -8.17 -6.48 -6.53 -5.85 -2.02 -0.27 -0.49 -4.19 -6.1 -5.76
Bad1 -7642.68 -11048.99 -15837.72 -24031.79 -21109.75 -31625.49 -38639.66 -47651.89 -61405.35 -97164.11
Bad2 -3858.67 -5839.01 -8148.58 -11487.51 -13576.19 -16099.02 -20042.11 -24408.86 -34081.19 -52407.39
3+Cycle -635.15 -670.12 -1097.4 -1125.18 -951.49 -954.55 -1149.93 -2139.17 -711.03 -257.61
Score1 -699.48 -1117.09 -1535.14 -2025.38 -2003.03 -2480.33 -3147.94 -3714.42 -5209.01 -9184.49
Score2 204.8 255.44 369.75 483.82 559.34 701.14 926.46 1245.03 1384.91 2414.72
Score3 151.44 186.99 281.22 392.45 214.38 460.81 592.7 697.27 899.82 1618.16
Score4 29.84 40.09 78.73 128.99 71.18 162.82 223.58 272.92 392.85 979.24
Score5 7.74 5.14 16.21 27.85 24.52 38.93 56.3 69.68 112.78 262.2
Score6 7.09 0.03 5.2 11.98 11.57 18.63 26.55 33.44 57.02 145.3
Score7 2.45 -3.39 3.16 5.69 14.82 17.49 26.22 38.48 65.03 152.27
Score8 -6.81 -7.64 -4.13 -0.3 7.49 10.55 17.98 23.87 44.73 103.44
Score9 -7.45 -8.24 -5.23 -2.3 4.28 6.17 11.56 21.86 35.09 78.36
Score10 -8.71 -5.83 -4.23 -2.4 7.24 8.37 11.42 22.02 32.85 83.54
The first column indexes the Score status and the first row indexes the Credit Limit statues
All values are in HK dollar (£1 ≈ HK$15)
For all absorbing states (Closed, Bad1, Bad2), we use the profit value in the month of the account being written-off
or closed as the profit.
Table 5.4: Average monthly profit
Looking at the profit values shown in Table 5.4 there is no consistent trend across
Inactive accounts. Of course one may say Inactive accounts are not important since they
generate a loss less than HK$9 per month. Indeed, this loss is the cost of funds for account
operation. Just like the UK credit card dataset, account profit increases with credit limit
and decreases with behavioural score.
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Score i
Macroeconomics Format Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood) Implications
Measurement (k,w) β β β
Inactive/New CPI (9,1) 1.43* 0.7124* 0.7177* 176876 A>T>C
3+Cycle CPI (12,1) 2.0016** / / 541 A>C
Others CPI (12,0.8) 0.4637* 1.1336* -0.67* 197760 T>A>C
Inactive/New GDP (3,1) -0.1574* -0.1079* -0.0495* 177044 C>T>A
3+Cycle GDP (N,N) N / / / /
Others GDP (12,1) 0.0787* 0.3152* -0.2365* 197753 T>A>C
Inactive/New Int (6,1) 2.1035* 0.1492 1.9543* 176057 A>T,A>C
3+Cycle Int (N,N) N / / / /
Others Int (12,1) 1.1083* 1.9803* -0.8721* 197746 T>A>C
Inactive/New Sto (1,1) 0.7488 -0.6218 1.3707* 177187 A>T
3+Cycle Sto (N,N) N / / / /
Others Sto (3,0.8) 2.275* 4.5227* -2.2476* 197837 T>A>C
Inactive/New Une (9,1) -1.7367* -1.2592* -0.4775* 177149 C>T>A
3+Cycle Une (N,N) N / / / /
Others Une (9,1) -0.8548* -2.6242* 1.7695* 197613 C>A>T
”/” represents there is no observation in the data.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise multinomial logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory
macroeconomic variable.
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
The first column is the index of the initial score state i where ”‘Others”’ refers to accounts with ordinary
behavioural score (Score1 to Score10).
The best fit macroeconomic variables (discussed in Section 5.2.4) are presented in column three.
The estimated parameters are presented in columns four to six.
-2log(likelihood) ratios which are used to measure the model fit statistics are presented in column seven.
Log(A/C) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.2)
Log(T/C) represents log
(
p(T |i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.3)
Log(A/T) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(T |i,M)
)
in (5.4)
Table 5.5: Summary of the multinomial logistic model estimates
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Model A (CPI, GDP, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood)
CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock
Inactive 1.2654* -.1456* / .5378* -.0938* / .7276* -.0518* / 176642
Others .5226* -.00946 2.4463* .6908* .2069* 5.1219* -.1683 -.2164* -2.6756* 197632
Model B (Unemployment rate, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood)
Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment
Others -2.5503* 1.8117* 4.4443* -2.6175* -2.5503* 1.8117* 197564
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
The models are developed only if there is significant variable found in Table 5.5.
Table 5.6: Summary of multinomial logistic model estimates of Model A and Model
B
5.3.2 Estimates for the multinomial logistic regression
We estimate the way the economy impacts on the transition probabilities in two stages.
Firstly we estimate the transition probability of moving to Inactive, Active and Closed
accounts (refer to Section 5.1.2). Then having the transition probability of moving to the
Active state, we calculate the transition probability of moving to a particular state (ref
to Section 5.1.3). To begin the discussion, we first look at the frequency distribution of
Closed, Inactive and Active accounts. The second and third columns in Table 5.3 show
the percentage of accounts with score band i moving to Closed and Inactive states respec-
tively. One may observe that for Score1 to Score10 accounts the frequency distribution
of moving to the Closed and Inactive states are rather similar. We therefore merge these
accounts to perform the analysis so as to ensure the multinomial regression has enough
observations to generate significant results. Thus we have three initial behavioural score
states: Inactive/New, 3+Cycle and Others, where ”‘Others”’ represents the merged score
state.
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Table 5.5 summarizes the multinomial logistic regression results. The first column is
the initial behavioural score state. Second column is the macroeconomic variable being
used in the logistic regression and the third column is the best fit format of the correspond-
ing macroeconomic variable. The first row of the result in Table 5.5 shows (9, 1) is the
best fit format which means that using the mean of the previous 9 month’s CPI variables
provides the best measurement to look at the impact of CPI on Inactive/New accounts.
Columns four to six are the regression coefficients of the log odds in the logistic regres-
sion. Log(A/C) equals 1.43 in the first row of the table, which mathematically means that
P(moving to an Active account|An Inactive/New account)
P(moving to a Close account|An Inactive/New account) = e
1.43CPI+Intercept. In words,
if there is a unit increase in the CPI, there are 4.17(≈ e1.43) more Inactive/New accounts
which become Active accounts for every Inactive/New account that becomes a Closed
account. Column seven shows the -2log(likelihood) ratios which are used to measure the
model fit statistics. This measurement is proportional to the sample size and a smaller
magnitude indicates a better fit.
The last column ”Implication” describes the rate of increase of accounts moving to
Closed(C), Inactive(T) and Active(A) if there is a unit increase of the macroeconomic
variable. There is an implication only if the coefficient estimate β is significant at the
95% level. The Implication column summarizes the impact of the economic variable on
the movements for that type of account. The first row of the Implication is ”‘A > T > C”’
which means that for Inactive/New accounts, the increase in the CPI will increase the
numbers that next month become Active. Also the increase in the CPI has a lower impact
on those who stay Inactive/New and in fact they drop but the largest drop will be in those
who will close their account.
We first examine the variable format. In most cases, the ”‘mean”’ of macroeconomic
variables is the best fit format which implies consumers react fairly and consistently across
sub-periods. One can compare the lag window used by Figlewski et al. (2006) who choose
w = 0.88 and k = 18 while looking at the corporate bond rating.
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We first look at the impact of CPI and Interest Rate on account movement. Note that
the economy experiences inflation when the interest rate or CPI goes up. The implications
of the CPI and Interest Rate models for Inactive/New borrowers are ”‘A > T > C”’ and
”‘A > T,A > C”’ respectively which indicate more of these borrowers require credit
during inflation, whereas for Others borrowers, the implications for both the CPI and
Interest Rate models are ”‘T > A > C”’, which indicates borrowers reduce their borrowing
during inflation. CPI is highly associated with 3+Cycle accounts and the impact lasts
for a year. This indicates when inflation comes, not many 3+Cycle accounts are able to
repay their debt and close their credit card accounts.
GDP going up indicates the economy is doing well. The results show the demand for
credit reduces when the HK market is doing well, since the implications for Inactive/New
and Others borrowers are ”‘C > T > A”’ and ”‘T > A > C”’ respectively.
The implication for Others borrowers in the Stock model is ”‘T > A > C”’ which indi-
cates more Others borrowers reduce the use of their credit card when HK’s stock market
index increases. If the unemployment rate goes up, the implications for Inactive/New and
Others accounts are ”‘C > T > A”’ and ”‘C > A > T”’, that is, more borrowers close
their credit card accounts.
Table 5.6 shows the results of Model A and B (as defined in Section 5.2.3). Note
that we use the best combination of the macroeconomic variables where individual effects
are found in Table 5.6 in Models A and B. When comparing the parameter estimates
between Table 5.5 and 5.6, only one parameter changes sign (highlighted in bold). This
sign-changed parameter is associated with GDP and the corresponding magnitude is small
and thus there is no significant impact on the overall model.
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5.3.3 Estimates for the cumulative logistic regression
We begin the discussion in this section by examining the result of using a single ex-
planatory variable. The regression results shown in Table 5.7 use Score10 as the reference
category. So a negative β means more borrowers move to a state with a higher behavioural
score whenever the explanatory macroeconomic variable increases one unit.
Initial i
CPI GDP Interest rate Stock Unemployment
(k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L)
3+Cycle (6,1) -1.7764** 848 (3,1) 0.1119** 855 (6,1) -5.2234* 843 N N N (9,.8) 1.7812** 854
Inactive (12,1) -6.4673* 101530 (12,1) -0.9764* 106849 (6,.8) -9.9927* 99844 (2,.2) 7.8655* 110248 (12,1) 6.016* 106520
Score1 (12,1) -0.9668* 7747 (12,1) -0.1098** 7758 (12,1) -1.8927* 7746 (2,.2) -3.0851** 7749 (12,1) 1.5825* 7739
Score2 (6,1) -1.0983* 87751 (12,1) -0.1692* 88073 (6,.8) -3.4636* 87881 (1,1) -0.6749* 88225 (12,1) 1.7241* 87916
Score3 (6,1) -1.2022* 430217 (12,1) -0.1863* 432117 (12,1) -2.5571* 431345 (3,.8) -3.2326* 432565 (12,1) 2.0705* 430555
Score4 (12,1) -1.0462* 845059 (12,1) -0.1251* 846900 (12,1) -1.844* 844964 (3,.8) -5.8616* 845166 (12,1) 2.2039* 842108
Score5 (12,1) -0.5408* 730487 (12,1) -0.0745* 730792 (12,1) -0.9525* 730495 (3,.8) -3.0535* 730480 (12,.8) 1.2364* 729680
Score6 (9,1) -0.8268* 385572 (12,1) -0.1345* 385961 (12,1) -1.7219* 385425 (3,.8) -3.6684* 385876 (12,.8) 1.6059* 385116
Score7 (12,1) -1.5348* 428421 (12,1) -0.1968* 429894 (12,1) -1.8635* 429469 (3,.8) -4.1701* 430120 (12,1) 2.252* 427946
Score8 (6,1) -1.7928* 680673 (12,1) -0.4607* 683939 (12,1) -2.9207* 684962 (3,.8) -3.0955* 689597 (12,1) 3.5824* 680296
Score9 (12,1) -1.9308* 549049 (12,1) -0.1276* 553407 (12,1) -2.6738* 550782 (1,1) -4.1888* 551750 (12,1) 2.6247* 549195
Score10 (9,1) -2.9673* 428366 (12,1) -0.6563* 433237 (12,1) -2.5793* 434126 (3,.8) -15.8883* 433483 (12,1) 3.8103* 427040
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable.
Table 5.7: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates
The number of borrowers moving to a high behavioural score increases with inflation.
This is different from the general perception which holds that inflation is an indicator of
more challenging times ahead and thus the risk score of consumers will be lower, and the
results in corporate research (Figlewski et al., 2006) which indicates inflation is associated
with increased risk of a rating downgrade. Our results indicate that behavioural score and
CPI move in the same direction. This is because the behavioural scores of borrowers go up
during expansion, and so does CPI. One can observe in Figure 1.1 that the year-on-year
CPI percentage change was positive from 2005 to 2007. This result shows one should use
not only inflation or deflation to predict the direction of the behavioural score movement
but also add other economic indicators to help make such estimates.
The coefficient estimates of the GDP variable are fairly similar and the best combina-
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tion of the macroeconomic variable is the mean of the previous twelve months. So if GDP
goes up, borrowers’ behavioural score improves gradually and it takes one year for credit
card holders to gain the real benefit. Similar results hold in the corporate risk research
which says there is a lower number of credit rating downgrade (Figlewski et al., 2006) or
higher default risk (Helwege and Kleiman, 1997) when GDP grows.
Consumers’ scores tend to increase when interest rate goes up as all coefficient esti-
mates with respect to the Interest Rate model are positive. The coefficient estimate of
3+Cycle is high and the lag is only six months. This shows interest rate has a more se-
vere impact on those in arrears than for standard behavioural score accounts. Moreover,
interest rate has a significant impact on Inactive accounts. These people tend to activate
their credit card account when the interest rate goes up.
The estimates of the Stock variable show stock market performance is a key indicator.
It is however rather hard to find a consistent trend in the regression coefficients. It
is evident that there is a huge dependence between Score 10 and Stock market, with
regression parameters β = −15.8883. So if stock market goes up, people’s behavioural
score improves. (A similar result found by Figlewski et al. (2006) which show reduced
credit rating downgrade if the stock market is doing well.) Conversely, when it goes down,
their score goes down and it is those in scoreband 10 (the highest) who are most hit.
Unlike the findings in Figlewski et al. (2006) which show labour market have volatile
impact on the credit rating, our finding show that the effect of the labour market is clear in
our parameter estimates. The parameters are positive and thus indicate the behavioural
scores are moving inversely with unemployment rate. The coefficient estimates for Inactive
borrowers are significantly higher than those of the other accounts. This indicates that
borrowers tend to use their credit cards when the labour market is not doing well.
Table 5.8 shows the cumulative regression results of the multivariate model. Putting
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Initial i
Model A Model B
CPI GDP Stock
-2Log(L)
Stock Unemployment
-2Log(L)
β β β β β
3+Cycle -1.6538** 0.0811 N 846 N N N
Inactive -6.2968* -0.1634* 9.9704* 100046 12.1121* 6.7087* 104552
Score1 -0.9267** -0.0314 -3.3048* 7731 -2.4069** 1.3978* 7731
Score2 -1.1747* -0.0227 -1.8722* 87659 -0.2523 1.7104* 87914
Score3 -1.4405* 0.0025 -5.874* 428739 -1.8103* 1.9667* 430410
Score4 -0.9516* -0.0183** -5.6601* 842854 -4.0862* 1.9673* 841003
Score5 -0.448* -0.0351* -3.148* 729955 -3.1522* 1.2489* 729141
Score6 -0.9523* 0.0114 -4.3578* 385007 -3.4841* 1.5761* 384748
Score7 -1.366* -0.0359* -3.105* 428121 -1.463* 2.1433* 427886
Score8 -1.7587* -0.1467* -6.4164* 677831 0.0597 3.5864* 680296
Score9 -1.9944* 0.0805* -3.3807* 547479 -3.0181* 2.36* 548145
Score10 -3.7399* 0.3292* -2.1302* 427866 -0.1625 3.7916* 427040
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise cumulative logistic regression cannot find any signifi-
cant explanatory macroeconomic variable.
Table 5.8: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates - Model
A and Model B
more than one variable into the cumulative logistic regression changes the signs of some
regression coefficients (highlighted in bold). This is because macroeconomic variables are
correlated with each other (as presented in Table 5.2). These collinear variables contain
the same information about the behavioural score migration. When one puts all these
variables together in a multivariate regression, the coefficient parameters are adjusted in
order to give a precise estimation of the behavioural score.
For example, say we examine the linear relationship between the dependent variable Z
and independent variables X and Y . The equations describing the relationships between
the dependent variable and each independent variable are:
z = 10 + 0.5x, z = 10 + 0.01y (5.8)
Hypothetically, if x and y are independent from each other, then the equation line de-
scribes the relationship between z and x and y is:
z = 10 + 0.5x+ 0.01y (5.9)
One can interpret this equation as ”‘if the value of x is unchanged and the value of y
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increases one unit, the value of z increases 0.5.”’ However, if x and y are correlated, any
change in y essentially changes the value of x. In that case, if we still use the above
equation to estimate z, then the value of z is too high or too low. Therefore if one puts x
and y together as independent variables of a regression analysis, the coefficient estimates
of x and y are different to those presented in (5.9) and are as follows:
z = 10 + (0.5 + δ1)x+ (0.01 + δ2)y, where δ1, δ2 ∈ <. (5.10)
If one would like to observe the actual impact of the independent variable, s/he should
use (5.8). Whereas if the objective is to predict the value of z from x and y, equation
(5.10) is used.
Note that as the magnitude of the coefficient estimates of these macroeconomic vari-
ables is small, it is possible that any adjustment in these coefficient estimates could change
their sign. Model A and Model B can be used later as a prediction of the behavioural
score migration whereas one should not use the models’ coefficient estimates to investigate
the impact of each individual macroeconomic measurement.
5.3.4 Comparing transition matrices
Suppose, at time t, the probability distribution of the behavioural score state is x(t) (a
row vector with dimension 1 × I) and the behavioural score transition matrix is Pt (a
I × I matrix). Then the probability distribution of the behavioural score state at t+ 1 is
given by
x(t+ 1) = x(t)Pt
Since we assume the behavioural score migration is a Markov chain, we can use the
following equation:
x(T ) = x(1)
T∏
t=1
Pt (5.11)
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to estimate the probability distribution of the behavioural score state at time T . What
we are concerned with is the accuracy of using our model’s transition matrix and this
essentially leads us to the comparison of the model’s transition matrix with the empirical
transition matrix. Moreover, we propose that estimating the migration of the behavioural
score through a transition matrix conditional on macroeconomic measurements has a
better performance than through an unconditional transition matrix. This proposition
will be verified in this section.
Score x(1)
x(12)
Real Unconditional CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Expansion
Closed 0 5.91 5.23 5.15 5.81 5.58 5.72 5.6 4.89 5.54
Inactive/New 8.09 1.59 1.6 1.48 1.66 1.74 1.68 1.67 1.37 1.74
Bad1 0 0.82 0.82 0.35 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.55 0.3 0.54
Bad2 0 0.41 0.29 0.12 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.2 0.1 0.19
3+Cycle 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
Score1 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04
Score2 0.27 0.32 1.39 0.44 1.3 0.84 1.22 0.88 0.33 0.82
Score3 4.17 4.18 9.95 4.71 9.66 7.23 8.86 7.52 4.04 7.15
Score4 16.12 15.58 16.97 10.72 16.82 15.82 15.73 14.9 10.09 14.49
Score5 8.74 7.66 10.31 7.05 10.25 9.7 9.66 9.42 6.49 9.3
Score6 4.48 4.67 5.39 3.68 5.4 4.68 5.08 4.93 3.35 4.93
Score7 6.18 7.42 5.97 4.47 6.05 5.29 5.59 5.76 4.08 5.73
Score8 12.11 12.62 12.17 11.37 12.71 11.87 11.66 12.88 10.52 12.94
Score9 8.69 8.08 12.21 15.44 12.58 14.03 12.26 14.2 14.7 14.59
Score10 31.08 30.66 17.6 35 16.64 22.18 21.42 21.43 39.72 22
Chi-square Value 8263 5142 9177 4403 4846 4817 7084 4578
Recession
Closed 0 6.14 6.29 6.85 6.62 6.49 6.15 6.71 6.63 6.49
Inactive/New 7.03 1.56 1.3 1.53 1.24 1.41 1.44 1.38 1.38 1.33
Bad1 0 2.03 2.19 3.27 2.73 2.44 2.01 2.66 2.8 2.43
Bad2 0 0.72 0.77 1.16 0.98 0.88 0.73 0.96 1 0.88
3+Cycle 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Score1 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.17
Score2 4.13 3.08 2.23 3.18 3.01 2.63 2.26 2.94 3.37 2.85
Score3 22.55 18.88 13.51 17.87 16.99 15.5 14.23 17.32 18.47 17.32
Score4 19.1 18.51 18.64 22.86 22.53 21.72 20.08 22.85 22.51 22.77
Score5 11.52 12.11 9.35 11.09 11.35 10.97 10.51 10.87 11.14 10.85
Score6 6.43 6.76 4.12 5.06 5.27 5.17 5.23 5.04 5.35 5.06
Score7 5.87 6.12 4.13 5.07 5.26 5.32 5.51 5.15 5.24 5.15
Score8 16.26 15.38 7.32 9.16 9.44 9.86 10.81 9.36 8.98 9.48
Score9 6.84 8.46 5.94 7.29 7.77 8.59 10.15 7.56 7.36 7.81
Score10 0.05 0.04 3.75 5.38 6.61 8.82 10.72 7 5.53 7.38
Chi-square Value 9679 6030 6045 6898 7674 6444 5883 6441
Table 5.9: Behavioural score state distribution
To compare these transition matrices, we look at the probability distribution of the
behavioural score at the beginning of the testing period. 49,577 random samples are
extracted from that month (May 2006) and the behavioural score state distribution is
listed in the second column of Table 5.9. We then calculate the ”‘Real”’ transition matrix
for the following 12 months (May 2006 to April 2007) and use (5.11) to calculate the
probability distribution in month 12 (i.e. April 2007). The outcome is listed in column 3
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of Table 5.9. We calculate x(12) with the unconditional transition matrix and the model’s
transition matrix with results listed in columns 4 to 11. For comparison, we extracted
49,319 random samples from January 2003 to repeat the exercise for the recession period.
The results are listed in the bottom part of Table 5.9. Note that the recession samples
are extracted from the in-sample period.
The chi-square test checks if real outcomes have the same distribution as those esti-
mated using the model. In a chi-square test, one compares the probability distribution
of the expected (E) and the observed (O) outcomes via the equation χ2 =
∑
i
(O−E)2
E
.
The expected outcome here is the probability distribution estimated with the model and
the observed outcome is the real probability distribution in the testing sample. Suppose
the probability distribution in month 12 estimated with the empirical transition matrix
xi(12), and the probability distribution in month 12 estimated with the unconditional ma-
trix or the model’s transition matrix is yi(12). We perform the test with a null hypothesis
xi(12) = yi(12),∀m. We look at the chi-square value of
χ2 =
∑
i
n
(xi(12)− yi(12))2
yi(12)
(5.12)
where n is the total number of testing samples, and check whether this value falls inside
or outside the significant value for a χ2 test with 14× 15 = 210 degrees of freedom. The
results are listed in the row labelled ”‘Chi-square value”’ in Table 5.9. Since the cutoff
value for the chi-square distribution with a significant level of 0.0001 is 294.9, we reject
the null hypothesis for all the models. Note that the chi-square values with respect to the
models (except those of GDP in Expansion) are lower than those for the unconditional
transition matrix. Moreover, during expansion, the value for Int model and Model B are
fairly low compared with the unconditional.
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5.3.5 Estimates for the linear regression analysis
We use linear regression analysis to determine the relationship between profit and macroe-
conomic variables. The mathematical model for this exercise is
r(l, i,M) = α(l,i) + Mβ(l,i) (5.13)
where β(l,i) is a single regression coefficient if we consider only one macroeconomic variable
(i.e. M is a 1×1 row vector) in the model, and if we look at more than one macroeconomic
variable β(l,i) is a column vector.
Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
L
im
it
1
3+Cycle -589.476** -652.867** -678.858** N -621.158** 540.0183** 12.1933 1935.966** N -570.256
Inactive -7.314** -8.6143** -8.7991** -8.102** -8.1227** 9.7712** 0.3303 12.6303** -14.6442** N
Score1 -721.331** -603.633** -697.424** -715.883** -696.929** -155.335 -83.1265** 250.3812 2145.11** -5.2385**
Score2 210.9161** 171.3952** 204.3485** 203.1618** 218.9636** 49.0768 27.6404** 66.4266 208.0974 -62.8712
Score3 155.957** 139.9364** 151.6328** 152.6542** 151.2403** 46.4859** 9.123** 25.9001 -209.489** -411.143**
Score4 34.0376** 33.1016** 29.8555** 32.6485** 29.742** 45.9363** -2.3676** -1.4438 -358.891** 8.1219
Score5 9.1264** 5.3085** 6.6943** 8.489** 7.547** 28.28** 1.6021 37.6679** -96.8838** 34.3265**
Score6 9.4106** -1.1335 5.5024** 8.4817** 6.9143** 42.5901** 6.0814** 49.826** -180.874** -5.4055
Score7 4.0183** -15.7759** -0.3522 2.1165** 0.9024 54.7493** 11.8198** 65.5427** 82.061** -11.0281
Score8 -7.2939** -16.2333** -9.3383** -6.757** -7.8107** 26.5937** 6.5408** 38.9994** -5.6362 -66.0161**
Score9 -6.602** -25.0574** -9.7546** -7.5314** -9.0821** 42.1238** 11.1475** 54.824** 38.5941** -37.106**
Score10 -10.4682** -18.4682** -10.9743** -9.2372** -10.1097** 20.6459** 5.8946** 21.8557** 102.7364** -57.5532**
L
im
it
1
0
3+Cycle -240.145** -259.441** -253.987** N -255.299** 105.5777** 1.2171 925.3441 N -13.9376
Inactive -3.6775** -10.6024** -7.2353** -5.8255** -5.4558** 22.5889** 3.6549** 30.6156** 10.7277 -121.131
Score1 -9714.84** -8457.12** -8950.95** -9393.02** -9172.78** -6020.89 -587.256 -8629.38 29437.71 -28.3977**
Score2 2164.712** 2746.148** 2518.092** 2431.85** 2366.31** -2106.1** -260.719 -11469** -1248.94 6161.068
Score3 1655.627** 1395.439** 1591.255** 1631.801** 1606.639** 632.7056** 158.4026** 1228.397** -1237.93 2284.35
Score4 1044.634** 541.4482** 822.3373** 1006.78** 904.4936** 2304.4** 287.5503** 3174.84** -2991.74** -1251.11**
Score5 300.6129** 228.2479** 233.0438** 266.3223** 251.3212** 591.8813** 22.6957** 1105.934** -411.736** -2318.13**
Score6 169.7808** 82.3828** 129.103** 144.4935** 139.0193** 339.0175** 46.7821** 741.9142** 88.1014 -316.074**
Score7 144.8015** 176.4515** 153.566** 152.5672** 156.3525** -106.086** -15.9125 -65.1358 -33.239 -318.152**
Score8 112.6287** 64.5296** 101.1547** 103.0252** 106.99** 122.6226** 29.9533** 172.8561** 62.9689 213.8856**
Score9 82.3667** 72.3827** 75.9774** 77.8565** 76.1055** 68.3721** 3.718 97.8609** 46.4252 -221.822**
Score10 79.1144** 67.3448** 79.9896** 82.0303** 78.7824** 51.6226** 9.5638** 36.5684** 275.961** -60.4351**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable and therefore we
did not build up the corresponding regression model.
The regression model is to test the relationship between the profit value and the macroeconomics variables
(mathematically,r(l, i,M) = α + βM)
Table 5.10: Summary of regression estimates
Here we only present the results with respect to Limit1 and Limit 10 in Table 5.10
and 5.11 respectively for illustration. One point of note is that the R-square of these
regression models are small (less than 0.05). This is because we use the whole samples
(N = 2, 994, 584) to generate the regression estimates. Thus deviations from the regression
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estimates can be explained by the unaccounted random heterogeneity of the population.
Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
L
im
it
1
3+Cycle -608.665** 541.825** 13.3096 N N N N
Inactive -4.5132** 14.7537** -1.6772** -20.402** -8.0167** -20.7451** -7.1456**
Score1 -604.204** 90.9678 -85.0342** 2035.695** -721.827** 2235.316** N
Score2 168.8085** 7.5201 28.8467** 263.2898** 218.2551** 65.7681 129.5972
Score3 150.3217** 31.9605** 4.0654 -155.113** 152.9342** -219.71** -405.564**
Score4 61.8805** 90.846** -14.8484** -417.7** 32.5289** -347.256** -9.1437
Score5 15.6126** 39.7014** -3.1942** -139.568** 8.2783** -97.8224** 10.1872
Score6 15.7792** 51.7884** -3.32 -179.321** 8.2836** -187.12** -6.2457
Score7 -4.49 45.5685** 5.4855** -52.4032 1.059 -85.7943** -15.2094
Score8 -10.5848** 21.5499** 2.2791** 11.276 -7.4663** -47.9994** -74.2411**
Score9 -17.8757** 27.1885** 6.9507** -2.8365 -9.0958** -12.9029 -39.9121**
Score10 -14.0573** 11.7416** 2.5647 19.9089 -10.0135** 51.4547** -59.0239**
L
im
it
1
0
3+Cycle -242.582** 139.4636** 5.3337 N N N N
Inactive -5.1008 20.1671** 0.8903 3.6767 -5.3841** -10.78 -19.8931**
Score1 -11750.3** -9279.42 1215.44 34300.96 -9390.48** 31043.92 -29.3218**
Score2 2055.639** -2528.27** 88.67 -3918.34 2379.206** -880.349 7319.155
Score3 1536.965** 485.1551** 77.0519** 144.0313 1625.127** -1719.76** 2245.768
Score4 1185.994** 2496.369** -62.9488** -4353.19** 942.9864** -4993.49** -1301.79**
Score5 432.7177** 768.8106** -75.7037** -736.595** 255.1174** -367.19 -2549.94**
Score6 205.6745** 412.684** -25.0685** 344.8193 138.3998** 68.635 -312.652**
Score7 153.294** -94.5249** -4.9552 -16.6526 155.2951** 133.2475 -317.88**
Score8 96.5516** 108.2475** 10.4781 209.8475 108.6581** -211.486 220.7216**
Score9 87.9927** 75.9425** -3.5223 44.2822 75.7165** 39.4081 -238.652**
Score10 84.6163** 48.2214** -3.5326 141.1312 79.0458** 123.4093 -59.4235**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory
macroeconomic variable and therefore we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table 5.11: Summary of regression estimates - Model A and
Model B
We hardly find any definite trend across different behavioural score groups. For ex-
ample, if Unemployment rate goes up, most people decrease their spending (such as
accounts with credit limit 1 and Score 10) but people with Score 8 and Limit 10 increase
their spending. But we can still draw several conclusions, as follows:
• If CPI, GDP or Interest rate goes up, the profitability of credit card accounts is
higher. Moreover, this profit decreases with behavioural score.
• If Unemployment goes up, the profitability of credit card accounts decreases and
the rate of decrease is higher in the low behavioural score group.
• There is no definite pattern for the impact of Stock market.
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When the model consists of more than one macroeconomic measurement, the most
significant results are those with respect to CPI and Unemployment. This is consistent
with the logistic regression results. It is thus more sensible to use a model with either
CPI or Unemployment rate as the lead variable.
5.3.6 Optimal policy
Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 1
3+Cycle 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Score2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
Credit limit 6
3+Cycle 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9
Score2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Table 5.12: Summary of optimal policy for accounts (for the first month of the period)
We use the transition matrices and profit functions conditional on the macroeconomic
climate during the out-of-sample period to generate the optimal policy2 for the MDP
2We use backward iteration to generate the optimal policies during Expansion (May, 2006 to April,
2007) and Recession (Jan, 2003 to Dec, 2003). Thus there are different optimal policies every month.
We present the optimal policy of the first month of that period. That is if the lender predicts that the
economy will experience expansion (or recession) in the coming year, what is the optimal policy in the
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model in (5.1). We present the results of accounts having credit limit band 1 and band 6
in Table 5.12 (Refer to Appendix D for the rest of the results).
The optimal policy for accounts in arrears (3+Cycle) and having the lowest behavioural
score (Score1) is to keep the current credit limit. This is what one would expect as these
accounts have a high default risk. The optimal policy for accounts having Score3 or
above is to increase their credit limit to the highest band. This can be explained by the
default probabilities. Since the probability of default is low, the model selects the highest
credit limit band in order to maximize the profit. A similar observation holds for Inactive
accounts.
To understand the effect of the economy on the optimal policy, we test the model
performance during the recession period. Note that this recession period (January 2003
to December 2003) is an in-sample period. The results for this in-sample recession period
are the same as those for the out-of-sample expansion period.
The transition matrices of recession and expansion are significantly different from each
other. It is surprising to find that the optimal policy stays the same in recession as in
expansion. We can explain this result with the profit function r(l, i,M). The former
increases in l for all i, i.e. profit is proportional to the credit limit. The MDP model
always increases borrowers’ credit limit to maximize the profit. If the expected loss given
default is large, the MDP model might not choose a high credit limit because it may lead
to a greater loss when in default. In our model, the loss when in default (i.e. r(l, D,M)) is
very small so the decision does not change at all. Therefore, even though there is difference
in the transition probabilities for recession and expansion, the model still generates the
same result.
To understand the impact of the loss values, we change r(l, D,M) to generate the
first month of this period?
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 1
3+Cycle 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Credit limit 6
3+Cycle 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 5.13: Summary of optimal policy for accounts (loss equals to the credit limit)
optimal policy. We set the loss of an account equal to its credit limit. For example,
say the credit limit of Limit 1 is HK$10000, if an account with Limit 1 defaults, the loss
r(l, D,M) is equal to −HK$10000. Note that the losses during expansion or recession are
the same. The result is presented in Table 5.13. The results for recession and expansion
are very different in that the credit policy during Recession is far more conservative.
For example, the model suggests keeping the credit limit of an account with a Score 3
and Limit 1 unchanged during recession whereas the model suggests increasing the credit
limit of these portfolios to Limit 10 during expansion. These results show the model
can generate different policies in different economic conditions provided that one uses a
high enough default value. Thus one way a lender can be conservative with the optimal
credit limit policy is to assume default values which are higher than the historical average.
93
Indeed, lenders have different credit limit policies in different economic conditions in the
credit card industry. After the global financial crisis in September 2008, many credit card
issuers reduced risk by decreasing credit limits on active cards (Business Finance Week,
2009).
5.4 Incorporating macroeconomic variables into the
UK data
We apply the model to the UK data. The objective is to contrast and compare the use of
macroeconomic measurements in credit card model with two datasets to make sure that
some properties of the models might hold in general while others depend on the particular
economy under investigation. We will not discuss the estimates in depth and instead only
present the critical estimates. The full results are presented in the Appendix B.
We present the estimates of the multinomial and cumulative logistic regression coeffi-
cient estimates of the UK dataset in Tables 5.14, B.3, 5.15 and B.4.
We first compare the results in Table 5.14 with those in Table 5.5. For the CPI model,
the implications for the HK and UK data are ”‘A > T > C”’ and ”‘A > C > T”’
for inactive accounts respectively. These indicate that when the economy experiences
inflation, more Inactive accounts activate their credit cards. On the other hands, when
there is inflation, the Others accounts in HK and UK react differently. In HK, more Others
borrowers reduce the use of their credit cards since the implication is ”‘T > A > C”’.
The UK borrowers react more extremely to inflation as many of them close their accounts
(since the implication is ”‘C > A > T”’) when there is inflation. The increase of interest
rate is also an indicator for inflation and therefore the results in the Interest Rate model
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Score i
Macroeconomics Format Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood) Implications
Measurement (k,w) β β β
Inactive CPI (9,1) 1.9152* -9.3047* 11.2199* 222005 A>C>T
Risk CPI (N,N) N / / -
Others CPI (12,.8) -2.333* -3.6692* 1.3362* 255310 C>A>T
Inactive GDP (6,1) -3.436* -0.3594* -3.0765* 219995 T>C>A
Risk GDP (12,.8) 0.585** / / 1592 A>C
Others GDP (9,1) -0.2084* 0.3474* -0.5558* 255449 T>C>A
Inactive Int (1,1) 6.5946* 6.1976* 0.397** 228573 A>T>C
Risk Int (9,1) -9.5591** / / 1589 C>A
Others Int (12,1) -10.5283* -7.0736* -3.4547* 255240 C>T>A
Inactive Sto (2,.8) -18.5047* -26.1677* 7.663* 223946 C>A>T
Risk Sto (2,0.2) -5.8758** / / 1586 C>A
Others Sto (3,.8) 3.8009* 3.5201* 0.2809 255660 A>T>C
Inactive Une (1,1) -0.7448* 3.3103* -4.0551* 219815 T>C>A
Risk Une (9,1) -9.5591** / / 1589 C>A
Others Une (12,1) -10.5283* -7.0736* -3.4547* 255240 C>T>A
”/” represents there is no observation in the data.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise multinomial logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory
macroeconomic variable.
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
The first column is the index of the initial score state i where ”‘Others”’ refers to accounts with
ordinary behavioural score (Score1 to Score4).
The best fit macroeconomic variables (discussed in Section 5.2.4) are presented in column three.
The estimated parameters are presented in column four to six.
-2log(likelihood) ratios which are used to measure the model fit statistics are presented in column
seven.
Log(A/C) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.2)
Log(T/C) represents log
(
p(T |i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.3)
Log(A/T) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(T |i,M)
)
in (5.4)
Table 5.14: Summary of the multinomial logistic model estimates for the UK
dataset
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are very similar to those of the CPI model. When the interest rate goes up, more Inactive
borrowers in HK or UK require additional credit since more of them are moving to an
active status. The Others borrowers in UK tend to close their account whenever the
interest rate increases but those in HK tend to remain inactive.
The way HK and UK Inactive borrowers react to GDP is very similar. When GDP
goes up (i.e. the economy is doing well), more HK Inactive borrowers close their accounts
(since the implication is ”‘C > T > A”’) and more UK Inactive borrowers remain inactive
(since the implication is ”‘T > C > A”’). In other words, the Inactive borrowers do not
need credit when the economy is doing well. For the Others borrowers, the implications
of the HK and UK data are ”‘T > A > C”’ and ”‘T > C > A”’ indicating more of them
move to an Inactive status. So in summary, these results show borrowers do not want
credit during good times.
The borrowers’ reaction to Stock market is different in the HK and UK markets.
When there is bull market, more Inactive borrowers in HK activate their credit card
immediately (since the lag=1 and the implication is ”‘A > T”’). Conversely, in UK,
more Inactive borrowers close their accounts when the stock market is doing well. For
the Others borrowers in HK, they tend to reduce borrowing with their credit card when
the Hang Seng index increases, whereas those in UK keep their current status unchanged
(i.e. remain Active).
The reaction to the labour market is quite similar in these two credit card datasets.
The HK borrowers, either the Inactive or Others, close their credit cards when the un-
employment rate increases. In the UK market, Inactive borrowers remain as inactive but
Other borrowers tend to close their credit card account when the unemployment rate goes
up. We performed multinomial analysis for Model A and Model B and the results are
presented in the Appendix B for reference.
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Initial i
CPI GDP Interest rate Stock Unemployment
(k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L) (k,w) β -2Log(L)
Inactive (6,1) -1.0618** 133333 (3,1) -0.2249** 13332 (3,1) -1.3373** 13340 (2,0.2) -1.6606** 13337 (3,1) -1.3373** 13340
Risk (9,1) 1.5535** 7382 (9,1) 0.7646* 7354 (12,1) 6.8403** 7376 (3,0.8) 3.286** 7380 (12,1) 6.8403** 7376
Score1 (1,1) 0.0881* 385808 (12,1) -0.3608* 385442 (6,0.8) 0.8759* 385830 (1,1) -0.8003* 385797 (6,0.8) 0.8759* 385830
Score2 (1,1) -0.1732* 559078 (9,1) -0.2894* 558900 (12,1) -2.5087* 559150 (1,1) -1.2616* 559112 (12,1) -2.5087* 559150
Score3 (1,1) -0.2399* 604810 (9,1) -0.185* 605137 (1,1) 0.6274* 605191 (2,0.5) -1.4517* 605161 (1,1) 0.6274* 605191
Score4 (1,1) -0.3256* 364450 (12,1) 0.7598* 363388 (9,1) -5.9774* 364486 (3,0.8) 3.9488* 364727 (9,1) -5.9774* 364486
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
Table 5.15: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates for the UK dataset
We look at the results in Table 5.7 and 5.15 to compare the behavioural score migration
of credit card borrowers in HK and UK. Since most of the coefficient estimates with
respect to the CPI model in both markets are negative, these datasets show borrowers’
behavioural score increases when there is inflation. All coefficient estimates with respect
to the GDP model are negative. These indicate that the behavioural score of borrowers
increases when the economy is doing well (which is shown by the increase in GDP).
The borrowers in HK and UK react differently with respect to increasing Interest
Rate. Most of the coefficient estimates of the Interest Rate model of the UK dataset are
positive. These indicate that borrowers’ behaivoural score reduces when there is inflation.
Conversely, the behavioural score of the HK borrowers increases when the Interest Rate
goes up since all coefficient estimates of the Interest Rate model of the HK dataset are
negative.
Most of the coefficient estimates with respect to the Stock market model in both
markets are negative. This indicates the behavioural score of borrowers improves when
there is bull market. One surprising result of the Unemployment model in UK is that
there are negative coefficient estimates. These indicate borrowers’ move to a state with
high behavioural score when the unemployment rate increases. Note, however, that the
labour market in UK was rather stable over the sampling period and thus this result
might not reflect the actual impact of unemployment rate on the UK market.
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5.5 Macroeconomic measurements
5.5.1 Consumer Price Index
CPI is one of the mostly quoted macroeconomic variables and reflects whether the econ-
omy is experiencing inflation or deflation. In corporate research, CPI is not the key
macroeconomic measurements in understanding the credit rating migration. Study con-
ducted by credit rating agencies (such as Moody’s Investor) has seldom incorporated CPI
as a macroeconomic indicators. Figlewski et al. (2006) found that the influence of infla-
tion on credit rating upgrade is inconsistent in sign and not significant but it is significant
in reflecting the credit rating downgrade. However, in our study, most of the regression
estimates for the HK and UK data of the CPI model are significant at 1% level. Note that
the CPI model and Model A generate rather satisfactory results. We therefore propose
using CPI as one of the key components for credit card pricing models.
For CPI, we expect positive coefficients in the cumulative logistic regression models, i.e.
prices and behavioural scores should be moving in opposite directions. The assumption
is that inflation indicates tough times ahead and therefore the capital level of credit card
borrowers reduces. However, the results have the opposite sign. That is, when prices
go up, more credit card borrowers move to a state with high behavioural score. This
observation can be found in both HK and UK datasets, i.e. this observation holds in
periods of both expansion and recession.
Looking at the overall economy during the sampling period, both regions experienced
inflation during expansion, and the HK market was in deflation during recession. It is
certainly true that credit card borrowers’ behavioural scores will be downgraded during
downturns. It happened that during downturns, prices were going down in the HK region
and so were the credit card accounts’ behavioural score. The implication is that there is
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no definite sign for the CPI measurement. Prices can go up during a recession (e.g. In
1970s, US was in inflation during recession of which CPI rose more than 10%). Using the
percentage difference (year-to-year or month-to-month) of CPI can reflect the financial
stress on households, but not the direction of the economy. One possibility is to use a
model with both GDP and CPI as explanatory variables. GDP is the best measurement
to reflect the direction of the economy. Indeed, Model A, which includes both CPI and
GDP as explanatory variables, has a very satisfactory performance.
One final remark about the use of CPI is the lag in CPI. It appears that the CPI
variables should have a short lag. This can be explained as follows. Since Governments are
using a set of household commodity prices to measure the CPI, it reflects the instantaneous
financial stress on a consumer, and thus the reaction time is rather short.
5.5.2 Gross Domestic Product
GDP is designed to measure the overall output of an economy. This overall output includes
the production of listed corporates, private companies, consumers and households. It is
not limited to measuring output in the consumer spectrum. GDP is widely used in the
corporate risk research (Fons, 1991; Achary et al., 2004; Pesaran et al., 2006)
The coefficient estimates in the GDP model are found to have the right sign (Figlewski
et al., 2006): negative implies that behavioural score goes up with the GDP. The only
exception is the coefficient estimates (β = 0.7598) with respect to accounts in a state with
Score4 in the UK dataset. Indeed the behaviour of accounts with the highest behavioural
score are generally different from the rest of the accounts. This can be explained through
the same argument presented in Chapter 6: Revolvers in the state with the highest
behavioural score have a volatile migration pattern.
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The lag of GDP is usually twelve months since it takes some time for consumers to
absorb the changes in the economy. Since all coefficient estimates of the GDP models are
negative which is an expected sign, GDP can be used as a good indicator of the economy.
We therefore recommend keeping it in any credit card pricing model.
5.5.3 Interest Rate
”‘Interest Rate”’ as used in this thesis are the Best Lending Rate and the base rate bench-
marked by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Bank of England respectively.
The question is whether the Interest rate variable is a good measurement to be used in
the credit card pricing model. Interest rate is a monetary policy controlled by the cen-
tral bank and is not driven by the market, and this is therefore a variable that reflects
the economy as a whole. However it can influence consumer loan interest rates directly,
or indirectly via interbank lending rates and cost of funding. The interaction between
behavioural score migration and the Interest rate variable is worth exploring for two rea-
sons. First, if a mortgage borrower chooses a tracker mortgage (i.e. the interest rate of
the mortgage varies throughout the repayment periods), the Interest Rate indicates the
mortgage borrower’s financial stress. Secondly, Interest Rate can be used as an indica-
tor to reflect the overall movement of the economy. We recommend using Interest Rate
as a single explanatory variable but do not associate it with any other macroeconomic
measurements, since we wish to avoid having the explanatory variables highly correlated,
leading to multicollinearity in the logistic regression model.
In our models, the coefficient estimates of the Interest Rate model are highly signifi-
cant. For the HK dataset results, the magnitudes and the signs (all are negative) of the
coefficient estimates in the Interest Rate model are very stable. These results indicate
the behavioural score goes up when the interest rate is raised. In corporate risk research,
however, the default probability increase when the interest rate goes up Figlewski et al.
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(2006). If we examine the impact of interest rate on the UK dataset, there are positive
and negative signs for the regression coefficients in the UK dataset. Aside from the Risk
accounts, the magnitude of the negative regression coefficients estimates are very small.
For the Risk accounts, it is to be expected that the results are relatively volatile. Thus we
conclude that in general more accounts move to a higher behavioural score group when
the Interest Rate goes up.
5.5.4 Stock Market
We expect the performance of the Stock Market to have two major impacts on credit card
borrowers. The first is essentially the real wealth term. Any increase or decrease of the
Stock Index affects the capital and property level of consumers who have invested on the
stock market. An increase in real wealth leads to an upgrade in behavioural score. On the
other hand, a bear market reduces these consumers’ savings and so increases their default
probabilities, and thus it is to be expected their behavioural scores will be downgraded.
Another possible impact of the Stock Market is on the consumer’s confidence index. This
is particularly true for the HK market where the stock market is the key industry.
The importance of the Stock Market is reflected in both datasets. First, across all
behavioural score levels, the coefficient estimates of the Stock model are highly significant.
Despite this, it is hard to find a definite trend across different behavioural score groups.
A possible explanation is that investment in the Stock market is not proportional to
behavioural score but rather depends on the individual. However, in general, accounts in
a state with the highest or the lowest behavioural score are highly sensitive to the Stock
Market.
101
5.5.5 Unemployment Rate
The last macroeconomic variable examined in this study is the Unemployment rate which
reflects the condition of the labour market. Unemployment rate is not commonly used in
corporate research to reflect the condition of the economy. Only Figlewski et al. (2006) use
the unemployment to understand the migration of credit rating and they found that have
volatile impact on the credit rating transition. We believe stock market is a critical indica-
tor in consumer research because this is directly related to consumers. The expected sign
for this measurement is positive, indicating that the score migration is moving inversely
with unemployment rate.
The HK dataset has the right sign whereas there is a conflicting finding on the UK
dataset. When the unemployment rate goes up, more people in the highest behavioural
score group remained in the same behavioural score group. This can be explained in that
the unemployment rate over the UK sampling period is very stable (around 5%). Having
this stable unemployment rate makes it hard to generate a very significant result to reflect
the actual impact of the unemployment rate.
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5.6 Conclusions
The model built in this chapter has shown that including macroeconomics measurements
in credit limit decisions adds another dimension - flexibility to reflect the performance of
the economy. In particular, using the transition probabilities generated with the macroe-
conomic variables can describe the behavioural score movement better than using the
unconditional transition probabilities. Also we compared the use of macroeconomic vari-
ables in credit card models with the UK and HK datasets. The table below summarizes
the use of the macroeconomic variables.
Macro. variable Lag Weight Notes
CPI 6 months 1 Critical measurements but cannot reflect the direc-
tion of the economy
GDP 12 months 1 Not directly related to the credit card market but
it is a good indicator to show the direction of the
economy
Interest Rate 12 months 1 Use individually
Stock market 3 months 0.8 A critical indicator to show the financial stress and
future confidence of credit card holders
Unemployment rate 12 months 1 Significant results for recession period
Table 5.16: Summary of using macroeconomic variables in the model
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Chapter 6
Transactors vs Revolvers
This chapter looks at the heterogeneity of behavioural score migration with respect to the
repayment pattern. We classify the credit card accounts into transactors and revolvers
and adjust the model proposed in Chapter 5 for analysis. Note that since we have limited
data in the UK dataset, in this chapter, we only analyze the Hong Kong credit card
dataset and empirical results for the performance of the model during expansion and
recession are presented.
6.1 Definition
In common with many other researchers (Frydman et al., 1985; Thomas et al., 2002), we
segment the credit card population into smaller groups in order to enhance the model’s
ability to forecast the credit card accounts’ future behaviour. In the credit card indus-
try, borrowers are classified as Transactors or Revolvers, where a Transactor makes full
repayment and a Revolver carries part of their outstanding balance to the next month.
Revolvers are preferred by lenders since these consumers pay both financial charges and
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merchandise fees. Different borrower types not only have different profitability, but it is
also the case that Transactors and Revolvers have diverse behavioural score migration
patterns, as we will show in later sections.
The key to classifying borrowers into Transactors(indexed by n = 0) and Revolvers
(indexed by n = 1) is to look at whether (1) borrowers had any balance carried forward or
(2) were in arrears. This classification was done by looking at a number of variables: cur-
rent balance, repayment amount, date of last repayment, membership fee and behavioural
score. As it might not be representative to look at repayment history in a single month
only, we instead examine the half year repayment history of an account.
Let t be the time that the sample has been selected. The six months preceding this
point is our observation period (i.e. t − 6 to t − 1). If the borrower was in arrears
at any point during the observation period, we classified this borrower as a Revolver.
Otherwise, we looked at the borrower’s repayment pattern. If this borrower was not able
to repay the full balance in any month during the observation period, we also classified
this borrower as a Revolver. So what remains in the dataset are those able to repay all of
their balance during the whole observation period, and these are the Transactors. Note
that if a borrower has not activated his account six month preceding the sample point
(i.e. his account balance at t− 6 to t− 1 =0), he is also a Transactor.
Below is an algorithm that we used to classify borrowers into Transactors and Re-
volvers:
Step 0. Set t′ = t; define nt ≡ borrower type at month t (where nt = 0 if the borrower is a
transactor at month t, and nt = 1 otherwise); goto Step 2.
Step 1. Set t′ = t′ − 1. If t = t′ − 7, goto Step 7; Otherwise, goto Step 2.
Step 2. If the account is in arrears at t′, n = 1, goto Step 8; Otherwise, goto Step 3.
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Step 3. If the current balance at t′ is equal to or less than zero, nt′ = 0, goto Step 1;
Otherwise, goto Step 4.
Step 4. If the current balance at t′ is equal to the membership fee, nt′ = 0, goto Step 1;
Otherwise, goto Step 5.
Step 5. If the repayment at t′ is greater than or equal to the current balance at t′, nt′ = 0,
goto Step 1; Otherwise, goto Step 6.
Step 6. nt′ = 1, goto Step 1.
Step 7. If
t∑
t′=t−6
nt′ ≤ 0, then n = 0; Otherwise, n = 1. Goto Step8.
Step 8. Stop.
Step 1 iterates through the half year before the sample point. If a credit card account was
in arrears, Step 2 classifies this account as a Revolver. A credit card account having zero
balance is essentially a Transactor, as stated in Step 3. Lenders in Hong Kong commonly
agree to waive the credit card account’s membership fee if the credit card holder makes
such a request. Normally the fee will be reimbursed into the cardholder’s account in the
next statement. In Step 4, we thus assume an account having current balance equal to
the membership fee is a Transactor. If a credit card holder repaid the full balance, Step
5 classifies this cardholder as a Transactor. Step 7 calculates the number of months that
this account was a Revolver. If a credit card account was a Revolver for one or more
month, the algorithm classifies this account as a Revolver. Otherwise, this account is
assumed to be a Transactor.
6.2 Borrower type distribution
Figure 6.1 shows the borrower type distribution during the sampling period. Revolvers
accounted for 35% to 45% of the total borrowers. During a recession, borrowers are very
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Figure 6.1: Account type distribution (In-sample period)
careful over borrowing on a credit card. Unless there is no other credit means, borrowers
seldom carry any balance on their credit card. Therefore the percentage of Revolvers was
low during recession. Conversely, during good times, borrowers are more willing to spend
with their credit card even if they are not capable of repaying the balance immediately.
Because these borrowers are optimistic about the economy they do not mind to spending
their future income (i.e. borrowing with a credit card).
Type n at t
Type n′ at t+ 1
Row Count
Transactors Revolvers
Transactors 95.17 4.83 1871169
Revolvers 15.18 84.82 524100
Table 6.1: Unconditional transition probabilities of borrower type (with respect to the training
sample period)
The unconditional probability of moving between borrower type is listed in Table 6.1.
84% revolvers remain revolvers one period later. For Transactors this month on month
estimation was 95.2%. One can assume the event of changing account type follows a
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Geometric distribution. We first look at the monthly event of changing from a Transactor
to a Revolver. The probability of a Transactor changing to a Revolver is p = 0.0483. The
probability that a borrower remains a Transactor in the 1st to the (k-1)th month and
changes from a Transactor to a Revolver in the k-th month is:
P (X = k) = (1− p)k−1p
The expected value for the above probability distribution function is E[X] = 1
p
. Therefore,
the average number of months before a Transactor becomes a Revolver is 20.7(= 0.0483−1)
months. Similarly, Revolvers take 6.6(= 0.1518−1) months on average to become Trans-
actors.
6.3 The model
There are two possible approaches to model the borrower type: including the borrower
type in the state space or not. However, in view of the transition probability in Table
6.1, it is not very likely for a borrower to migrate from one borrower type to the others.
Therefore, we decided to fit two different MDP models: one for Transactors and one for
Revolvers. The approach of including the borrower type, on the other hand, is a possible
extension for future research. Once an account has been predefined as a Transactor or
Revolver, the assumption is that the borrower status of this account will not change in
the planning horizon. The model is similar to (5.1), except in that we have an additional
index n (n = 1, 2) for the borrower type. This leads to the following optimality equation
for V nt (l, i,M), the maximum expected profit over the next t periods that can be obtained
from an account which currently has a behaviour score i, a credit limit l, a borrower-type
n and macroeconomic variables M:
V nt (l, i,M) = max
l′∈Al
{rn(l, i,M) + λ
∑
i′
pn(i′|i,M)∫
qt−1(U|M)V nt−1(l′, i′,U)dU} (6.1)
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The pn(i′|i,M) gives the probability that this behavioural score changes to i′, and qt−1(U|M)
is the probability that the current macroeconomic variable changes to U. The profit to
the lender from the credit card borrower in the current period is rn(l, i,M) and the profit
in the remaining t − 1 periods is V nt−1(l′, i′,U) if the behavioural score changes to i′ and
the macroeconomic variables change to U. The definition of the discount factor λ and
the explanation of the optimality principle are the same as presented in (5.1). Similar to
the model presented in Chapter 5, V n0 (l, i,M), for all l, i,M, are the boundary conditions
of (6.1), i.e. the expected return of a customer at the end of the planning horizon. In
this study, we assume the boundary conditions equal to zero to simplify the discussion.
Whereas it is possible to set up different boundary conditions for different accounts (such
as introducing penalty for accounts with low behavioural score etc), we leave it for future
research to understand the sensitivity of the model to these boundary conditions.
Given a borrower of type n, currently in behavioural score state i, what change in
the behavioural score occurs in the next period and what is the impact of the macroeco-
nomic variables on this movement? We use the same approach to estimate the transition
probabilities and profit function as presented in Chapter 5.
6.4 Empirical results
We used the Hong Kong credit card data for empirical study. The definition of Expansion
and Recession, and the testing and training periods are the same as those defined in
Chapter 5.
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6.4.1 Unconditional transition matrices and profits
Table 6.2 shows the unconditional transition matrices for Transactors (the top part of
the table) and Revolvers (the bottom part of the table). After classifying the data into
Transactors and Revolvers, there are two inadmissible transitions: Transactors to 3+
Cycle, Revolver to Inactive. 3+cycle accounts (i.e. in arrears for 3 months or longer) have
carrying balance in their account and therefore our algorithm will classify these accounts
as Revolvers. Since Revolvers must have some carrying balance in their accounts and thus
their accounts are always activated, they can never move to an Inactive state. However,
we can have New Revolvers. A credit card account which was newly opened in the last
two months before the sample point is called New. We grouped these New accounts
with the Inactive accounts to simplify the discussion. New Transactors are those able to
pay back their balance during their short customer lifetime, whereas New Revolvers are
those having carry balance in the first two months of their lifetime with the lender. The
frequency distribution of Transactors’ behavioural score spreads quite evenly as shown in
the last column of the table. Conversely, there are a large number of Revolvers having a
behavioural scoreband 3 to 5.
These transition matrices are mainly dominated by the diagonal entries. One exception
is New Revolvers. These accounts borrowed at the beginning of their lifetime, therefore
it is not surprising to see more than half of them moved to a state with a low score band
(Score4 or lower). An account with Score1 is more likely to move to a state with Score2
or a state with Bad1, especially for Revolvers.
The volatility of score transition is clearly higher for Revolvers than for Transactors
such that the percentages remaining in the same behavioural score band for Transactors
are higher than those for Revolvers, especially for a state with behavioural Score6 to
Score9. On the other hand, the diagonal entry of Score1 or Score3 Revolvers is higher
than those for Transactors. This implies Transactors with low behavioural scoreband have
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Score i at t
Score i′ at t + 1 Row
Closed Inactive/New Bad1 Bad2 3+Cycle Score1 Score2 Score3 Score4 Score5 Score6 Score7 Score8 Score9 Score10 Count
Transactors
Inactive/New 1.02 82.99 0 0 - - 0.01 0.15 4.63 3.17 1.64 0.76 1.39 1.22 3.02 171115
Score1 1.25 - 25 2.5 - 26.88 38.13 5 1.25 - - - - - - 160
Score2 2.12 0.03 1.04 0.34 - 3.09 69 23.08 1.28 0.03 - - - - - 2977
Score3 1.43 0.82 0.06 0.03 - 0.06 1.29 74.47 18.88 1.75 0.94 0.16 0.09 0.03 0 55205
Score4 0.82 0.49 0.01 0 - 0 0.08 3.63 76.19 11.35 1.96 2.12 2.83 0.38 0.14 208900
Score5 0.77 0.46 0.02 0 - - 0.02 1.7 9.04 59.33 8.06 7.54 7.47 4.14 1.45 165033
Score6 0.77 0.78 0.01 - - - 0.01 0.71 3.4 13.77 53.78 7.67 13.75 2.01 3.33 104841
Score7 0.59 0.44 0.01 0 - - 0 0.55 2.78 9.83 7.6 51.45 11 12.16 3.58 116257
Score8 0.36 0.21 0.01 0 - 0 0 0.25 1.74 3.27 7.12 6.59 64 9.93 6.52 220698
Score9 0.29 0.12 0.01 0 - - 0 0.13 0.85 1.09 1 6.38 8.59 71.72 9.82 233977
Score10 0.21 0.01 0.01 0 - - - 0.06 0.45 0.18 0.42 0.76 5.57 7.65 84.68 264797
Revolvers
New - 13.17 0.08 0.16 - - 2.66 26.83 33.1 5.6 5.12 4.84 4.37 0.28 3.81 2520
3+Cycle 31.08 - 29.05 4.5 2.93 0.45 12.16 19.37 0.45 - - - - - - 444
Score1 2.42 - 31.32 5.73 3.35 13.76 40.7 2.68 0.04 - - - - - - 2688
Score2 1.18 - 1.86 0.88 0.65 3.87 65.56 25.55 0.45 0 - - - - - 45657
Score3 0.43 - 0.28 0.15 0.01 0.21 5.13 78.92 14.53 0.29 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 257708
Score4 0.4 - 0.06 0.03 - 0 0.28 12.48 74.77 9.45 1.16 0.79 0.47 0.09 0.03 278089
Score5 0.23 - 0.02 0 - - 0.05 3.05 17.65 60.6 5.35 3.18 6.34 2.94 0.6 104170
Score6 0.23 - 0.01 0 - - 0.03 3.34 15.6 12.01 48.61 5.77 6.26 5.66 2.48 26277
Score7 0.18 - 0.01 - - - 0.03 3.76 15.92 12.61 4.3 45.23 8.51 2.78 6.68 21689
Score8 0.11 - - - - - 0.01 2.45 8.5 11.12 3.69 3.2 54.27 3.97 12.68 40768
Score9 0.12 - 0.01 - - - 0.03 3.08 12.44 16.39 6.92 3.22 7.54 41.25 9.02 18998
Score10 0.1 - 0.01 0 - - 0 0.62 5.28 3.1 1.06 2.31 10.02 4.93 72.57 52301
”‘-”’ represents there is no sample observation.
”‘0”’ represents the transition probability is less than 0.0005.
A bold value indicates the transition frequency is greater than 50% .
The transition probabilities of all absorbing states (Closed, Bad1 and Bad2) are not shown in the table.
There is no 3+Cycle Transactors.
Table 6.2: Unconditional transition matrix (in percentage) for Transactors and Revolvers
a high probability of moving to a higher behavioural score state.
There is a larger behavioural score state movement for Revolvers than for Transactors.
For example, 11.12% Revolvers with Score8 move to a state with Score5 in the next month,
however, it is much less likely that Transactors will have such movement (only 3.27%).
Moreover, it is noticeable that more Transactors than Revolvers move to a state with
higher behavioural score in the next month. The number of default accounts (moving to
Bad1 or Bad2) is higher for Revolvers than Transactors, as may be expected.
Table 6.3 shows the profit value of Transactors and Revolvers. There is no consistent
trend for Inactive accounts if we look at the magnitudes of the profit values. Of course one
may say Inactive Transactors are not important accounts since they generate a loss less
than HK$11 per month. The loss is the cost of funding for account operation. However,
New Revolvers generate a profit of on average HK$182 per month. Note that the profit
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Limit1 Limit2 Limit3 Limit4 Limit5 Limit6 Limit7 Limit8 Limit9 Limit10
Transactors
Closed 71.54 94.81 198.91 308.33 105.74 215.04 438.92 272.94 483.64 1057.77
Inactive/New -10.75 -10.1 -9.97 -8.86 -5.76 -5.98 -5.18 -6.09 -8.08 -5.94
Bad1 -4472.83 -6000.56 -7038.7 -15959.43 -11803.34 -22019.16 -16774.42 -13915.23 -20945.72 -41227.9
Bad2 -2402.74 -6809.58 -5926.3 -11199.04 -15131.59 -6824.92 -16926.6 -23376.59 -31816.03 -25834.61
Score1 -515.09 -611.54 -1316.97 -978.37 -1820.19 -1530 -1520.76 -1111.14 -1751.72 -5975.94
Score2 207.11 285.63 463.95 562.84 436.29 791.46 967.87 888.83 650.08 1216.29
Score3 24.41 26.39 57.79 90.57 21.71 92.15 118.32 132.96 158.6 358.1
Score4 -6.3 -2.58 1.22 5.93 13.77 18.11 24.9 39.68 59.46 138.17
Score5 -2.62 -4.36 0.86 6.32 10.45 11.07 21.29 30.99 51.22 108.12
Score6 1 -5.86 -2.6 3.64 1.03 7.59 9.44 15.55 31.14 63.58
Score7 -3.74 -9.04 -4.63 -1.48 6.52 7.46 17 28.22 48.48 115.91
Score8 -11.87 -12.49 -9.79 -6.08 -2.68 0.27 6.02 13.14 30.09 84.23
Score9 -12.21 -12.9 -10.21 -7.98 -4.36 -2.57 2.52 10.8 23.16 63.88
Score10 -13.3 -11.57 -9.01 -6.96 -1.65 0.82 3.81 12.55 22.59 71.34
Revolvers
Closed -13.14 -15.54 -11.29 -8.65 -14.93 -9.88 -7 -8.43 -17.02 62.69
New 161.35 171.21 194.26 156.24 222.91 254.17 233.11 145.33 271.48 21.86
Bad1 -7828.04 -11363.53 -16486.3 -24312.91 -22590.3 -32337.07 -40516.15 -51693.26 -65367.88 -103788.13
Bad2 -3895.07 -5830.98 -8274.66 -11502.82 -13484.69 -16408.15 -20200.52 -24537.89 -34343.81 -54801.32
3+Cycle -635.15 -670.12 -1097.4 -1125.18 -951.49 -954.55 -1149.93 -2139.17 -711.03 -257.61
Score1 -709.45 -1137.16 -1546.51 -2068.89 -2022.05 -2569.78 -3214.09 -3920.44 -5575.69 -9426.65
Score2 204.64 253.53 362.36 478.14 567.48 695.55 924.13 1264.85 1416.39 2477.14
Score3 181.12 229.7 328.46 445.73 312.51 539.04 678.61 807.06 1026.91 1764.97
Score4 80.39 87.23 143.38 212.88 136.13 258.48 337.3 425.47 579.58 1296.55
Score5 35.62 27.36 43.27 60.9 48.47 76.37 98.9 127.35 193.44 450.07
Score6 36.76 27.96 35.14 42.32 71.9 65.3 88.8 103.91 141.88 388.53
Score7 37.29 36.1 45.6 42.16 70.82 70.24 69.51 92.65 141.58 313.29
Score8 21.46 20.53 22.68 26.3 78.15 61.2 74.88 86.54 128.61 214.26
Score9 45.53 45.25 48.88 61.51 131.85 115.58 116.02 163.87 181.04 284.54
Score10 15.69 23.99 17.51 17.69 55.27 42.86 47.67 71.47 87.83 158.78
The first column indexes the Score status and the first row indexes the Credit Limit statues
All values are in HK dollar (£1 ≈ HK$15)
For all absorbing states (Closed, Bad1, Bad2), we use the profit value (derived by the lender) in the month of the
account being written-off or closed.
Table 6.3: Average monthly profit for Transactors and Revolvers
with respect to New Revolvers with credit limit band 10 is low, only HK$21. In the
samples, there are 24 New Revolvers with credit limit band 10 of which 13 of these
borrowers were in arrears. That is, these 13 borrowers did not repay anything in their
second or third month-on-book. In the profit value defined by the lender, the provision is
higher for those in arrears than those not. Moreover, the provision decreases with month-
on-book (i.e. the longer credit history, the lower the provision). The provision for these
New in arrear Revolvers therefore is very high and skews the average profit.
Profit increases with credit limit if the account has a behavioural scoreband 2 or above
and decreases with credit limit if the account has a behavioural state Score1 or 3+Cycle.
These observations hold for both Transactors and Revolvers. For Transactors with a
behavioural state Score 2 or above, the profit is low. Roughly speaking, these profit
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values decrease with behavioural score. For Revolvers with Score 2 or above, the profit
value is much higher than those of Transactors. Since the number of Revolvers with Score
6 or above is low, the corresponding profit values fluctuate.
Given the same credit limit and behavioural score status, Revolvers in general generate
a much higher profit than Transactors. For example, Revolvers with a credit limit 10 and
behavioural score 10 add HK$158.78 monthly profit. This amount is double the profit of
a Transactor in the same state (HK$71.34). This is because the accumulated revolving
balance contributes interest to the profit.
The profit values with respect to different borrower types are different and thus justify
our argument for segmenting the samples by repayment pattern.
6.4.2 Estimates for the multinomial logistic regression model
Table 6.4 summarizes the multinomial logistic regressions results for Transactors and
Revolvers.
We first examined the behaviour of Inactive Transactors. The Implications for the
CPI and Interest Rate models are ”‘A > T > C”’ and ”‘A > T,A > C”’ respectively,
which both indicate more Inactive Transactors activate their credit cards when these two
measurements increase. Since the increase of CPI and Interest Rate indicates the economy
is in an inflationary period, these results show during inflation the demand for credit cards
increases. More Inactive Transactors activate their credit cards when the Stock market
is doing well and the reaction time with respect to changes of the Stock Index is quite
instantaneous with the lag equal to 1. Conversely, when GDP goes up, the Implication
”‘C > T > A”’ indicates more Inactive Transactors close their credit card accounts. Since
GDP is an index to show the economy’s performance, this result shows the demand for
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Score i
Macroeconomics Format Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood) Implications
Measurement (k,w) β β β
Transactors
Inactive/New CPI (9,1) 1.4277* 0.7147* 0.713* 168893 A>T>C
Others CPI (12,0.8) 0.4732* 1.1082* -0.635* 150157 T>A>C
Inactive/New GDP (3,1) -0.1609* -0.1077* -0.0532* 169017 C>T>A
Others GDP (12,1) 0.1116* 0.3073* -0.1958* 150143 T>A>C
Inactive/New Int (6,1) 2.0642* 0.1454 1.9188* 168166 A>T, A>C
Others Int (12,1) 1.0369* 2.0645* -1.0276* 150157 T>A>C
Inactive/New Sto (1,1) 0.8107 -0.607 1.4177* 169174 A>T
Others Sto (3,0.8) 3.0142* 4.5483* -1.5341** 150204 T>A>C
Inactive/New Une (9,1) -1.8346* -1.2699* -0.5647* 169109 C>T>A
Others Une (9,1) -1.1578* -2.6118* 1.454* 150011 C>A>T
Revolvers
New CPI (6,1) / / 1.2436* 1944 A>T
3+Cycle CPI (12,1) 2.0016** / / 541 A>C
Others CPI (12,1) 0.556* / / 43173 A>C
New GDP (4,1) / / 0.2085** 1956 A>T
3+Cycle GDP (N,N) N / / / /
Others GDP (N,N) N / / / /
New Int (9,1) / / 1.7144** 1950 A>T
3+Cycle Int (N,N) N / / / /
Others Int (12,1) 1.2527* / / 43148 A>C
New Sto (2,0.2) / / 8.2053* 1932 A>T
3+Cycle Sto (N,N) N / / / /
Others Sto (N,N) N / / / /
New Une (1,1) / / -1.0578** 1950 T>A
3+Cycle Une (N,N) N / / / /
Others Une (12,1) -0.5505** / / 43187 C>A
”/” represents there is no observation in the data.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise multinomial logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory
macroeconomic variable.
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
The first column is the index of the initial score state i where ”‘Others”’ refers to accounts with ordinary
behavioural score (Score1 to Score10).
The best fit macroeconomic variables (discussed in Section 5.2.4) are presented in column three.
The estimated parameters are presented in column four to six.
-2log(likelihood) ratios which are used to measure the model fit statistics are presented in column seven.
Log(A/C) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.2)
Log(T/C) represents log
(
p(T |i,M)
p(C|i,M)
)
in (5.3)
Log(A/T) represents log
(
p(A|i,M)
p(T |i,M)
)
in (5.4)
Table 6.4: Summary of the multinomial logistic model estimates for Transactors
and Revolvers
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credit reduces when the economy is expanding. More Inactive Transactors close their
account when the Unemployment rate increases. This is because borrowers are cautious
in borrowing during bad times.
For the Others Transactors, the implication for the CPI and Interest Rate models
is ”‘T > A > C”’ which indicates that these borrowers reduce the use of their credit
cards when these measurements increase. This result shows borrowers who have used
credit cards are very caution in borrowing when there is inflation. The implication for
the Stock market model is also ”‘T > A > C”’ which indicates these borrowers reduce
their spending when there is a bull market. The implication for the GDP model is the
same, which indicates when economy is doing well, borrowers reduce their spending with
credit cards. The implication for the Unemployment model is identical to those of Inactive
Transactors, that is these borrowers tend to close their credit card accounts when there
is stress in the labour market.
The coefficient estimates of the models with respect to the New Revolvers reflects the
lender’s decision only. These New Revolvers had no repayment record and therefore the
lender did not have enough information to generate a behavioural score for these accounts.
After two to three months, the lender was able to generate a score for them and those the
probability of moving from New to Active was an operational decision.
Only CPI has significant impact on the distribution of 3+Cycle borrowers moving
to the Active, Inactive and Closed state. The implication is ”‘A > C”’, that is, more
3+Cycle borrowers remain active if there is inflation. Or in other words, when there is
inflation, many of them are not able to repay their debt in full.
For Others Revolvers, the implication for the CPI and Interest Rate models is ”‘A >
C”’ which indicates these borrowers keep their carrying balance when there is inflation.
Conversely, if the unemployment rates goes up, i.e. the economy is in bad times, the
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implication is ”‘C > A”’. This result shows Others Revolvers want to payoff their debt
and so as reduce their spending.
Sixty-three percent of the data are Transactors, thus the parameter estimates of All
samples (presented in Chapter 5) are the same as those of Transactors. These results
show it is necessary to split the dataset in order to understand the finer details of the
behavioural score migration of different borrower types.
Model A (CPI, GDP, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood)
CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock
Transactors
Inactive 1.2601* -.1494* / 0.5401* -0.0937* / .7206* -.0556* / 168643
Others .4104* .0471** 3.2039* 0.6776* 0.2079* 5.2561* -0.2672** -0.1607* -2.0521** 150049
Revolvers
New / / / / / / 0.6591** -0.0293 6.2860* 1928
Model B (Unemployment rate, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(T/C) Log(A/T)
-2Log(likelihood)
Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment
Transactors
Others 2.6314* -1.1041* 4.5818* -2.6044* -1.9504* 1.5002* 149958
Revolvers
New / / / / 6.327* -0.684 1930
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
The models are developed only if there is significant variable found in Table 6.4.
Table 6.5: Summary of multinomial logistic model estimates of Model A and Model
B for Transactors and Revolvers
When comparing the parameter estimates between Table 6.4 and 6.5, there is one
sign-changed parameter (highlighted in bold). This is because there are correlations
among macroeconomic measurements. This does not change our conclusions about each
individual macroeconomic variable, since one should only use Model A and Model B to
predict the behavioural score in the next month, but not to look at the impact of each
macroeconomic variable (as explained in Chapter 5).
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6.4.3 Estimates for the cumulative logistic regression
Initial i
CPI GDP Interest rate Stock Unemployment
format β -2Log(L) format β -2Log(L) format β -2Log(L) format β -2Log(L) format β -2Log(L)
Transactors
Inactive
(12,1) -6.7626* 90454 (12,1) -1.0338* 95740 (6,.8) -10.6821* 88405 (2,.2) 8.7253* 99060 (12,1) 6.1264* 95680
/New
Score1 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
Score2 (6,1) -1.1155* 4766 (12,1) -0.1719** 4786 (12,1) -1.9464** 4790 (3,.8) 3.0606** 4791 (9,1) 1.6271* 4779
Score3 (1,1) 0.2402* 78654 (9,1) -0.0464* 78720 (6,.8) -1.0807* 78699 (3,.8) -2.4181* 78690 (1,1) -0.214* 78721
Score4 (6,1) -0.6927* 358061 (2,.8) 0.0847* 358405 (3,1) 0.4255* 358744 (3,.8) -2.7931* 358558 (12,1) 1.0019* 358405
Score5 (12,1) -0.4758* 452934 (12,1) -0.0408* 453113 (12,1) -0.8188* 452977 (1,1) -1.2288* 453009 (3,1) 0.6434* 452716
Score6 (6,1) -0.5952* 294268 (9,1) -0.0684* 294580 (12,1) -1.7539* 294154 (3,.8) -2.3313* 294553 (12,.8) 1.1221* 294252
Score7 (12,1) -1.3732* 348100 (12,1) -0.1568* 349143 (1,1) -1.3968* 348825 (3,.5) -2.8758* 349280 (12,1) 1.9061* 348043
Score8 (6,1) -1.838* 545258 (12,1) -0.4574* 548000 (12,.8) -2.9134* 549964 (3,.8) -3.0677* 552732 (12,1) 3.6516* 545299
Score9 (12,1) -2.0559* 460572 (12,1) -0.1364* 464680 (12,1) -2.846* 462499 (1,1) -4.8054* 462693 (12,1) 2.9001* 460294
Score10 (9,1) -3.7254* 305240 (12,1) -0.8775* 309471 (12,1) -2.8825* 312621 (3,.8) -18.5641* 311055 (12,1) 4.8722* 302997
Revolvers
3+Cycle (6,1) -1.7764** 848 (3,1) 0.1119** 855 (6,1) -5.2234* 843 N N N (9,.8) 1.7812** 854
New (12,1) -6.0597* 6651 (12,1) -0.8582* 7018 (6,.8) -8.1252* 6714 (1,1) 3.2333** 7274 (12,1) 5.6492* 6932
Score1 (12,1) -1.121* 7269 (12,1) -0.1207* 7284 (12,1) -1.8704* 7274 (2,.5) -3.4411** 7276 (12,1) 1.6939* 7263
Score2 (6,1) -1.0972* 82876 (12,1) -0.1688* 83178 (6,.8) -3.608* 82973 (1,1) -0.7666* 83316 (12,1) 1.723* 83028
Score3 (6,1) -1.4185* 345203 (12,1) -0.2419* 347142 (12,1) -2.8117* 346541 (3,.8) -2.9047* 348086 (12,1) 2.3614* 345653
Score4 (12,1) -2.0709* 462674 (12,1) -0.2984* 466338 (12,1) -2.9479* 463883 (3,.8) -6.621* 466882 (12,1) 3.2658* 460547
Score5 (12,1) -1.2195* 268739 (12,1) -0.155* 269524 (12,1) -2.085* 268642 (3,.8) -5.8526* 269147 (12,1) 2.3445* 268014
Score6 (9,1) -2.2351* 82911 (12,1) -0.5398* 83277 (12,1) -2.8916* 83258 (3,.8) -7.7378* 83872 (12,1) 3.6088* 82633
Score7 (9,1) -2.7243* 70587 (12,1) -0.3816* 71638 (12,1) -2.9425* 71305 (3,.8) -5.2799* 71999 (12,1) 2.9623* 70996
Score8 (12,1) -5.9702* 113322 (12,1) -1.0071* 119054 (12,.8) -6.4278* 116474 (3,.8) -2.6835* 122116 (12,1) 5.7196* 117738
Score9 (12,1) -4.8335* 62555 (6,1) 0.2139* 65905 (6,1) -8.1506* 61011 (1,1) 0.6409* 66004 (12,1) 1.9513* 65692
Score10 (12,1) -1.5928* 108006 (6,1) 2.2258* 102641 (6,1) -3.8963* 106356 (3,.8) -6.1142* 108710 (1,1) -1.6228* 108388
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable.
Table 6.6: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates for Transactors and Revolvers
Table 6.6 presents the results of the cumulative logistic regression for Transactors and
Revolvers. The top of this table presents the results for Transactors and the bottom of
this table presents those of Revolvers.
We first examine the impact of CPI. Except for those of Transactors with Score 3,
the coefficient estimates of borrowers with other scorebands are negative, which indicates
more borrowers move to a state with a high behavioural score if CPI goes up. This
means the default probabilities of borrowers decrease during inflation. The coefficient
estimate of Inactive Transactor is −6.7626, which indicates the behavioural score of these
accounts have a high increment when there is inflation. This is because after these Inactive
Transactors resume using their credit cards, it is likely the lender allocates them high
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scores as these borrowers have no debt history. The best fit format of the CPI variable
for Transactors is in general shorter than those for Revolvers indicating inflation has a
greater short-term impact on Transactors than Revolvers.
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Figure 6.2: The ”‘time”’ distribution of Revolvers in a state with Score 10 at t move to a state
with Score 9 or lower
The coefficient estimates with respect to the GDP model are positive which indicates
borrowers move to a state with higher behavioural score when the economy is doing well.
This is with the exception of Revolvers in a state with Score 10. When GDP increases,
these accounts move to a state with lower behavioural score when GDP goes up. Looking
at the data, there were 14344 Revolvers in a state with Score 10 which moved away from
their current behavioural score state. 61.08% of these accounts has just become Revolvers
at time t. That is, these accounts repaid their balance in month t−5, t−4, t−3, t−2, t−1
(when t is the sampling time) and had some carrying balance in month t. Our algorithm
classifies these accounts as Revolvers. As shown in Figure 6.2, the majority of these
accounts are found during Expansion. There are two reasons to explain why the logistic
regression model generates a positive regression parameter (β = 2.2258) for Revolvers with
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Score 10. The first is that Revolvers with Score 10 have a very good repayment history
over the last half year and therefore the scoring system gives them a high behavioural
score. However, such borrowers’ financial status is not very strong. Once there is any
over-spending, these Revolvers are not capable of paying off their balance. This happens
when the economy is doing well, when consumers tend to increase their spending. The
second reason is the lender’s policy which might change becuase of GDP increases. This
is something that is out of the scope of this research as we do not have a full access to
the behavioural score definition and the operational decisions of the lender.
The fact that the coefficient estimates of the Interest Rate model are negative indicates
the behavioural score of borrowers increases if interest rate increases. One observation
is that Interest rates put high pressure on Revolvers. The regression parameters of the
Interest rate model with respect to Revolvers are higher than those of the Transactors.
Borrowers take different time periods to react to changes in the economy. For example,
Transactors in a state with Score 4 (where lag=3) and Score 7 (where lag=1) react to
the Interest Rate quite instantaneously. However, the lag of the Interest Rate model for
Transactors in a state with Score 9 and 10 is 12 months. In general, the impact of Interest
Rates on Revolvers lasts longer than it does with Transactors.
The regression estimates of the Stock market model show the behavioural score mi-
gration is volatile with respect to the different bands. It is hard to find a consistent trend
among different behavioural score states. New Revolvers are much more likely to move
to a state with low behavioural score if the Stock variable is going up. This finding may
suggest that borrowers having a poor financial record were betting on the stock market
with money borrowed from credit cards.
The effect of the labour market is clear in our parameter estimates. The parameters of
the Une model are mostly positive and statistically significant, i.e. the behavioural scores
are moving in the opposite direction to unemployment rate. An exception, however, is
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Initial i
Model A Model B
CPI GDP Stock
-2Log(L)
Stock Unemployment
-2Log(L)β β β β β
Transactors
Inactive/New -6.6344* -0.1735* 11.2484* 88774 13.1573* 6.8782* 93563
Score1 N N N N N N N
Score2 -1.0792* -0.0111 0.2521 4766 1.4089 1.4945** 4778
Score3 0.3608* -0.1226* -2.31* 78509 -2.3993* -0.2078* 78672
Score4 -0.9296* 0.1018* -5.2144* 356878 -2.3834* 0.9174* 358234
Score5 -0.4808* 0.0021 -1.2261* 452792 -1.3505* 0.6641* 452545
Score6 -0.721* -0.0047 -3.6397* 293962 -2.4183* 1.1352* 294108
Score7 -1.3047* -0.0102 -2.3016* 347932 -1.2025* 1.8201* 348000
Score8 -1.8272* -0.1676* -6.88* 542404 -0.2025 3.6378* 545297
Score9 -2.078* 0.0669* -4.0183* 458706 -3.5998* 2.5935* 458966
Score10 -3.9639* 0.163* -2.6328* 305100 0.3265 4.9097* 302997
Revolvers
3+Cycle -1.6538** 0.0811 N 846 N N N
New -5.7948* -0.1473* 4.9853* 6613 7.316* 6.205* 6863
Score1 -1.1047** -0.0175 -3.6097** 7255 -2.4547** 1.4874* 7257
Score2 -1.1779* -0.0228 -1.9478* 82782 -0.3309 1.7018* 83025
Score3 -1.5812* -0.0217** -5.61* 344068 -0.9189* 2.3006* 345623
Score4 -1.8219* -0.0495* -4.8807* 461748 -2.0901* 3.0991* 460395
Score5 -1.2448* 0.0137 -5.7539* 268081 -4.0585* 2.1349* 267703
Score6 -1.9326* -0.0813* -5.9487* 82698 -0.9585* 3.5245* 82629
Score7 -3.0652* 0.1967* -0.7281 70487 4.3441* 3.4206* 70931
Score8 -7.4596* 0.4503* 8.0063* 112562 11.8904* 6.8287* 117044
Score9 -5.0535* 0.2151* 4.3363* 62258 2.5384* 2.222* 65630
Score10 -3.1794* 2.2038* 16.7296* 101499 -12.9723* -2.4137* 107675
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘N”’ represents the stepwise cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant
explanatory macroeconomic variable.
Table 6.7: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates for Transac-
tors and Revolvers- Model A and Model B
Transactors with Score3. Its coefficient equals -0.214(<.0001). A second exception is
Revolvers with Score10. These indicate borrowers in these states tend to reduce con-
sumption instantaneously in preparation for the tough times ahead. In summary, the
impact of macroeconomic variables on behavioural score migration is more volatile for
Revolvers than for Transactors. That the magnitudes of the regression estimates are in
general higher for Revolvers indicates Revolvers are more sensitive to the economy. It is
also noticeable that the impact of macroeconomic variables is less marked on those with
lower score or in 3+Cycle.
The coefficient estimates of the macroeconomic models with respect to Transactors are
very similar to the results presented in 5.7. This is because more than 60% of the samples
are Transactors, showing that splitting the samples into Transactors and Revolvers can
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provide more insight into the behavioural score migration.
Table 6.7 shows the cumulative regression results with more than one explanatory
variable. Putting more than one variable into the cumulative logistic regression changed
the signs of several coefficients. This is due to the correlation among macroeconomic
variables, although these estimates do not change the conclusions with respect to the
impact of each macroeconomic variable (explained in Chapter 5).
6.4.4 Comparing transition matrices
We use equation (5.12) to compare the behavioural score states forecast by the transition
matrix conditional on what actually happened in the economy. Note that our credit card
dataset consists of a lot of samples (i.e. n >> in equation (5.12)), thus obtaining a χ2
value that does not reject the null hypothesis xi(12) = yi(12) is very unlikely. The focus
in this section, however, is to use the χ2 value as a tool for comparison rather than as an
indication of whether or not we need to reject our proposed hypothesis.
The chi-square value (= 14601) for the probability distribution estimated with the
unconditional transition matrix is very large, which implies the matrix unsuccessfully
reflects the real behavioural score transition path, especially for Revolvers. For most of
the portfolios, the fitness ratio of using the unconditional transition matrix to estimate
the probability distribution is less informative. However, it is remarkable to note that the
unconditional matrix estimates the default probability quite accurately.
Among all the conditional matrices, those built with CPI (i.e. CPI model or Model A)
perform generally well. This is particularly the case for Revolvers during Expansion. The
chi-square value of the Pearson chi-square test for CPI model and Model A are 1115 and
1278 respectively, which is ten times lower than for the other conditional transition matri-
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Score x(1)
x(12)
Real Unconditional CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Transactors - Expansion
Closed 0 7.59 5.74 5.8 6.56 6.35 6.43 6.26 5.68 6.18
Inactive/New 13.77 3.05 2.71 2.62 2.98 3.12 3 2.95 2.5 3.08
Bad1 0 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.12
Bad2 0 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
3+Cycle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Score1 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
Score2 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.11
Score3 0.49 0.75 2.61 1.33 2.66 2.71 2.47 2.17 1.13 2.08
Score4 8.16 6.89 9.77 4.4 9.76 9.73 9.15 7.87 3.77 7.7
Score5 6.31 4.37 8.75 4.16 8.68 7.88 7.95 7.18 3.76 7.01
Score6 3.82 3.87 6.26 3.08 6.18 5.49 5.64 5.08 2.79 5.02
Score7 8.27 10.69 7.53 4.13 7.54 6.54 6.65 6.54 3.76 6.4
Score8 12.42 13.85 15.25 10.84 15.84 13.79 13.77 14.74 10.13 14.59
Score9 10.49 10.6 17.21 17.86 17.76 16.83 16.31 19.05 17.28 19.37
Score10 36.23 38.01 23.84 45.61 21.69 27.25 28.3 27.87 49.05 28.29
Chi-square value 5278 5224 6359 3950 3440 3714 6742 3683
Transactors - Recession
Closed 0 6.56 7.51 7.7 7.57 7.26 6.87 7.7 7.58 7.37
Inactive/New 11.03 2.58 2.57 2.68 2.19 2.46 2.51 2.45 2.44 2.35
Bad1 0 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.29
Bad2 0 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
3+Cycle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Score1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Score2 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.3 0.35 0.29
Score3 6.7 5.41 3.6 4.97 4.38 4.2 3.89 4.52 5.09 4.65
Score4 17.19 14.92 12.16 16.16 14.25 13.7 12.48 15.1 15.54 15.07
Score5 11.95 12.41 9.94 12.34 12.73 11.32 10.09 11.88 12.87 11.84
Score6 9 9.79 6.61 7.84 8.19 7.43 7 7.61 8.62 7.63
Score7 8.56 9.12 7.62 8.59 8.88 8.29 8.08 8.54 9.07 8.56
Score8 24.65 24.26 14.76 15.85 16.04 15.25 15.85 15.74 15.54 15.72
Score9 10.5 14.16 15.59 14.14 14.55 14.91 16.63 14.25 13.82 14.39
Score10 0.07 0.06 19.06 8.94 10.51 14.53 16.03 11.52 8.65 11.75
Chi-square value 9177 4428 4830 6652 7400 5345 4329 5384
Revolvers - Expansion
Closed 0 3.6 3.87 3.92 3.76 4.35 3.77 4.43 3.88 3.6
New 0.32 0 0 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07
Bad1 0 1.72 2.17 0.72 1.9 2 1.94 1.38 0.61 1.33
Bad2 0 0.9 0.83 0.28 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.54 0.24 0.52
3+Cycle 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Score1 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.13
Score2 0.58 0.68 4.14 1.09 3.71 2.51 3.6 2.6 0.88 2.48
Score3 9.21 8.98 26.18 11.37 25.35 19.5 23.89 20.82 10.35 20.35
Score4 27 27.21 31.93 24.71 32.43 34.5 31.65 32.82 24.12 32.75
Score5 12.06 12.17 12.83 14.57 13.27 16.72 13.56 14.79 14.32 15.1
Score6 5.39 5.6 3.16 4.48 3.4 4.42 3.45 4 4.58 4.12
Score7 3.32 3.27 2.31 3.91 2.44 3.33 2.56 3.03 3.85 3.13
Score8 11.69 10.51 4.92 10.58 5.21 6.24 5.55 6.62 10.46 6.85
Score9 6.22 4.81 2.03 5.87 2.1 2.36 2.3 2.63 6.38 2.69
Score10 24.03 20.37 5.35 18.36 5.4 3.09 6.66 6.11 20.2 6.86
Chi-square value 14601 1115 13880 23556 10368 10100 1278 8465
Revolvers - Recession
Closed 0 5.21 5.72 5.49 6.01 5.24 5.51 5.22 5.39 5.91
New 0.08 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Bad1 0 5.33 5.49 8.15 6.66 5.95 4.83 6.41 7.14 5.95
Bad2 0 1.89 2.03 2.94 2.46 2.18 1.8 2.35 2.62 2.22
3+Cycle 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06
Score1 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.45 0.44 0.4 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.39
Score2 10.72 8.27 5.45 7.33 7.13 6.28 5.44 6.72 8.17 6.53
Score3 50.04 42.97 29.65 35.18 34.35 32.51 30.87 34.35 36.93 34.42
Score4 22.42 22.09 30.12 28.39 28.1 31.31 30.55 29.98 27.14 30.06
Score5 10.79 9.78 10.33 7.42 7.66 9.52 9.87 8.06 6.84 7.88
Score6 1.98 1.48 2.34 1.48 1.56 2.02 2.17 1.67 1.3 1.61
Score7 1.2 0.98 1.64 0.95 1.01 1.36 1.52 1.12 0.88 1.12
Score8 1.7 1.07 3.07 1.25 1.47 1.91 3.08 1.77 1.2 1.95
Score9 0.47 0.53 1.27 0.45 0.65 0.62 1.24 0.68 0.41 0.71
Score10 0.02 0.01 2.52 0.44 2.42 0.64 2.73 1.17 1.37 1.17
Chi-square value 2614 1060 1319 1460 2428 1221 974 1263
Table 6.8: Behavioural score state distribution - Transactors and Revolvers
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ces. One weakness of these two models, however, is the estimation of default probability.
They over-estimate the number of default cases during Recession and under-estimate the
number of default cases during Expansion. Nevertheless, the overall performance of the
CPI model and Model A are very satisfactory.
6.4.5 Estimates for the regression analysis
We use regression analysis to determine the relationship between profit and macroeco-
nomic variables, results are presented in the Appendix C. Here we only present the results
in Table 6.9 and 6.10, with respect to Limit1 and Limit 10, for illustration.
One observation is that the impact of macroeconomic measurements on the profit
function is more consistent for Transactors than for Revolvers. For example, if there is a
unit change of GDP, Transactors tend to slightly increase (all with positive regressors (β)
and referring to significant parameters only) their credit card usage, whereas Revolvers
with different behavioural score have different consumption patterns (borrowing either
more or less). One may say that it is hard to convince a ’Good’ customer to borrow even
if the economy is doing well.
Notice that the regression parameters of Revolvers with Score10 are different from
those in the lower behavioural group. This can be explained by the fact that these accounts
do not have a very strong financial foundation. For example, say the time we extracted
these samples is t. They may be able to pay off their full balance in t− 6, t− 5, . . . , t− 2,
and therefore the scoring system generates a high score to these ”‘good”’ borrowers. When
these borrowers are not able to repay their balance in t− 1, these borrowers are classified
as Revolvers according to our definition (which is presented at the beginning of this
Chapter). However, as these borrowers make full payment during most of the observation
period (which is used to extract the performance data to calculate the behavioural score),
123
Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Transactors
L
im
it
1
Inactive -9.358** -14.8223** -11.5503** -10.827** -10.5777** 15.914** 2.9951** 16.1011** 17.3277** -21.5767**
Score2 214.6951** 208.129** 205.2988** 209.3069** 206.5986** 75.089 -0.793 523.0692 -157.812 N
Score3 24.8458** 24.9604** 22.1858** 24.956** 24.4365** 4.8301 -0.4366 184.3264** -52.0418 -40.6215
Score4 -4.8397** -6.0348** -7.5699** -6.3205** -6.1334** 17.8509** -0.1778 43.8172** 2.4805 1.6774
Score5 -1.9213** -6.1493** -2.7885** -2.4709** -3.1029** 11.4855** 2.3231** 8.7718 -19.6276 -28.841**
Score6 2.9041** -7.5404** -0.4239 2.171 0.6502 45.5707** 6.3531** 53.3613** -135.123** -13.6567**
Score7 -1.7064 -23.0082** -23.0082** -4.0648** -5.1249** 53.8285** 12.6105** 12.6105** 81.0685** -20.4707
Score8 -11.9178** -20.6051** -14.8709** -11.9918** -12.7439** 24.1727** 6.211** 40.1437** 13.4285 -69.9504**
Score9 -11.1518** -25.8332** -13.9263** -12.2655** -13.4582** 37.9413** 8.6816** 49.481** 28.7733** -40.4746**
Score10 -14.6815** -21.2082** -14.8309** -13.8328** -14.6263** 16.9856** 4.7531** 16.2516** 106.3518** -48.9259**
L
im
it
1
0
Inactive -4.2438** -10.1484** -6.9549** -6.0087** -5.6751** 18.3828** 3.1775** 21.1403** 11.6257 -24.9206**
Score2 1282.258 301.6541 1310.976 1534.14 1176.502 598.1707 657.951 -28897.1 -24816.7 -24.6766**
Score3 353.145** 302.3895** 304.9737** 350.7289** 357.8236** -74.8055 41.8075 2088.507** 499.1023 -4394.49
Score4 161.8748** 118.7261** 122.5792** 146.4554** 140.8982** 291.9732** 14.6326** 506.351** -698.417** -9.8448
Score5 125.998** 82.3991** 105.4503** 107.1216** 104.1268** 200.7662** 17.4211** 216.5456** 105.712 -557.864**
Score6 72.6411** 53.1556** 61.0598** 65.3069** 61.7984** 117.3595** 7.4978 278.0578** -183.169 -96.5053**
Score7 112.3033** 114.4006** 114.4006** 117.3629** 118.6302** -48.1817 0.9946 0.9946 -152.211 -116.473**
Score8 95.4003** 45.5795** 81.7571** 83.6035** 90.7196** 111.0142** 30.8684** 157.9425** 92.5254 129.2794
Score9 66.3793** 59.7475** 62.6707** 62.5675** 62.4455** 39.1742** 2.5632 58.5047** 115.5095** -248.182**
Score10 66.8314** 55.9455** 66.671** 69.5453** 66.5147** 50.5256** 8.9331** 49.8775** 297.0855** -38.4349**
Revolvers
L
im
it
1
3+Cycle -589.476** -652.867** -678.858** N -621.158** 540.0183** 12.1933 1935.966** N -570.256
Inactive 132.1707** 284.7269** 196.0249** 157.0641** 145.8868** -410.845** -100.204** -459.434** -1038.64** N
Score1 -726.414** -625.223** -705.839** -723.087** -705.997** -119.812 -73.1968** 357.6259 2335.848** 578.0048**
Score2 210.5769** 168.7747** 204.5245** 202.977** 220.3502** 47.0052 29.8137** 18.5524 230.1352** -80.5748
Score3 186.1071** 165.388** 181.5737** 181.3783** 182.2409** 51.2494** 12.5236** 51.0053** -55.781 -426.789**
Score4 79.6252** 100.2156** 81.7486** 83.1569** 80.5202** -11.5397 -14.0637** -77.2417** -578.707** -39.1395**
Score5 35.9541** 36.0818** 35.0729** 37.2323** 36.6675** 20.1712 -0.3082 10.5024 -216.928** 112.4593**
Score6 36.7358** 45.2547** 37.0719** 37.2412** 36.942** -5.0708 -5.8936 -5.339 -176.594 35.7146**
Score7 38.7511** 43.0125** 39.4874** 37.1168** 37.7011** -34.1999 -3.5275 -30.6547 70.6016 21.5649
Score8 28.4333** 48.2992** 39.309** 21.422** 25.6156** -96.5318** -16.416** -122.897** 6.2876 9.2566
Score9 53.1967** 2.4119 80.0707** 45.1257** 43.4504** -115.319** 27.0243** -214.098** 93.5587 72.2372**
Score10 15.5305** -98.1335** 26.5883** 15.4645** 12.5569** 1.6361 75.6476** -55.1338** 40.1743 -34.5416
L
im
it
1
0
3+Cycle -240.145** -259.441** -253.987** N -255.299** 105.5777** 1.2171 925.3441 N -215.179**
Inactive 73.6662 -74.1425 -55.7597 28.0795 29.0486 613.2376 70.6857 1029.174** -358.868 -121.131
Score1 -9933.37** -8476.72** -9229.76** -9686.91** -9416.96** -6023.89 -776.353 -6874.85 34086.14 -598.258
Score2 2208.515** 2833.378** 2569.097** 2474.082** 2425.416** -2254.66** -281.603 -10402.3** 225.6363 7252.259
Score3 1796.247** 1567.981** 1745.413** 1772.047** 1753.169** 559.0514** 138.9789** 846.7927** -668.273 2337.611
Score4 1292.784** 1022.114** 1146.718** 1314.451** 1224.759** 1819.893** 170.5733** 2311.776** -2182.06** -1170.59**
Score5 473.3263** 433.0826** 396.6362** 457.5807** 442.5904** 656.3879** 11.1738 1228.398** -719.708 -1552.14**
Score6 394.5633** 267.3071** 352.9707** 376.381** 380.0842** 320.2606** 83.797** 594.369** 1498.907** -250.546**
Score7 294.1524** 447.209** 318.5244** 304.8226** 316.841** -491.539** -88.3283** -188.986 1830.378** -595.896**
Score8 229.8247** 355.0325** 281.1884** 214.5434** 232.498** -446.4** -89.6367** -565.364** -48.3109 337.8152**
Score9 288.0819** 259.5032** 347.0945** 285.0907** 274.9195** -210.36** 15.6453 -590.396** -146.499 428.0257**
Score10 153.4814** -129.938** 197.7582** 157.1834** 155.2927** 88.6204 190.1618** -224.685** 810.3713** -249.969**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable and therefore
we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table 6.9: Summary of regression estimates for Transactors and Revolvers
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
Transactors
L
im
it
1
Inactive -11.4582** 12.2693** 1.2734** 11.1029** -10.573** -0.8916 -21.6581**
Score2 238.3766** 112.6692 -16.129 64.7147 208.4051** -117.793 N
Score3 27.9148** 6.6524 -1.911 -46.0476 24.9998** -52.8317 -27.4848
Score4 -4.515** 19.4735** -0.4032 39.8692** -5.9586** -16.9758 2.0733
Score5 -4.1082** 8.1843 1.402 -18.1955 -2.9621** -16.1005 -29.7001**
Score6 0.9893 39.4744** 1.7204 -74.9322 1.8286 -136.317** -13.2394**
Score7 -13.2194** 38.3787** 7.1712** -6.9909 -5.028** -46.282 -20.9284
Score8 -15.934** 18.8902** 2.6268** 36.2742 -12.5477** -24.5137 -74.4376**
Score9 -18.204** 28.7944** 4.3406** -7.3982 -13.4724** -15.6905 -41.7794**
Score10 -16.8842** 6.8419 1.6422 59.0312** -14.4869** 66.758** -50.6974**
L
im
it
1
0
Inactive -5.9539** 15.4533** 1.0608 6.2169 -5.6286** -7.0448 -28.8285**
Score2 -141.07 -3089.53 1014.917 -30780.8 1498.545 -22923.6 -25.2851**
Score3 233.7135** -172.097 79.4694 481.2159 350.4425** 499.435 -1253.47
Score4 146.3401** 282.2437** 12.0842** -110.884 152.3616** -953.459** -10.1771
Score5 133.0962** 212.1593** -4.7122 92.797 102.7878** 129.3594 -589.847**
Score6 81.8955** 130.2314** -6.065 18.0567 63.3873** -165.545 -99.4686**
Score7 100.658** -65.5663 7.6289 -131.817 119.4381** -93.7268 -114.741**
Score8 70.3278** 87.1549** 16.8302** 236.953 92.3652** -184.583 125.2321
Score9 65.2711** 40.4923** -0.0989 119.3744** 61.2412** 112.7179** -263.467**
Score10 70.4766** 37.9339 -2.169 201.4575** 66.968** 203.7054** -36.4956**
Revolvers
L
im
it
1
3+Cycle -608.665** 541.825** 13.3096 N N N N
Inactive 167.8658** -422.192** -13.556 -1026.07** 145.4118** -399.854 534.1021**
Score1 -618.367** 95.5701 -78.853 2258.543** -730.538** 2481.055** N
Score2 164.095** 0.1869 32.0385** 280.561** 219.5362** 77.8121 153.8681
Score3 175.4652** 35.3775** 7.2632** -5.3627 183.1084** -120.418 -419.947**
Score4 118.9694** 71.8018** -21.8699** -624.427** 82.5486** -433.6** -49.5764**
Score5 47.5622** 44.2644** -6.1175 -264.945** 37.6115** -181.116** 74.2642**
Score6 52.8225** 31.8727 -10.7361 -154.47 37.2402** -161.6 21.9561
Score7 26.1025** -76.1248** 8.5149 251.5856 38.0187** 148.1691 4.78
Score8 21.1587 -135.932** 4.6599 383.2693** 25.4402** 257.2657** 24.9192
Score9 4.6298 -138.492** 30.6452** 281.0833** 43.7447** 74.662 98.4003**
Score10 -97.6155** -16.0179 75.9123** 117.7843 13.1861** -149.392 -24.2986
L
im
it
1
0
3+Cycle -242.582** 139.4636** 5.3337 N N N N
Inactive -7.5464 308.5877 30.6448 174.8047 32.1094 -181.775 -234.509**
Score1 -11856.8** -9271.27 1099.105 39992.58 -9700.95** 37496.12 -590.779
Score2 2095.061** -2566.44** 85.8759 -2384.6 2415.72** 662.0061 8976.736
Score3 1691.844** 448.9804** 65.4526 516.8665 1765.585** -1212.85 2370.186
Score4 1549.22** 2200.589** -136.945** -4496.65** 1247.104** -4110.39** -1212.58**
Score5 688.9073** 946.6731** -127.631** -1083.39** 451.1442** -940.449** -1798.14**
Score6 414.4702** 371.947** -22.0442 1598.199** 374.2596** 810.889 -293.009**
Score7 280.6083** -528.01** 1.3939 2163.552** 305.5247** 3086.183** -543.039**
Score8 227.0274** -500.162** -1.2231 1129.02** 230.2443** 1152.272** 619.8885**
Score9 256.4719** -217.257** 19.8249 0.0047 274.7839** -366.065 533.0457**
Score10 -133.609** 6.5101 191.2582** 822.6668 155.893** -444.124 -289.206**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression cannot find any significant explanatory
macroeconomic variable and therefore we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table 6.10: Summary of regression estimates for Transactors and Revolvers-
Model A and Model B
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the scoring system still classifies these borrowers as ”‘Good”’ customers and thus gives
a high score to these Revolvers. Indeed, for all the analyses presented in this section,
Revolvers in a state with high behavioural score react uniquely.
6.4.6 Optimal policy
We use the real macroeconomic variables during the testing sample period to generate
the profit value and the transition matrices of that period. Here we report the optimal
policy1 of accounts having credit limit band 1 and band 6 in Table 6.11. The rest of the
results can be found in Appendix D
In summary, the optimal policy of Transactors is very similar to those presented in
Chapter 5. There are some differences on the Score2 accounts’ policies whereas the model
suggests increase most accounts’ credit limit to the highest level (i.e. Limit 10). Moreover,
the optimal policy for expansion and recession are identical, except for Revolvers in the
state with Score 2 and limit 1. The optimal policy in the CPI model for these borrowers
during expansion is to increase the credit limit to Limit 10, however, the optimal policy
during recession is Limit 8. Similarly, the optimal policy in the CPI model for Revolvers
with Score 2 and Limit 6 is to increase their credit limit to Limit 8 during recession
whereas the optimal policy for these borrowers during expansion is Limit 10.
The optimal policy of accounts in arrears (3+Cycle) and having the lowest behavioural
score (Score1) is to keep the current credit limit. This is what one would expect as these
accounts have a high default risk. For Inactive accounts, the proposed optimal policy is
1We use backward iteration to generate the optimal policies during Expansion (May, 2006 to April,
2007) and Recession (Jan, 2003 to Dec, 2003). Thus there are different optimal policies every month.
We present the optimal policy of the first month of that period. That is if the lender predicts that the
economy will experience expansion (or recession) in the coming year, what is the optimal policy in the
first month of this period?
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Transactor
Unconditional
Revolver
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Expansion - Credit Limit 1
3+Cycle - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive/New 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 2
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Recession - Credit Limit 1
3+Cycle - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive/New 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 2
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Expansion - Credit Limit 6
3+Cycle - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
New 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Recession - Credit Limit 6
3+Cycle - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
New 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 6.11: Summary of optimal policy for Transactors and Revolvers
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to increase the credit limit in the hope these customers will start to use their credit cards.
Transactors are safe portfolios and thus the model suggests increasing their credit limit
to the highest level. The New Revolvers have a volatile behavioural score migration. The
model suggests increasing their credit limit to Limit9 rather than the highest credit limit
level.
One observation concerns the optimal policy for accounts with a behavioural score
state 2. The model suggests increasing Transactors’ credit limit in such a state with Limit
1 and behavioural scoreband 2 to Limit 7. However, the optimal policy for Revolvers in a
state with Limit 1 and behavioural scoreband 2 is Limit 8. Thus the credit limited offered
to Revolvers is higher than those of Transactors.
The optimal policy of accounts having Score3 or above is to increase their credit limit
to the highest band for both Transactors and Revolvers. The same observation was found
in the previous chapter.
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Transactor
Unconditional
Revolver
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Expansion - Credit Limit 1
3+Cycle - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 2
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2
Recession - Credit Limit 1
3+Cycle - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
Score1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 2
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 2
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 2
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 2
Expansion - Credit Limit 6
3+Cycle - 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6
Score1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Recession - Credit Limit 6
3+Cycle - 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Inactive 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Score1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 7 6 7 7 7 6 7 10
Table 6.12: Summary of optimal policy for Transactors and Revolvers (loss equals to the credit
limit)
To understand the impact of the loss value on the optimal policy, we changed the
profit value for the default states (i.e. Bad1 and Bad2). The new default values equal the
credit limit of the credit card, i.e. the loss of a default account with credit limit HK$1000
is -HK$1000. The results are presented in Table 6.12.
The optimal policies with respect to Transactors are almost the same during recession
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and expansion. The exception is Transactors in state Score 3. The MDP model offers a
more conservative policy during recession. For example, the optimal policy for Transactors
with credit limit 1 and behavioural score 3 is limit 4 during expansion whereas the optimal
policy for these borrowers during recession is limit 3 instead.
On the other hand, the optimal policies for Revolvers during expansion and recession
exhibit huge differences. The optimal policy for Revolvers during Expansion are almost
identical to those of Transactors, whereas, during the bad times, the model offers a very
low credit limit for Revolvers. For example, in the CPI model, the optimal policy for
Revolvers in a state with credit limit 1 and behavioural score 10 during recession is to
increase the credit limit to limit 5.
6.5 Conclusions
The model built in this chapter has shown that segmenting the population into Transactors
and Revolvers yields more insight about the behavioural score migration pattern and the
profitability pattern.
The results presented in Table 6.12, i.e. changing the loss to the credit limit, show two
issues about the use of MDP model in adjusting the credit limit of credit card borrowers:
1. Splitting borrowers into Transactors and Revolvers allows the model to generate
different policies for two very different borrower types.
2. Although both probability of default and loss function changes the value of expected
loss (since expected loss = probability of default × loss function), the later is the
key value in estimating the expected loss. Thus it has a major effect on the credit
limit policy which is derived from the model.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to develop and to further research the application of the Markov
Decision Process model to a credit card pricing model and to demonstrate both the
method and the process of incorporating macroeconomic measurements into the model.
This concluding chapter summarizes the findings and the contributions of this research
and discusses possible future areas of research for the application.
7.1 Summary
7.1.1 Building a model for making sequential credit limit deci-
sions
This thesis identifies the importance of replacing the conventional static decision model
with a MDP model in pricing the credit limit of credit cards. The MDP model is able
to derive a sequence of policies to maximize profit, leading to a competitive alternative
to the current model. The second advantage of using the MDP model is that it can
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incorporate other mathematical models. In Chapter 5, we demonstrated how one can
use logistic regression models to estimate the interaction between the economy and credit
card accounts.
7.1.2 Using behavioural score as the key parameter
Behavioural score has been used by lenders for at least the past twenty years in monitoring
the default risk of current credit customers. This score is tailor-made by every lender, and
characterizes credit behaviour while estimating the possible default risk of every individual
customer. This study demonstrated using behavioural score to simplify the state space
of an MDP model. Using behavioural score as a key parameter not only simplifies the
model development, but also dynamically links the default risk with a profit model.
7.1.3 Lack of samples: low default portfolios
Researchers in the credit card industry usually have no problem in overall sampling since
the numbers of credit card holders, and therefore the quantities of available samples, are
enormous. This, though, is not always true of the default cases. It is possible for lenders
to have no default observations during the sampling period, particularly for credit card
accounts with good credit history. In Chapter 4, we used the method proposed by Pluto
and Tasche (2006) to adjust the default probabilities of some credit card accounts. The
results show that the method does not change the optimal policy. Nevertheless, it is
still worth incorporating such adjustments in default probabilities, as it guarantees the
connectedness of the states and prevents formulating a structural zero MDP model.
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7.1.4 Segmentation by repayment behaviour
In common with many other authors, we segment the population by looking at the re-
payment behaviour of the credit card users. Transactors and Revolvers have significantly
different behavioural score migration patterns as shown in Chapter 6. The segmentation
enhances the performance of MDP models in adjusting the credit card limit of current
credit card customers, since it provides a better estimation on the path of behavioural
score migration.
7.1.5 Credit card accounts and the economy
Results in this thesis show there are significant interactions between the economy and the
riskiness of credit card accounts. Our model is able to take the economy into consideration
when one is making a credit limit decision. We also explored the adequacy of using
different macroeconomic variables, the reaction time, the distribution of account types
under different macroeconomic conditions, and the possibility of using more than one
macroeconomic variable.
7.2 Contributions to knowledge
This thesis has developed and has explored the context of using a MDP model for building
a credit card pricing model. All the stages of the model development: parameter selec-
tion, coarse-classifying, choice of order, dealing with low default portfolios, movements of
inactive, closed and active accounts, the interaction with logistic regression model, the im-
pact of the economy on credit card holders’s behaviour in two different countries, account
segmentation, assessment of model performance; can be accomplished using the methods
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proposed in this thesis. This is the first research to provide such an in-depth study in
the context. This study has demonstrated the impact of economy on the credit card ac-
counts, and hence provides empirical evidence to encourage lenders to use macroeconomic
measurements for pricing models.
7.3 Research limitation
Behaviour score is the key parameter in this thesis, although we do not have knowledge
regarding how the lender generates this score. The transition matrix in our dataset has
preserved a lot of the lender’s operation policy. If the information were available, we could
adjust the definition of the score bands accordingly.
7.4 Suggestions for future research
7.4.1 Estimation of the default value
Further improvement on the model performance can be done by looking at the default
amount of different Bad accounts. This default amount is an important component both in
our model and in reality. In our MDP model, the expected loss value (=default probability
× the loss given default 1) drives the optimal policy. We have looked at the possibility
of adjusting the expected loss when in default. The results presented in Table 5.13 and
1This loss given default (called LD) is the loss value, i.e. the profit at default such as for example
r(l,D) and r(l,D,M) as defined in Chapters 3 and 5 respectively. This value is thus different from the
loss given default (LGD) defined in the capital formula of the new Basel Accord where LGD is a fraction
of credit exposure that will not be recovered in the event of default. That is if the total borrowing of a
credit card holder is B, then the two variables can be related as follow: LGD = LDB .
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6.12 in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively show the optimal policies are very sensitive to the
expected loss given default. Questions that have not been studied are: how sensitive is
the MDP model to this expected loss given default? Should one adjust the probability
of default or the loss given default? Up to now there is no literature that considers the
expected loss of credit card products. This is despite the fact that such work would be
of practical use for lenders since LGD is a critical component in the new Basel accord’s
capital formula.
7.4.2 Simulating the economy
We used the out-of-sample period macroeconomic variables to test the performance of
the MDP model in Chapter 5. This solution is an optimal policy built on a finite-horizon
MDP model conditional on the actual macroeconomic measurements observed. One can
use simulation to estimate possible future macroeconomic measurements and put these
into the MDP model.
This is how corporate credit risk models are often being validated in practice. Some
credit rating agencies (Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, United States
Securities and exchange commission, July 2008) use a Monte Carlo method to simulate a
time series of macroeconomic variables. Using these macroeconomic variables, the credit
rating agencies create a loss distribution to predict the loss given default or the probability
of default. One can use the same approach to simulate qt−1(U|M) in equation (5.1) and
then use the simulated macroeconomic variables to predict the transition probabilities
p(i′|i,M) and the reward function r(l, i,M). In this way the MDP model in (5.1) will
generate a set of MDP policies that can be readily used by lenders in the future.
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7.4.3 Measurement of the model’s performance
In Section 5.3.4 of Chapter 5 we used a chi-square test to compare the predicted and
actual transition probabilities in order to check whether using macroeconomic variables
to estimate the transition probabilities lead to a reasonable model. The observation
window we used was twelve months, but is this an optimal period? Should we instead
look at a shorter period, say six months, since consumers are sensitive to the economy?
Besides these open questions that have not been explored, it is possible that there are
other assessments can be carried out by a researcher to understand the MDP model’s
performance. One possible approach is to compare the difference between the following:
1. actual profit value of actual policy
2. model profit value of actual policy
3. model profit value of optimal policy
4. actual profit value of optimal policy
Say we extract N random samples in the out-of-time sampling period, then we can cal-
culate or estimate the actual profit value. Then (1.) and (2.) can be used to compare
the actual profit and the model profit so as to examine the performance of the regression
model. Comparing (2.) and (4.) or (1.) and (4.) can assess the difference in using the
actual policy and optimal policy. Also, one can determine which of these gives the most
applicable policy.
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7.4.4 Using Bayesian inference to estimate the default proba-
bility
The transition probabilities in this study use maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), i.e.
taking an average of the history data. Researchers (Kadam and Lenk, 2008; Stefanescu
et al., 2007) suggest that using the maximum likelihood method to estimate the sparse
default probability entries results in large estimation errors, since MLE is suitable for a
frequentist estimation framework, i.e. for a dataset consisting of numerous observations.
By contrast, the Bayesian approach gives a greater mathematical basis for estimating the
default probability. The idea is presented as follows. Assume the probability of default
given a credit card holder in a state s (which can depend on behavioural score, credit
limit, or other characteristics of the credit card holder) is Pr(D|s). Then, according to
Bayes’ rule, this probability can be written as:
Pr(D|s) = Pr(s|D)Pr(D)
Pr(s)
(7.1)
where Pr(D) is the unconditional prior probability, Pr(s|D) is the posterior probabil-
ity that the credit card holder is in a state s given s/he defaults, and Pr(S) is called
the marginal probability of S. If we have a dataset with the credit card holders’ his-
tories, we can estimate the posterior probability. Say there are ND default cases and
ND(s) of them are in default with a state s, then the posterior probability Pr(s|D) is
equal to ND(s)
ND
. The marginal probability is calculated as the sum of the product of
all probabilities of any state si and corresponding conditional probabilities Pr(si), i.e.
Pr(s) =
∑
i Pr(s|si)Pr(si). One can then set the prior probability Pr(D) to a certain
value and calculate Pr(D|s) in the first iteration. In the second iteration, one uses the
computed posterior equation Pr(s|D) as the prior posterior and repeats the calculation
process. There is mathematical evidence to show one can find a posterior probability close
to the real conditional probability after several iterations. However, researchers warn that
the value of this posterior probability is sensitive to the prior probability.
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Therefore, possible areas to explore in using Bayesian inference to estimate the default
probability are: (1) The sensitivity of the default probabilities to the prior probabilities.
(2) The difference in using the maximum likelihood method and the Bayesian method
to estimate the default probabilities. (3) How to incorporate macroeconomic variables in
estimating the default probabilities with Bayesian Inference.
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Appendix A
UK Data
This Appendix provides some information about the UK data samples, including, the field
specification, frequency distribution, coarse-classifying and chi-square goodnes-of-fit test
results. All of these are excluded from the main thesis contents and are provided here as
additional information for readers.
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The file specifiication provided by the UK data provider.
I. Fields definition
Name Description Contents Format
prodid MasterKey for linkage n 8
advlim Advised Credit Limit Pounds n 7
act\_bal Current balance
Pounds.Pence (eg 
\pounds1 = 1.00) n 11.2
coff\_code Charge-off Reason Code c 2
days\_del Days delinquent
Numeric length 3 (eg 1 
= 001) n 3
ext\_stat External status ext\_stat c 1
accopen Open date CCYYMMDD c 8
sortcode
The bank sortcode of the cardholder's checking account-
holding branch unless an alternative sort code is used for 
direct debit payments c 6
cusbehsc Visa Behavioural score cusbehsc c 3
prodtype Product type c 3
attrsc Attrition score c 3
II. Further details
External Status (ext\_stat)
Z Charge Off
B Blocked / Bankrupt
L Lost
U Stolen
U 5 + Cycles Delq
U Never Active
U Inactive
U Transferred Account
A Auth Prohibited
C Closed
E Revoked
F Frozen
I Interest Prohibited
*
**
*** Optional Scores (the behaviour score is added to the exception score to calculate an optional score)
Coff\_Code (following a 'Z' charge off)
00 Awaiting insolvency details
01-05 In house debt collectors (pre 1995)
07 Weekly fixed payers (or cash payers)
74 Fixed payers using Baines \& Ernst
75 Fixed payers using Gregory Pennington
76 All other fixed payers using external bureaux
88 Stolen charge off
89 Bankrupt charge off
90 Deceased
93 Being referred for or waiting abandon
94 Account outplaced to debt collector
95 Account outplaced to debt collector
Prodtype
ART ART Cards
GCC Gold Credit Card
GMC Gold Mastercard
HN Harvey Nichols
NT National Trust
MC Master Card
Pl Platinum
Pr Premier
V Visa
Designated Scores (the system does not calculate a behaviour score but uses the designated score during 
processing)
Fixed Scores (the system does not calculate a behaviour score but assigns a fixed score to be used in processing)
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Behavioural Score (cusbehsc)
Score Odds (/1)
780 3840
765 1920
750 960
735 480
720 240
705 120
690 60
675 30
660 15
645 7.5
630 3.75
615 1.87
600 0.93
585 0.46
570 0.23
Exclusions to Behaviour Scores
0 New account which has not yet cycled, so score not yet generated
1 Deceased 
2 Not used
3 Not used
4 Bankrupt 
5 Written Off
6 Not used
7 Involuntarily closed more than 6 months ago and balance = zero
8 Voluntarily closed more than 6 months ago and balance = zero
9 Attrition Score exclusion - Involuntarily closed more than 6 months ago and balance = zero
10 Attrition Score exclusion - Voluntarily closed more than 6 months ago and balance = zero
11 Never Active
12 Inactive 12+ months
13 Recently Reactivated in the last 2 months
14 Recently Acquired (less than 3 cycles on the books)
Score Odds
Payment Projection 365 16
350 8
335 4
320 2
305 1
290 0.5
275 0.25
260 0.125
245 0.06
230 0.03
215 0.015
200 0.0075
(These scores are 
applied if the account is 
under some stress, i.e. 
having these scores 
means the account is of 
worse condition than 
the rest). These scores 
predict the likelihood of 
payment.
NB Behaviour score forecasts the probability of accounts to become, within the next six months, 3 or more cycles delinquent (excluding 
fraudulent losses), or bankruptcy, where the customer's outstanding debt is \pounds10 or greater.
NB Behaviour score forecasts the probability of accounts to become, within the next six months, 3 or more cycles delinquent (excluding 
fraudulent losses), or bankruptcy, where the customer's outstanding debt is \pounds10 or greater.
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Appendix B
UK Data - incorporating
macroeconomic variables
B.1 Unconditional transition matrices
Score i Score i′ at t + 1 Row
at t Closed Inactive Bad Risk Score1 Score2 Score3 Score4 Count
Inactive 2.22 96.03 - - 1 0.68 0.06 0.01 458817
Risk 5.09 - 19.79 53.68 21.44 - - - 3951
Score 1 0.76 0.37 0.08 0.49 84.25 11.73 2.2 0.13 379242
Score 2 0.69 1.68 0 - 12.15 67.81 15.69 1.98 323448
Score 3 0.78 1.46 - - 2.77 15.27 64.13 15.59 322344
Score 4 0.71 0.2 0 - 0.84 1.85 17.27 79.14 307728
”‘-”’ represents there is no sample observation.
”‘0”’ represents the transition probability is less than 0.0005.
A bold value indicates the transition frequency is greater than 50% .
The transition probabilities of all absorbing states (Closed and Bad)
are not shown in the table.
Table B.1: Unconditional transition matrix (in
percentage) for the UK data
The unconditional behavioural score transition matrix is diagonally dominated. Note
that accounts in the Risk behavioural score state preserve the highest default probabilities
(= 19.79%). 96.03% Inactive accounts remain Inactive after one time period which is
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much higher than those (= 81.96%) of the HK dataset. The mobility of Score1 and
Score4 accounts are low since around 80% of them remain in the same behavioural score
state in the subsequency month.
Note that we use the account balance presented in Table 3.4 and r = 0.02 to estimate
the unconditional account profit with result present in Table B.2.
Credit limit Score at t (i)
at t (l) Close Inactive Bad Risk Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4
Limit 1 0 0 -563 8.66 6.32 1.78 1.3 1.04
Limit 2 0 0 -761 14.06 9.8 2.38 1.46 1.08
Limit 3 0 0 -983 17.52 11.4 2.9 1.78 1.46
Limit 4 0 0 -1658 29.02 16.44 4.92 2.78 2.48
Limit 5 0 0 -2234 42.68 24.58 10.44 4.7 3.88
Limit 6 0 0 -3047 57.82 29.94 13.84 7.02 5.64
Limit 7 0 0 -3605 60.96 34.9 16.6 9.34 7.22
Limit 8 0 0 -5722 109.6 63.62 43.74 22.12 14.62
The profit value of Closed and Inactive are assumed to be 0.
Table B.2: Profit value used in the UK macroeconomic model
B.2 Logistic regression estiamtes
B.3 optimal policy
144
Model A (CPI, GDP, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(I/C) Log(A/I)
-2Log(likelihood)
CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock CPI GDP Stock
Inactive 1.527* -2.9093* -15.0743* -5.8577* -.1453* -20.8934* 7.3846* -2.7641* 5.8191* 209550
Risk N .4150 -6.0157** N N N N N N 1584
Others -2.5268* -.2913 4.7335* -4.1679* .3324* 3.7540* 1.6411 -..6237* .9795** 254776
Model B (Unemployment rate, Stock)
Log(A/C) Log(I/C) Log(A/I)
-2Log(likelihood)
Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment Stock Unemployment
Inactive -26.7510* -1.4272* -26.4975* 2.6415* -.2535 -4.0687* 215664
Risk -6.5421** -.6713 N N N N 1587
Others 2.2037* -9.8242* 2.3607* -6.3339* -.1570 -3.4903* 255204
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
The models are developed only if there is significant variable found in Table 5.14.
Table B.3: Summary of multinomial logistic model estimates of Model A and Model
B for the UK dataset
Initial i
Model A Model B
CPI GDP Stock
-2Log(L)
Stock Unemployment
-2Log(L)
β β β β β
Inactive -1.0534** -0.197** -2.0944** 13310 -1.6245** -1.2918** 13332
Risk 1.4063** 0.7397* 1.8988 7343 5.231* 9.7446* 7356
Score1 0.0738* -0.3407* -0.4804* 385384 -0.7727* 0.8082* 385771
Score2 -0.1822* -0.2762* -1.1101* 558446 -1.3893* -2.8125* 558877
Score3 -0.236* -0.1604* -1.1193* 604509 -1.3517* 0.5744* 605040
Score4 -0.3473* 0.7012* 3.0011* 362294 3.7205* -5.714* 364023
”‘*”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 99% level.
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
Table B.4: Summary of cumulative logistic model estimates - Model
A and Model B for the UK dataset
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Limit 1 Limit 6
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB Unconditional CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB Unconditional
Inactive 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6
Risk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Score 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6
Score 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6
Score 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6
Score 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6
Table B.5: Summary of optimal policy for accounts - UK data
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Appendix C
HK Data - Regression analysis
estimates
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Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit1
3+Cycle -589.476** -652.867** -678.858** N -621.158** 540.0183** 12.1933 1935.966** N -570.256
Inactive -7.314** -8.6143** -8.7991** -8.102** -8.1227** 9.7712** 0.3303 12.6303** -14.6442** **
Score1 -721.331** -603.633** -697.424** -715.883** -696.929** -155.335 -83.1265** 250.3812 2145.11** -5.2385**
Score2 210.9161** 171.3952** 204.3485** 203.1618** 218.9636** 49.0768 27.6404** 66.4266 208.0974 -62.8712
Score3 155.957** 139.9364** 151.6328** 152.6542** 151.2403** 46.4859** 9.123** 25.9001 -209.489** -411.143**
Score4 34.0376** 33.1016** 29.8555** 32.6485** 29.742** 45.9363** -2.3676** -1.4438 -358.891** 8.1219
Score5 9.1264** 5.3085** 6.6943** 8.489** 7.547** 28.28** 1.6021 37.6679** -96.8838** 34.3265**
Score6 9.4106** -1.1335 5.5024** 8.4817** 6.9143** 42.5901** 6.0814** 49.826** -180.874** -5.4055
Score7 4.0183** -15.7759** -0.3522 2.1165** 0.9024 54.7493** 11.8198** 65.5427** 82.061** -11.0281
Score8 -7.2939** -16.2333** -9.3383** -6.757** -7.8107** 26.5937** 6.5408** 38.9994** -5.6362 -66.0161**
Score9 -6.602** -25.0574** -9.7546** -7.5314** -9.0821** 42.1238** 11.1475** 54.824** 38.5941** -37.106**
Score10 -10.4682** -18.4682** -10.9743** -9.2372** -10.1097** 20.6459** 5.8946** 21.8557** 102.7364** -57.5532**
Limit2
3+Cycle -626.062** -599.913** -679.67** N -642.025** 351.0271 -44.6027 455.0281 N -22.4374**
Inactive -5.0507** -7.9122** -7.3581** -6.4536** -6.2965** 13.2526** 1.1079 21.6564** -10.8732 -1319.97**
Score1 -1148.5** -1043.2** -1118.63** -1136.19** -1109.98** -192.747 -67.6749 -111.288 1672.044** -7.3596
Score2 264.7964** 215.9097** 253.6813** 248.777** 283.6798** 72.6912 32.9342** 405.2293** 863.8926** -144.695
Score3 192.0291** 171.4079** 187.1244** 188.087** 186.959** 44.0972** 12.7606** 11.5623 -202.13** -766.036**
Score4 40.9139** 52.7938** 40.5213** 45.3432** 38.6813** 7.3377 -9.3941** -127.425** -565.121** 0.8099
Score5 7.953** 0.0887 4.8382** 5.832** 4.993** 30.7415** 3.5491** 28.0398** -79.135** 118.409**
Score6 4.356** -4.8428** -0.1898 1.2384 0.0138 36.5942** 3.8789** 46.8611** -108.295** -6.6612
Score7 -1.0722 -8.316** -3.5105** -3.4044** -3.4831** 29.2822** 3.2203** 46.2254** 6.8096 -6.272
Score8 -6.4254** -15.4633** -8.7241** -7.843** -7.5174** 18.4352** 5.9746** 39.9121** 17.3056 -15.3321**
Score9 -6.6017** -17.7164** -9.2646** -8.2178** -9.2628** 35.4062** 5.8404** 47.3968** 39.797** -38.1734**
Score10 -7.0973** -16.6989** -8.0128** -6.0441** -6.934** 26.4566** 7.0022** 30.7315** 127.9152** -41.3865**
Limit3
3+Cycle -989.195** -1136.83** -1104.38** N -1030.51** 706.1175 23.519 769.1358 N -31.9354**
Inactive -6.475** -4.6693** -6.709** -6.434** -6.6281** 0.6317 -1.3634 3.361 -31.9727** -2132.62
Score1 -1716.39** -1236.55** -1540.17** -1557.97** -1569.79** -1295.25** -263.751** -803.118 1910.321 12.4114**
Score2 369.447** 338.8211** 371.7739** 365.1708** 391.0807** -2.4762 24.9793 -304.985 506.3753** 891.8996
Score3 289.6987** 262.6102** 281.7647** 282.5025** 282.4171** 83.7289** 14.6654** 83.1577** -186.016** -720.234**
Score4 83.214** 88.0112** 79.6965** 84.4742** 78.5674** 47.4088** -6.6752** -88.6037** -642.181** -53.3118**
Score5 17.9186** 19.5953** 15.7523** 17.0184** 16.8862** 21.8749** -2.348** 25.1277** -89.2109** 88.5878**
Score6 7.7848** 2.2786 4.8348** 6.5429** 5.258** 28.4721** 2.2045** 24.9532** -129.436** 26.1784**
Score7 5.0626** 1.7619 2.8122** 3.3124** 3.1409** 26.0454** 0.936 30.3204** -37.4448 5.4467
Score8 -3.425** -12.6923** -5.4167** -4.1391** -4.5637** 20.6049** 6.1542** 33.6746** 0.7478 -2.8378
Score9 -3.5313** -12.9644** -6.427** -5.3119** -6.1341** 34.7457** 4.9408** 45.0668** 26.066** -39.5137**
Score10 -5.3107** -11.5459** -5.9052** -4.5254** -5.1681** 18.4768** 4.532** 21.2502** 96.7612** -40.9441**
Limit4
3+Cycle -945.672** -1076.64** -1157.37** N -1077.63** 1269.029 -49.8221 2065.578 N -20.6226**
Inactive -5.5725** -3.9283** -5.8877** -5.7857** -5.843** 4.068 -1.3703 0.5784 -18.3762 -1300.57
Score1 -2148.32** -1843.04** -2025.22** -2108.08** -2031.75** -938.065 -152.253 144.1903 5955.255** 5.308
Score2 490.1844** 453.7079** 484.9757** 467.5699** 506.4127** 53.9895 23.9981 -166.806 1615.81** 271.7233
Score3 404.0841** 349.4323** 393.458** 391.7773** 396.0295** 124.3296** 33.2751** 338.1869** 107.0566 -890.28**
Score4 140.8944** 132.6267** 128.9788** 137.6178** 129.0818** 137.7224** -2.5855 0.7597 -986.887** -197.654**
Score5 30.5246** 31.8296** 27.3693** 29.4827** 28.7371** 34.7817** -2.7926** 23.8346** -168.679** 57.9466**
Score6 14.0936** 10.4936** 11.7072** 13.4771** 12.2233** 24.2457** 1.1181 18.2516 -157.936** 36.0953**
Score7 8.0351** 2.5898 5.2967** 5.9782** 5.6681** 28.9675** 2.1484** 33.9845** -47.4308 20.93**
Score8 0.1461 -4.688** -1.1495** -0.0428 -0.4861 15.8232** 3.0939** 22.6206** -26.9824 -7.3142
Score9 -0.6688 -6.8434** -2.9297** -2.4196** -2.6965** 25.8443** 3.0224** 27.019** 21.8131** -14.2116**
Score10 -3.3185** -8.7855** -3.8036** -2.5788** -3.2207** 18.2606** 3.9659** 19.4721** 74.7146** -25.5901**
Limit5
3+Cycle -945.515** -802.499** -882.934** N -932.662** 62.2539 -131.802 -1587.17 N -19.4895**
Inactive -2.2263** 1.3654 -1.6996 -1.767** -1.7012** -3.6881 -2.3094** -4.7774 -35.5171 -737.782
Score1 -2251.46** -1205.55** -2035.52** -2044.49** -2085.98** -1522.59 -738.981** -1595.95 10965.77** 18.6776**
Score2 510.5147** 652.2264** 566.4721** 554.9855** 551.5548** -401.283** -75.1041 -956.848 943.6692 1573.496
Score3 231.3896** 190.6841** 217.0372** 222.2184** 216.0518** 143.8175** 19.215** 349.8029** -827.028** 217.1357
Score4 83.423** 53.4722** 70.3467** 74.8049** 71.7204** 118.3834** 13.1977** 116.6653** -496.075** -64.3555
Score5 30.582** 17.2835** 24.0543** 25.9325** 24.201** 58.7165** 5.3123** 88.1385** -173.915** -53.6535**
Score6 19.0442** 2.8328 11.6755** 12.207** 11.5934** 74.3722** 6.9955** 107.8187** -132.952** -25.9792**
Score7 17.8957** 11.4343** 14.4151** 14.792** 15.0444** 31.317** 2.4388 81.0709** 4.48 -35.76**
Score8 10.5721** -2.8325** 7.1729** 8.1033** 8.953** 33.223** 8.4088** 57.0638** -90.2641** -21.8892**
Score9 5.4394** -0.7406 3.2053** 4.3778** 3.0344** 22.164** 3.0823** 57.3311** -19.3784 -49.1071**
Score10 5.281** -3.9227 5.3086** 6.7478** 5.4111** 26.344** 6.7921** 21.6329** 120.6405** -36.3958**
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Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit6
3+Cycle -508.098 -688.78 -1104.25 N -1164.35** 6633.009** -186.757 4107.207 N -31.7124**
Inactive -1.0862 0.7375 0.1632 -0.1324 -0.1058 -11.8323 -0.7199 -6.7376 -23.992 -11904.3**
Score1 -2515.16** -2286.71** -2495.5** -2572.16** -2467.54** -290.63 -158.563 2367.511 8187.108** 40.8168
Score2 676.7212** 620.4059** 708.274** 694.733** 729.2421** -199.988 64.5777** -1990.31** 669.7515 -808.247
Score3 478.817** 430.446** 461.5582** 468.6492** 462.3007** 175.1175** 23.9029** 172.5263** -992.565** -1046.49**
Score4 172.0612** 178.9124** 163.7332** 173.4889** 163.0257** 109.4686** -11.4791** -64.143** -1386.12** -70.828
Score5 43.9762** 38.5399** 37.5593** 42.2786** 39.261** 59.0452** 0.2736 85.4159** -342.138** 162.5558**
Score6 21.9435** 18.6484** 17.7159** 19.3756** 19.0001** 42.7683** -0.0146 71.5229** -113.814** 15.1427
Score7 18.0439** 17.6003** 17.1187** 17.8016** 17.5037** 6.4667 -0.0773 30.5337** -44.9522 29.8625**
Score8 11.8025** 3.3006 9.7959** 11.0039** 10.7174** 22.4509** 5.4128** 31.3645** -52.0622 6.1826
Score9 7.1632** 2.0303 5.1896** 6.2743** 5.0549** 19.3671** 2.5553** 43.847** -16.3329 -33.4768**
Score10 6.9717** 1.4104 7.2869** 8.0616** 7.0955** 19.1321** 4.2111** 12.2621** 72.9115** -31.2708**
Limit7
3+Cycle -830.459 -1163.27 -1365.21** N -1030.38** 2396.046 6.6174 6196.54 N -21.9343**
Inactive -0.359 1.4401 -0.5381 -0.8284 -0.4003 2.1175 -1.3398 0.7539 54.1875 -6391.13
Score1 -3392.29** -2923.1** -3145.27** -3265.73** -3141.54** -2047.59 -173.829 -1508.37 11376.15** 7.4244
Score2 905.9658** 966.4549** 936.964** 900.2062** 945.2012** -172.954 -30.8935 -2309.12** 2280.26** -448.071
Score3 604.7205** 554.8105** 593.3521** 595.9859** 594.613** 120.8463** 29.2311** 340.6315** -391.72** -833.646**
Score4 240.9439** 226.9219** 220.5536** 233.9156** 224.014** 227.9975** -2.329 157.4529** -1297.85** -112.464**
Score5 62.1948** 59.8344** 54.7077** 59.106** 56.6781** 69.5945** -2.5125 96.9507** -300.731** 62.1585**
Score6 30.64** 25.911** 25.1379** 27.343** 26.7104** 53.8907** 0.4862 99.559** -108.88** 17.0336
Score7 27.1338** 26.8905** 26.1951** 27.0694** 26.1934** 10.0336 -0.4766 2.0475 -118.113 12.9972
Score8 19.0762** 13.0239** 17.4441** 18.6232** 18.1042** 20.2629** 3.6632** 24.163** -85.7033** 10.8532
Score9 13.5392** 8.1045** 10.4276** 11.4632** 10.581** 31.5097** 2.2169** 53.4034** 11.6922 -25.8729**
Score10 10.2608** 4.2116** 10.4661** 11.1127** 9.9417** 16.7178** 4.3402** 11.3447** 74.5552** -35.7157**
Limit8
3+Cycle -2144.76 -2131.94 -2514.97 N -2111.47** -148.928 -3.2807 8205.221 N -25.8514**
Inactive -3.2183** -6.0418** -4.8185** -4.4627** -4.3178** 13.9362** 1.2899 10.8248 36.4478** -18398**
Score1 -5027.6** -2261.52** -3734.34** -3862.88** -3891.53** -9368.74** -1210.41** -7660.38 15415.82 -12.9756**
Score2 1202.352** 1306.167** 1251.657** 1225.626** 1248.733** -351.537 -47.4049 -1117.98 1887.308 7180.274**
Score3 720.7597** 629.6955** 696.1256** 713.765** 700.0589** 249.4964** 51.9031** 472.9266** -1632.36** -161.838
Score4 305.2036** 210.7888** 260.7896** 287.253** 270.7977** 442.1478** 43.9412** 565.6882** -1608.52** -245.093**
Score5 78.8684** 67.0888** 66.7311** 72.6089** 69.1487** 107.8272** 1.8028 181.5699** -294.1** -199.515**
Score6 37.251** 40.0893** 31.6459** 33.9932** 34.305** 52.4318** -4.8237 138.4763** -75.3867 -20.2275
Score7 38.8395** 45.0727** 38.0491** 37.4937** 38.4726** 4.6925 -4.3848 29.5663 128.8815** 39.7979**
Score8 25.7848** 14.5799** 22.9859** 23.5221** 24.5265** 25.3955** 7.1053** 51.1299** 36.1787 -0.4385
Score9 23.8254** 18.5318** 20.2788** 21.8634** 20.6102** 36.6471** 2.0696 69.5003** -0.1815 -51.2053**
Score10 20.4893** 14.6569** 20.5259** 21.7695** 20.6253** 19.4827** 4.3733** 16.5691** 51.2985 -35.3494**
Limit9
3+Cycle -997.349 -687.895 -731.143 N -381.319 -1321.46 -13.3359 2009.37 N -21.7985**
Inactive -5.1101** -7.3397** -6.7067** -6.1963** -6.0521** 10.3995 0.9251 12.8196 16.3163 -5376.57
Score1 -6001.03** -4495.27** -5220.29** -5230.12** -5333.63** -5322.68 -619.261 -6718.16 2568.676 -4.3588
Score2 1270.641** 1598.576** 1420.356** 1356.85** 1386.496** -881.894** -171.135 -6403.25** 2717.896 3114.584
Score3 922.7394** 834.3853** 899.0795** 918.9792** 901.8153** 253.5054** 49.5194** 265.949 -1972.14** -53.896
Score4 442.424** 295.0313** 371.0868** 407.8786** 388.042** 725.3986** 68.2671** 905.1133** -1818.51** -229.305**
Score5 125.4756** 115.5729** 108.2568** 117.3322** 112.3539** 154.7852** -1.9433 273.7494** -461.073** -397.546**
Score6 63.7718** 57.9703** 53.7867** 56.4694** 57.3653** 81.9112** -0.7135 255.5579** 72.9987 -15.993
Score7 60.9132** 75.6143** 66.0033** 65.1748** 65.6528** -50.3114** -7.1551 -81.7367** -19.813 22.5776
Score8 47.4081** 29.3496** 43.6836** 43.1832** 45.9933** 33.4689** 11.8408** 77.1735** 175.4604** 68.6362**
Score9 38.0209** 29.9548** 33.5227** 35.1129** 33.8** 46.2171** 3.2534** 80.7326** -2.4016 -81.8838**
Score10 31.8487** 29.1436** 32.3057** 32.8256** 31.946** 12.8051 2.1932 6.1067 4.7462 -43.5881**
Limit10
3+Cycle -240.145** -259.441** -253.987** N -255.299** 105.5777** 1.2171 925.3441 N -13.9376
Inactive -3.6775** -10.6024** -7.2353** -5.8255** -5.4558** 22.5889** 3.6549** 30.6156** 10.7277 -121.131
Score1 -9714.84** -8457.12** -8950.95** -9393.02** -9172.78** -6020.89 -587.256 -8629.38 29437.71 -28.3977**
Score2 2164.712** 2746.148** 2518.092** 2431.85** 2366.31** -2106.1** -260.719 -11469** -1248.94 6161.068
Score3 1655.627** 1395.439** 1591.255** 1631.801** 1606.639** 632.7056** 158.4026** 1228.397** -1237.93 2284.35
Score4 1044.634** 541.4482** 822.3373** 1006.78** 904.4936** 2304.4** 287.5503** 3174.84** -2991.74** -1251.11**
Score5 300.6129** 228.2479** 233.0438** 266.3223** 251.3212** 591.8813** 22.6957** 1105.934** -411.736** -2318.13**
Score6 169.7808** 82.3828** 129.103** 144.4935** 139.0193** 339.0175** 46.7821** 741.9142** 88.1014 -316.074**
Score7 144.8015** 176.4515** 153.566** 152.5672** 156.3525** -106.086** -15.9125 -65.1358 -33.239 -318.152**
Score8 112.6287** 64.5296** 101.1547** 103.0252** 106.99** 122.6226** 29.9533** 172.8561** 62.9689 213.8856**
Score9 82.3667** 72.3827** 75.9774** 77.8565** 76.1055** 68.3721** 3.718 97.8609** 46.4252 -221.822**
Score10 79.1144** 67.3448** 79.9896** 82.0303** 78.7824** 51.6226** 9.5638** 36.5684** 275.961** -60.4351**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable and therefore we did
not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.1: Summary of regression estimates - All accounts
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
Limit1
3+Cycle -608.665** 541.825** 13.3096 N N N N
Inactive -4.5132** 14.7537** -1.6772** -20.402** -8.0167** -20.7451** -7.1456**
Score1 -604.204** 90.9678 -85.0342** 2035.695** -721.827** 2235.316** **
Score2 168.8085** 7.5201 28.8467** 263.2898** 218.2551** 65.7681 129.5972
Score3 150.3217** 31.9605** 4.0654 -155.113** 152.9342** -219.71** -405.564**
Score4 61.8805** 90.846** -14.8484** -417.7** 32.5289** -347.256** -9.1437
Score5 15.6126** 39.7014** -3.1942** -139.568** 8.2783** -97.8224** 10.1872
Score6 15.7792** 51.7884** -3.32 -179.321** 8.2836** -187.12** -6.2457
Score7 -4.49 45.5685** 5.4855** -52.4032 1.059 -85.7943** -15.2094
Score8 -10.5848** 21.5499** 2.2791** 11.276 -7.4663** -47.9994** -74.2411**
Score9 -17.8757** 27.1885** 6.9507** -2.8365 -9.0958** -12.9029 -39.9121**
Score10 -14.0573** 11.7416** 2.5647 19.9089 -10.0135** 51.4547** -59.0239**
Limit2
3+Cycle -585.009** 208.5566 -37.4409 N N N N
Inactive -3.021 17.2884** -1.1942 -19.595 -6.1889** -20.1344 -16.6725**
Score1 -1069.43** 3.007 -59.7989 1586.559 -1136.74** 1677.501 -9.4564**
Score2 220.0369** 76.311 31.3206** 988.5898** 276.8933** 636.1877** 10.0691
Score3 177.955** 17.6377 9.7483** -156.497** 188.7584** -219.738** -715.107**
Score4 76.0658** 55.7579** -17.8776** -594.684** 43.5325** -482.073** -17.3886
Score5 9.8436** 33.0026** -0.6454 -87.1908** 5.6809** -80.2522** 87.3712**
Score6 9.5179** 42.4824** -2.9813** -64.5747** 1.2223 -108.71** -7.4207
Score7 0.3425 35.4409** -0.5245 -71.4291** -3.4406** -36.4373 -6.7118
Score8 -11.4763** 15.2922** 3.1508** 59.9963** -7.5036** -1.1396 -18.9229**
Score9 -10.1276** 30.7434** 2.0412** 6.1946 -9.2408** 6.3306 -38.2155**
Score10 -8.806** 26.03** 1.1479 -31.191 -6.9629** -13.1093 -40.6134**
Limit3
3+Cycle -1052.03** 941.7419 59.0208 N N N N
Inactive -2.444 8.265 -2.4217** -34.3048** -6.5448** -22.3432 -33.4118**
Score1 -1486.23** -815.308 -160.813 1594 -1611.79** 2662.409** 10.1679**
Score2 317.4881** -37.1288 34.6823** 532.3446** 387.8702** 285.8476 1154.09**
Score3 284.6593** 74.2603** 3.5075 -53.6023 284.5959** -254.691** -699.069**
Score4 127.4118** 111.3452** -22.9033** -704.149** 83.9284** -591.733** -72.0217**
Score5 32.0797** 42.7734** -7.962** -118.541** 17.659** -87.0516** 51.916**
Score6 15.4157** 37.7212** -4.3594** -98.1163** 6.5987** -129.214** 25.7219**
Score7 11.7368** 39.6653** -3.5368** -97.1034** 3.3158** -52.1142** 5.0956
Score8 -8.3981** 15.8564** 3.1669** 38.4705** -4.3233** -23.8591 -7.6083
Score9 -4.5098** 33.2682** 0.5707 4.1381 -6.1327** -1.6456 -40.4914**
Score10 -6.0823** 15.2226** 0.5623 17.6181 -5.0916** 35.4277 -41.1163**
Limit4
3+Cycle -920.178** 1219.531 -33.3509 N N N N
Inactive -0.4125 12.946** -3.1901** -22.7675 -5.7924** -14.9712 -16.5542**
Score1 -2183.64** -779.548 -19.5777 5727.639** -2125.74** 6185.316** 3.9555
Score2 451.3021** 123.1834 23.1753 1784.51** 489.9385** 1435.758** 617.4167
Score3 373.2426** 93.4942** 20.1861** 294.7278** 396.7029** -88.4005 -810.209**
Score4 211.7135** 241.5758** -37.0922** -1106.06** 137.6432** -990.439** -204.056**
Score5 51.0527** 63.8856** -11.4332** -205.203** 30.3608** -168.035** -3.5286
Score6 23.3347** 35.8111** -5.2244** -135.382** 13.661** -154.133** 35.9105**
Score7 12.783** 38.009** -2.4219 -86.1834** 6.0534** -67.0661** 19.0207**
Score8 -0.1242 15.453** 0.1848 -0.2289 -0.1338 -39.8768** -12.7843
Score9 -0.0183 26.4977** -0.4466 11.55 -2.7289** 8.1716 -16.2336**
Score10 -2.8188 20.5519** -0.3609 -13.9298 -3.2117** 3.7946 -24.8543**
Limit5
3+Cycle -769.365** 272.9027 -137.934 N N N N
Inactive 2.7956 3.7032 -2.9519** -39.3451 -1.5335 -27.2237 -19.0573**
Score1 -1291.91** 196.9436 -663.221** 9717.775** -2205.01** 12679.89** 17.0422**
Score2 545.9735** -316.745 -22.6108 605.2108 543.7436** 1044.02 2922.102
Score3 235.6661** 117.1674** -1.4885 -589.947** 225.9745** -900.913** 300.6919
Score4 97.697** 142.023** -5.7315** -566.81** 76.5677** -605.114** -117.383**
Score5 38.3018** 70.563** -3.565** -201.886** 25.6428** -182.426** -96.5012**
Score6 35.2062** 104.9034** -9.9133** -148.68** 12.3622** -159.843** -29.3204**
Score7 22.4324** 38.7438** -2.6821 -14.6294 15.2445** -29.8359 -42.3498**
Score8 4.8487** 23.4219** 4.2702** -63.0498** 10.6163** -175.104** -24.3924**
Score9 3.901 21.6352** 1.024 -31.7859** 3.101** -44.6827** -65.0516**
Score10 2.8079 20.7485** 1.7391 7.602 5.4716** 25.9001 -40.9192**
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
Limit6
3+Cycle -345.834 6524.186 -119.17 N N N N
Inactive -2.9116 -14.6866 1.2381 -17.996 -0.121 2.8196 -28.831**
Score1 -2503.66** -132.184 -67.4852 8015.084** -2567.55** 8093.916** 41.0226
Score2 478.8903** -434.262** 131.3076** 529.0762 724.5984** 411.3549 -224.918
Score3 483.3035** 146.2577** -1.3067 -733.443** 472.7053** -1115.31** -1020.13**
Score4 261.9121** 255.725** -46.669** -1565.21** 172.9195** -1299.98** -146.375**
Score5 68.5404** 92.4267** -12.7139** -382.89** 42.5865** -341.519** 72.5234**
Score6 44.7768** 83.9837** -14.2859** -110.013** 19.6304** -101.487** 14.2059
Score7 20.8475** 10.9922 -1.4312 -50.6945 17.783** -41.1708 27.0152**
Score8 9.0425** 17.8501** 2.0254 -23.7889 11.5483** -91.1369** 3.24
Score9 6.2287** 18.8114** 0.6491 -23.1287 5.1618** -32.3009** -39.5187**
Score10 7.2528** 20.5476** -0.2094 -9.0606 7.1077** 5.359 -33.9829**
Limit7
3+Cycle -1059.57 2982.995 152.5289 N N N N
Inactive 2.7199 6.5472 -2.1806 50.8028 -0.7395 62.422** -21.334**
Score1 -3650.07** -2096.99 108.102 10822.18** -3268.64** 11440.48** 12.2251
Score2 906.769** -20.5257 -6.6506 2246.812** 917.9968** 2112.431** 157.2895
Score3 581.5112** 80.131** 16.0288 -192.64 599.2633** -494.363** -705.406**
Score4 347.0937** 393.5285** -56.5265** -1573.26** 233.9609** -1324.1** -141.89**
Score5 94.8789** 115.9212** -18.0761** -356.334** 59.4762** -300.478** -23.633
Score6 57.6491** 102.8407** -17.0824** -95.924 27.4399** -104.844** 16.7451
Score7 33.1031** 19.4993 -2.9712 -127.552 27.0417** -115.121 10.505
Score8 18.8891** 17.8827** 0.3806 -60.6855** 19.0991** -126.343** 2.6228
Score9 16.0155** 34.8415** -1.4783 4.4491 10.5893** -1.3173 -35.0281**
Score10 7.7825** 11.2387 1.6976 9.246 9.9178** -10.4336 -35.8016**
Limit8
3+Cycle -2112.39 -192.886 -15.4273 N N N N
Inactive -2.6391 14.757** -0.5307 32.2535 -4.5271** 30.7924 -27.0271**
Score1 -4951.97** -8842.9** -111.798 13733.71 -4098.57** 18420.54** -11.0018
Score2 1185.416** -268.518 7.9273 1633.306 1226.951** 1874.96 8381.789**
Score3 696.3652** 148.4006** 20.9316 -1224.69** 719.1002** -1796.29** -52.3273
Score4 369.7983** 536.5971** -28.8909** -1890.65** 286.4162** -1872.52** -323.358**
Score5 113.4349** 154.8078** -18.7729** -357.354** 72.0911** -293.149** -299.978**
Score6 80.8013** 129.8853** -27.2736** -46.8335 34.7314** -62.4035 -19.2657
Score7 48.1802** 17.5237 -6.1183** 111.1322 37.5349** 137.369** 38.4378**
Score8 21.7388** 23.7121** 2.4145 79.1348** 24.6369** -10.5262 8.2672
Score9 27.6218** 41.4743** -2.1348 -12.5671 20.6898** -14.1191 -51.9083**
Score10 19.0635** 20.1031** 0.9157 -34.1268 20.5838** -17.4744 -36.3593**
Limit9
3+Cycle -974.648 -1841.69 -78.05 N N N N
Inactive -4.1104 11.963 -0.6901 12.5558 -6.1468** 14.1577 -23.7645**
Score1 -6282.51** -5773.58 180.5866 759.4945 -5370.46** 3576.29 -3.2694
Score2 1355.524** -638.983 -58.7816 1935.15 1352.158** 2759.962 3300.319
Score3 904.7019** 144.369** 18.113 -1622.53** 924.092** -2191.38** 144.9341
Score4 546.2507** 887.237** -50.9863** -2384.61** 405.7426** -2341.19** -342.529**
Score5 186.0956** 238.8553** -33.3559** -581.144** 116.9284** -460.602** -534.151**
Score6 109.3008** 165.1629** -29.6632** 115.3004 56.7801** 81.5924 -15.0704
Score7 64.174** -45.482** -1.9494 2.4894 65.2703** 56.1837 24.5028
Score8 36.4316** 28.3304** 6.6229** 222.3889** 44.9979** 100.1392** 72.3244**
Score9 41.5669** 50.7752** -1.9919 -12.9432 33.9204** -17.8146 -74.6216**
Score10 32.7045** 20.4853 -0.6741 -64.2824 31.8206** -52.8263 -44.7226**
Limit10
3+Cycle -242.582** 139.4636** 5.3337 N N N N
Inactive -5.1008 20.1671** 0.8903 3.6767 -5.3841** -10.78 -19.8931**
Score1 -11750.3** -9279.42 1215.44 34300.96 -9390.48** 31043.92 -29.3218**
Score2 2055.639** -2528.27** 88.67 -3918.34 2379.206** -880.349 7319.155
Score3 1536.965** 485.1551** 77.0519** 144.0313 1625.127** -1719.76** 2245.768
Score4 1185.994** 2496.369** -62.9488** -4353.19** 942.9864** -4993.49** -1301.79**
Score5 432.7177** 768.8106** -75.7037** -736.595** 255.1174** -367.19 -2549.94**
Score6 205.6745** 412.684** -25.0685** 344.8193 138.3998** 68.635 -312.652**
Score7 153.294** -94.5249** -4.9552 -16.6526 155.2951** 133.2475 -317.88**
Score8 96.5516** 108.2475** 10.4781 209.8475 108.6581** -211.486 220.7216**
Score9 87.9927** 75.9425** -3.5223 44.2822 75.7165** 39.4081 -238.652**
Score10 84.6163** 48.2214** -3.5326 141.1312 79.0458** 123.4093 -59.4235**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroe-
conomic variable and therefore we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.2: Summary of regression estimates - Model A and Model B
- All accounts
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Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit1
Inactive -9.358** -14.8223** -11.5503** -10.827** -10.5777** 15.914** 2.9951** 16.1011** 17.3277** -21.5767**
Score2 214.6951** 208.129** 205.2988** 209.3069** 206.5986** 75.089 -0.793 523.0692 -157.812 **
Score3 24.8458** 24.9604** 22.1858** 24.956** 24.4365** 4.8301 -0.4366 184.3264** -52.0418 -40.6215
Score4 -4.8397** -6.0348** -7.5699** -6.3205** -6.1334** 17.8509** -0.1778 43.8172** 2.4805 1.6774
Score5 -1.9213** -6.1493** -2.7885** -2.4709** -3.1029** 11.4855** 2.3231** 8.7718 -19.6276 -28.841**
Score6 2.9041** -7.5404** -0.4239 2.171 0.6502 45.5707** 6.3531** 53.3613** -135.123** -13.6567**
Score7 -1.7064 -23.0082** -23.0082** -4.0648** -5.1249** 53.8285** 12.6105** 12.6105** 81.0685** -20.4707
Score8 -11.9178** -20.6051** -14.8709** -11.9918** -12.7439** 24.1727** 6.211** 40.1437** 13.4285 -69.9504**
Score9 -11.1518** -25.8332** -13.9263** -12.2655** -13.4582** 37.9413** 8.6816** 49.481** 28.7733** -40.4746**
Score10 -14.6815** -21.2082** -14.8309** -13.8328** -14.6263** 16.9856** 4.7531** 16.2516** 106.3518** -48.9259**
Limit2
Inactive -8.1219** -14.091** -11.102** -10.1444** -9.5484** 18.2597** 3.0907** 25.0308** 14.6506** -20.9184**
Score2 289.8143** 242.0597** 286.134** 286.8734** 283.1466** 40.4023 32.9164 -1152.34** -103.223 -21.8822**
Score3 26.3903** 26.2133** 24.8612** 27.2768** 26.4012** -0.0373 0.1426 210.4964** -85.9032 -248.67
Score4 -1.5818** -3.9434** -3.311** -2.3408** -2.4362** 10.1072** 0.8766** 26.4915** -19.9878 0.4241
Score5 -1.881** -12.1945** -4.4648** -4.2842** -4.8897** 23.9422** 5.5345** 25.0127** -8.0681 -14.1826**
Score6 -2.6588** -10.7984** -5.9572** -5.236** -5.8322** 28.2007** 3.8319** 66.1978** -49.4039** -14.8323**
Score7 -6.1359** -15.844** -15.844** -9.1164** -9.2333** 34.4386** 4.4393** 4.4393** 43.8606** -30.6598**
Score8 -10.7851** -20.1698** -14.1881** -12.8352** -11.9347** 18.7773** 6.0761** 55.7667** 26.8414** -29.2916**
Score9 -11.3048** -20.4963** -13.5231** -12.8791** -13.6347** 29.3463** 4.6907** 42.2189** 28.9285** -45.741**
Score10 -12.4343** -20.0643** -13.0621** -11.6999** -12.4242** 21.6162** 5.4864** 25.7519** 106.4391** -33.0294**
Limit3
Inactive -9.0723** -12.966** -10.5602** -10.0083** -9.87** 10.8734** 2.1938** 10.8919** 11.7751 -26.261**
Score2 470.4698** 419.1515** 465.3528** 460.8675** 462.3923** 62.3058 34.2486 352.1531 267.1929 -13.0756**
Score3 58.7913** 48.9819** 52.4457** 57.4394** 57.4241** 11.7879 6.7893** 505.6216** 37.82 -203.35
Score4 2.5209** 0.1477 0.0846 1.4486** 1.3687** 15.2687** 0.7085 35.9123** -20.0766 -16.6286
Score5 0.9526 0.7481 0.8897 1.0302 0.6933 1.0632 0.075 -3.5087 -20.5889 -23.7989**
Score6 0.144 -7.9471** -3.046** -1.8781** -2.8182** 30.5367** 3.9987** 46.4761** -60.916** -4.6088
Score7 -2.6821** -8.9212** -8.9212** -4.6177** -4.721** 24.235** 2.8808** 2.8808** -3.0583 -27.8481**
Score8 -8.5285** -19.0399** -11.5325** -9.8986** -9.8875** 20.5909** 6.869** 43.1866** 10.0323 -14.9587**
Score9 -8.2397** -17.6257** -11.2203** -10.2992** -11.0278** 34.4971** 4.7475** 50.8222** 28.9538** -49.7056**
Score10 -9.9903** -15.6743** -10.3986** -9.2717** -10.0052** 17.4219** 4.0723** 20.1802** 79.6426** -40.9681**
Limit4
Inactive -8.0829** -10.6389** -9.2882** -8.8991** -8.8815** 11.3409** 1.2664 6.6292 10.704 -20.1711**
Score2 580.5261** 645.1414** 564.7131** 523.2566** 559.7276** 173.1152 -62.6429 1030.974 3692.64** -13.8164**
Score3 93.624** 73.8099** 80.6233** 90.6042** 89.3534** 36.4812** 12.8093** 758.3996** -3.6507 -466.681
Score4 6.9065** 5.1354** 4.4184** 6.6518** 5.9942** 11.6123** 0.5229 46.8384** -63.876** -52.6561**
Score5 5.8605** 7.8595** 6.7827** 6.5855** 6.4336** -5.1347 -1.0703 -44.0861** -27.7984 -10.3743
Score6 6.0991** -1.5732 3.4025** 5.0798** 3.5422** 28.0586** 3.9198** 26.4609 -129.451** 3.2668
Score7 1.3069 -7.362** -7.362** -1.6182** -1.5441** 31.748** 4.1104** 4.1104** 20.54 -13.2032
Score8 -5.0511** -13.6118** -8.3337** -6.0817** -6.2846** 19.36** 5.4427** 55.8938** 0.133 -27.6145**
Score9 -5.9705** -14.2714** -8.7549** -8.1656** -8.538** 29.0709** 4.1819** 41.1157** 31.4603** -36.8086**
Score10 -7.9436** -13.3569** -8.24** -7.1764** -7.9723** 18.2476** 3.8649** 19.275** 67.5204** -36.7466**
Limit5
Inactive -5.2493** -8.6954** -6.0904** -5.8275** -5.9766** 9.2991** 1.9962** 4.8605 8.8389 -19.7078**
Score2 396.9551** 610.4533** 435.1468** 394.5717** 452.6859** -504.586 -126.075 249.7886 5967.692** -12.2216**
Score3 21.5028** 27.7366** 19.2635** 26.8637** 22.4234** -2.761 -4.4829 373.118** -400.046** 1050.087
Score4 16.4576** 11.0399** 13.9747** 15.1895** 14.2779** 30.6081** 1.9212 -6.4409 -162.482** 18.92
Score5 13.7008** 4.3969** 10.4795** 10.9441** 10.5195** 28.4928** 4.4748** 27.486** -68.885** -32.3004**
Score6 7.1815** -3.5486** 1.6003 1.6112 1.0474 64.067** 3.4555** 87.6415** -113.277** 2.3286
Score7 11.031** 0.8566 0.8566 6.5044** 6.7726** 44.7999** 4.0552** 4.0552** 2.3206 -36.244**
Score8 1.78** -14.1332** -3.8257** -2.4136** -0.3591 38.8759** 9.6943** 89.8309** -39.5352** -34.6465**
Score9 -3.0315** -8.1032** -5.1756** -4.3674** -5.2923** 23.363** 2.2988** 55.9055** 1.051 -57.9172**
Score10 -2.8398** -7.7303** -2.664** -1.946** -2.8613** 16.5783** 3.6692** 12.5814** 73.2528** -27.9559**
152
Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit6
Inactive -5.0654** -11.682** -6.2592** -6.1384** -6.0716** 13.1195** 4.0798** 4.4023 28.1097** -20.3303**
Score2 798.4906** 904.1937** 793.2447** 750.6962** 789.9947** 60.6417 -86.0941 1288.266 3623.488 -24.0779**
Score3 93.7078** 90.0878** 82.5341** 97.3925** 92.4565** 18.213 1.5308 910.6243** -440.304** -620.814
Score4 19.1074** 20.0117** 18.0304** 19.8349** 18.1603** 13.2221** -1.2987 2.215 -162.317** 9.9324
Score5 11.8653** 8.1591** 11.0805** 11.5056** 11.062** 7.8275 2.0788 -1.4234 -46.2752** -13.1363
Score6 11.6925** 6.2141** 7.239** 8.1204** 7.4894** 53.5799** 0.9999 94.4371** -74.8848 -0.2736
Score7 9.1921** 2.0328 2.0328 7.0979** 7.3823** 19.157** 3.7641** 3.7641** 47.2735 -9.0411
Score8 2.3002** -8.9166** -1.0602 0.3744 1.0971 24.2425** 7.1366** 51.6985** -11.5321 -20.6808
Score9 -1.5331** -5.2445** -3.2002** -2.5752** -3.548** 18.5708** 1.6463** 34.597** 0.042 -48.9865**
Score10 -0.3935 -5.6431** -0.0077 0.6141 -0.4604 16.6647** 3.8512** 10.3495** 45.6913 -27.5091**
Limit7
Inactive -4.796** -6.9238** -4.9222** -5.387** -5.2873** 6.3437 1.2144 -3.7398 33.4397** -20.2818**
Score2 988.0649** 977.8119** 973.1486** 953.5261** 967.1668** 198.0311 -7.6709 994.9007 982.1918 -9.459
Score3 121.3373** 94.861** 100.5414** 121.724** 117.0625** 39.5185** 17.3957** 1454.118** -305.378 -185.381
Score4 25.3278** 28.0477** 24.1255** 26.0744** 24.9073** 5.8997 -2.1201 21.2825 -111.182 -41.3156
Score5 21.4944** 23.3819** 21.4422** 21.5648** 21.4497** 2.071 -1.4917 -24.2657 -31.4798 -4.2068
Score6 13.4615** 10.2226** 8.8977** 9.6444** 9.1581** 51.9554** -0.5749 111.1097** -26.8124 4.7353
Score7 20.6579** 11.0503 11.0503 17.0736** 17.1099** 37.4967** 4.2493 4.2493 -9.4062 -27.2458**
Score8 7.986** 0.0776 5.3398** 6.3633** 6.5817** 23.8267** 4.5579** 27.3927** -44.2718 -53.4693**
Score9 4.4434** -2.0257 1.6093** 2.3942** 1.6147** 27.708** 2.919** 55.9493** 15.1256 -33.8947**
Score10 2.9486** -1.2324 3.2653** 3.625** 2.4966** 12.1281** 2.9762** 7.027 39.8247 -33.8828**
Limit8
Inactive -5.3817** -8.1607** -6.3627** -6.2838** -6.2046** 10.1028** 1.446 4.8073 26.8351 -20.6314**
Score2 893.7369** 828.6126** 889.2721** 923.5811** 869.4649** 64.1701 43.3656 -1338.26 -3190.11 -11.9124**
Score3 134.5798** 115.2487** 123.5843** 138.6577** 132.7955** 20.4274 13.5209 713.4185** -410.522 -1194.95
Score4 43.6824** 28.4299** 39.036** 42.0441** 40.2491** 47.8634** 8.5384** 20.7838 -191.265 -6.6114
Score5 32.9024** 26.847** 31.1544** 31.6084** 30.4153** 18.6631 2.9094 -23.6028 -63.4921 -90.0144**
Score6 18.8977** 15.0227** 14.7128** 16.2977** 15.36** 51.502** 0.3569 153.229** -102.989 -14.4146
Score7 29.5575** 29.4294** 29.4294** 27.0209** 27.7827** 16.8693 -0.8035 -0.8035 137.9336** -8.0557
Score8 16.227** 2.839 11.6028** 13.0464** 14.5645** 31.1588** 8.1287** 72.5373** 9.153 -28.2128
Score9 12.362** 8.8393** 9.669** 10.7123** 9.9718** 26.9219** 1.2153 58.6839** 10.1441 -65.4158**
Score10 11.1868** 6.1896** 11.4401** 12.2934** 11.2129** 16.3669** 3.6936** 12.8908** 46.7322 -23.1106**
Limit9
Inactive -6.2866** -11.4879** -8.8061** -8.1405** -7.8555** 18.8702** 2.5439** 15.4097** 10.3955 -18.4695**
Score2 622.1653** 1582.336** 588.4421** 598.1492** 636.2804** -278.653 -753.834 -8646.7 6543.304 -20.4634**
Score3 164.2332** 119.0215** 142.2669** 162.0555** 155.3411** 77.7303** 29.9648** 1430.096** -261.851 3808.997
Score4 64.2759** 49.8404** 55.7312** 63.5252** 60.403** 55.8156** 7.2022** 122.8581** -358.721** -110.528
Score5 56.0484** 48.7774** 50.8857** 51.4353** 50.471** 48.2225** 1.7158 50.5724 -21.9758 -97.8063**
Score6 35.3341** 35.188** 30.7968** 30.9046** 31.4464** 50.8367** -2.8783 139.0191** 31.82 -20.0601
Score7 48.4184** 44.3225** 44.3225** 47.6512** 48.2815** -0.7448 2.8092 2.8092 99.5117 22.0018
Score8 34.153** 11.8476** 28.2779** 28.8855** 32.3958** 39.0366** 14.4948** 107.9113** 129.7395** -17.513
Score9 25.6891** 18.8816** 21.9919** 23.0382** 22.121** 36.8507** 2.7006** 75.4326** 13.4391 -95.152**
Score10 21.1077** 15.2989** 22.0347** 22.4274** 20.7414** 17.6021** 4.2099** 6.4683 28.6924 -34.5357**
Limit10
Inactive -4.2438** -10.1484** -6.9549** -6.0087** -5.6751** 18.3828** 3.1775** 21.1403** 11.6257 -24.9206**
Score2 1282.258 301.6541 1310.976 1534.14 1176.502 598.1707 657.951 -28897.1 -24816.7 -24.6766**
Score3 353.145** 302.3895** 304.9737** 350.7289** 357.8236** -74.8055 41.8075 2088.507** 499.1023 -4394.49
Score4 161.8748** 118.7261** 122.5792** 146.4554** 140.8982** 291.9732** 14.6326** 506.351** -698.417** -9.8448
Score5 125.998** 82.3991** 105.4503** 107.1216** 104.1268** 200.7662** 17.4211** 216.5456** 105.712 -557.864**
Score6 72.6411** 53.1556** 61.0598** 65.3069** 61.7984** 117.3595** 7.4978 278.0578** -183.169 -96.5053**
Score7 112.3033** 114.4006** 114.4006** 117.3629** 118.6302** -48.1817 0.9946 0.9946 -152.211 -116.473**
Score8 95.4003** 45.5795** 81.7571** 83.6035** 90.7196** 111.0142** 30.8684** 157.9425** 92.5254 129.2794
Score9 66.3793** 59.7475** 62.6707** 62.5675** 62.4455** 39.1742** 2.5632 58.5047** 115.5095** -248.182**
Score10 66.8314** 55.9455** 66.671** 69.5453** 66.5147** 50.5256** 8.9331** 49.8775** 297.0855** -38.4349**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable and therefore we did
not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.3: Summary of regression estimates - Transactors
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
*
Limit1
Inactive -11.4582** 12.2693** 1.2734** 11.1029** -10.573** -0.8916 -21.6581**
Score2 238.3766** 112.6692 -16.129 64.7147 208.4051** -117.793 N
Score3 27.9148** 6.6524 -1.911 -46.0476 24.9998** -52.8317 -27.4848
Score4 -4.515** 19.4735** -0.4032 39.8692** -5.9586** -16.9758 2.0733
Score5 -4.1082** 8.1843 1.402 -18.1955 -2.9621** -16.1005 -29.7001**
Score6 0.9893 39.4744** 1.7204 -74.9322 1.8286 -136.317** -13.2394**
Score7 -13.2194** 38.3787** 7.1712** -6.9909 -5.028** -46.282 -20.9284
Score8 -15.934** 18.8902** 2.6268** 36.2742 -12.5477** -24.5137 -74.4376**
Score9 -18.204** 28.7944** 4.3406** -7.3982 -13.4724** -15.6905 -41.7794**
Score10 -16.8842** 6.8419 1.6422 59.0312** -14.4869** 66.758** -50.6974**
*
Limit2
Inactive -9.6596** 15.4874** 0.9488 4.5733 -9.5076** -7.4903 -13.4506**
Score2 229.5678** -32.4656 39.0759 81.2359 278.7623** 328.6386 -22.6654**
Score3 27.2902** -0.8532 -0.0614 -87.5154 27.289** -85.9872 -291.766
Score4 -3.0351** 10.2524** 0.9546** -1.3387 -2.1042** -26.7702 0.66
Score5 -8.8837** 12.9034** 4.1488** -1.5622 -4.8265** -6.7938 -15.2025**
Score6 -4.5396** 26.4932** 1.183 12.8542 -5.2636** -45.1036** -14.7799**
Score7 -7.4306** 33.2642** 0.7936 -12.0964 -9.2257** -7.567 -30.2099**
Score8 -16.3087** 16.3193** 3.4278** 76.0547** -12.039** 7.9093 -30.0573**
Score9 -14.0838** 25.8516** 1.6001** 1.7736 -13.6262** 2.4146 -45.4544**
Score10 -12.6885** 22.6151** 0.1504 -15.0766 -12.4422** -7.4659 -32.7389**
*
Limit3
Inactive -10.7899** 7.8501** 1.0616 6.3293 -9.8681** -0.5015 -27.0971**
Score2 411.8736** 16.5201 36.4301 532.861 456.2234** 510.3485 -13.1257**
Score3 49.4775** 4.9526 6.2044 73.1301 57.0309** 41.6279 -239.389
Score4 1.4271 15.7392** 0.6651 10.9915 1.746** -33.1078 -16.827
Score5 1.6234 2.0237 -0.2797 -21.2691 0.8725 -19.7551 -25.1816**
Score6 -1.302 28.9518** 0.924 5.7559 -2.1548** -55.2181** -4.2457
Score7 -2.3854 25.7776** -0.0246 -32.5666 -4.6183** -28.4017 -27.0626**
Score8 -15.5996** 14.2887** 4.5041** 54.7111** -9.7382** -13.2995 -17.5913**
Score9 -9.2428** 32.7705** 0.5628 8.3766 -11.0303** 2.5339 -50.1759**
Score10 -10.6471** 15.4214** 0.4555 7.4277 -9.9652** 16.8391 -40.7071**
*
Limit4
Inactive -7.2087** 12.66** -0.5701 4.6752 -8.8777** -1.1136 -18.2486**
Score2 737.4926** 645.3233** -120.482 4624.642** 507.4964** 4621.78** -13.9165**
Score3 81.2191** 27.63** 8.4092 73.3454 89.3014** 5.7165 -870.067
Score4 6.2193** 9.5883** 0.6851 -46.6896 6.8041** -70.3389** -52.6792**
Score5 7.9118** -2.321 -1.0552 -29.7434 6.7282** -28.7597 -13.2103
Score6 4.2659 21.4701** 1.616 -80.3688** 4.9743** -128.276** 3.8966
Score7 0.3548 30.25** 0.5543 3.9813 -1.4816** -9.4204 -12.3936
Score8 -9.7469** 14.9253** 2.9485** 37.0242** -6.0557** -22.844 -28.3432**
Score9 -7.6635** 26.2463** 0.9096 22.5241** -8.5994** 13.7181 -37.8108**
Score10 -8.1003** 18.5199** 0.0973 -6.0123 -7.9553** 6.4242 -35.5675**
*
Limit5
Inactive -7.1295** 6.5489 1.1326 8.8427 -5.9961** 3.1158 -18.9816**
Score2 472.305 -89.3181 -59.2603 5562.311 407.0812** 5436.591 -12.0381**
Score3 35.6166** 0.913 -6.2328 -423.79** 27.456** -396.28** 563.4893
Score4 14.2468** 25.3934** 1.9928 -122.666** 16.2135** -198.914** 17.0048
Score5 12.1681** 26.0626** 1.3095 -71.8373** 11.0063** -68.8031** -44.4135**
Score6 12.0357** 68.8429** -3.1235** -50.2859 1.7178 -129.709** 2.0867
Score7 15.3386** 51.6189** -2.5389 -11.9581 7.0394** -38.4751 -40.0156**
Score8 -4.6171** 30.6466** 4.5938** 3.8611 1.003 -127.827** -37.8249**
Score9 -2.9718 23.9459** 0.0213 -12.0273 -5.2621** -17.1686 -70.3269**
Score10 -2.2512 16.7127** -0.3853 9.9748 -2.8224** 15.0063 -29.6748**
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
*
Limit6
Inactive -11.269** 2.6304 3.7948** 30.1363** -6.1411** 13.0431 -18.6635**
Score2 1002.299** 648.3062 -143.491 4638.61 734.4388** 4834.706 -23.1249**
Score3 103.6091** 18.5247 -3.5756 -425.293** 97.7139** -440.566** -1112.71
Score4 21.6806** 7.5589 -1.0106 -142.851** 20.0451** -174.277** 10.1687
Score5 10.1893** 4.813 1.2782 -44.8223** 11.5139** -46.3047** -20.8458
Score6 20.3479** 65.0636** -5.6353** -4.1638 8.0249** -77.2 0.2347
Score7 4.9675 13.0412 2.296 46.744 7.1411** 32.3401 -10.2134
Score8 -3.9135** 16.9798** 4.204** 21.2787 1.7293** -61.3186** -18.5596
Score9 -1.0774 19.3093** -0.226 -7.2416 -3.5007** -12.8636 -53.2866**
Score10 -1.7167 16.5275** 0.8579 -23.8279 -0.5005 -15.8561 -28.5711**
*
Limit7
Inactive -6.2059** 3.8204 0.7343 32.4462 -5.4406** 28.606 -22.0389**
Score2 1036.574** 355.988 -42.6738 1571.089 948.9186** 1228.234 -7.2713
Score3 105.4007** 22.4744 12.678 -220.827 120.4654** -305.182 -269.568
Score4 28.8792** 2.2252 -1.8697 -98.2443 26.1536** -116.39 -41.2833
Score5 26.307** 9.1832 -2.6972 -35.709 21.7421** -32.0047 -9.203
Score6 24.6361** 68.6549** -7.4614** 42.6171 9.3888** -29.9656 5.0352
Score7 21.3802** 38.4778 -0.3737 -12.4996 17.5607** -53.4876 -27.476**
Score8 6.8614** 21.9639** 0.7991 -8.9695 7.3903** -88.5413** -56.9328**
Score9 3.9585** 27.0434** 0.2194 11.6228 1.5882** 3.939 -40.628**
Score10 1.1901 9.3634 1.1639 -3.6835 2.4408** -22.5314 -33.6405**
*
Limit8
Inactive -6.214** 8.7956 0.387 25.2039 -6.3489** 21.4313 -23.1601**
Score2 859.9291 -192.854 37.1118 -3431.84 895.6995** -2129.56 -10.5347
Score3 122.3396** 1.1542 11.904 -351.856 138.4856** -410.833 -1007.66
Score4 33.4883** 39.8575** 8.2529** -109.443 43.1382** -230.312** -6.9752
Score5 32.4987** 17.1476 0.6015 -62.6586 31.0428** -61.6575 -97.2502**
Score6 29.7688** 64.0968** -6.69** -35.5046 16.0985** -104.32 -13.6931
Score7 32.9796** 22.1864 -2.7254 127.4327** 26.8156** 123.6376** -9.0948
Score8 11.6055** 28.6259** 2.9159 66.5748** 15.1115** -46.9523 -21.3188
Score9 15.3585** 30.6195** -1.7313 1.1328 9.9586** 2.1701 -68.6524**
Score10 9.2006** 13.4436 1.3091 -4.5199 11.2297** 6.6827 -22.9635**
*
Limit9
Inactive -6.3104** 18.7997** -0.0083 4.8743 -7.8336** -3.2922 -17.7248**
Score2 2039.398** 1934.912 -1006.95** 6274.578 593.5789** 5463.228 -20.7176**
Score3 138.1412** 52.8303 19.2122 -82.7055 158.8928** -270.416 3627.327
Score4 56.6748** 40.9801** 7.0962** -279.206** 65.2521** -414.622** -110.947
Score5 64.7544** 61.1711** -4.98 -32.2981 50.6602** -18.4693 -114.045**
Score6 50.6175** 73.538** -10.0578** 101.2758 31.1876** 36.2594 -19.7691
Score7 39.6195** -13.1296 4.6166 109.7103 47.583** 91.0122 22.5024
Score8 18.6675** 27.8591** 10.0041** 186.6794** 31.8888** 45.7102 -12.1779
Score9 27.497** 39.1601** -1.0779 6.4311 22.0986** 3.0783 -91.7331**
Score10 17.8883** 15.2534 2.0842 -33.4373 20.6535** -34.9298 -34.3554**
*
Limit10
Inactive -5.9539** 15.4533** 1.0608 6.2169 -5.6286** -7.0448 -28.8285**
Score2 -141.07 -3089.53 1014.917 -30780.8 1498.545 -22923.6 -25.2851**
Score3 233.7135** -172.097 79.4694 481.2159 350.4425** 499.435 -1253.47
Score4 146.3401** 282.2437** 12.0842** -110.884 152.3616** -953.459** -10.1771
Score5 133.0962** 212.1593** -4.7122 92.797 102.7878** 129.3594 -589.847**
Score6 81.8955** 130.2314** -6.065 18.0567 63.3873** -165.545 -99.4686**
Score7 100.658** -65.5663 7.6289 -131.817 119.4381** -93.7268 -114.741**
Score8 70.3278** 87.1549** 16.8302** 236.953 92.3652** -184.583 125.2321
Score9 65.2711** 40.4923** -0.0989 119.3744** 61.2412** 112.7179** -263.467**
Score10 70.4766** 37.9339 -2.169 201.4575** 66.968** 203.7054** -36.4956**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroe-
conomic variable and therefore we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.4: Summary of regression estimates - Model A and Model B
- Transactors
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Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit1
3+Cycle -589.476** -652.867** -678.858** N -621.158** 540.0183** 12.1933 1935.966** N -570.256
Inactive 132.1707** 284.7269** 196.0249** 157.0641** 145.8868** -410.845** -100.204** -459.434** -1038.64** **
Score1 -726.414** -625.223** -705.839** -723.087** -705.997** -119.812 -73.1968** 357.6259 2335.848** 578.0048**
Score2 210.5769** 168.7747** 204.5245** 202.977** 220.3502** 47.0052 29.8137** 18.5524 230.1352** -80.5748
Score3 186.1071** 165.388** 181.5737** 181.3783** 182.2409** 51.2494** 12.5236** 51.0053** -55.781 -426.789**
Score4 79.6252** 100.2156** 81.7486** 83.1569** 80.5202** -11.5397 -14.0637** -77.2417** -578.707** -39.1395**
Score5 35.9541** 36.0818** 35.0729** 37.2323** 36.6675** 20.1712 -0.3082 10.5024 -216.928** 112.4593**
Score6 36.7358** 45.2547** 37.0719** 37.2412** 36.942** -5.0708 -5.8936 -5.339 -176.594 35.7146**
Score7 38.7511** 43.0125** 39.4874** 37.1168** 37.7011** -34.1999 -3.5275 -30.6547 70.6016 21.5649
Score8 28.4333** 48.2992** 39.309** 21.422** 25.6156** -96.5318** -16.416** -122.897** 6.2876 9.2566
Score9 53.1967** 2.4119 80.0707** 45.1257** 43.4504** -115.319** 27.0243** -214.098** 93.5587 72.2372**
Score10 15.5305** -98.1335** 26.5883** 15.4645** 12.5569** 1.6361 75.6476** -55.1338** 40.1743 -34.5416
Limit2
3+Cycle -626.062** -599.913** -679.67** N -642.025** 351.0271 -44.6027 455.0281 N -97.1895**
Inactive 143.3644** 278.8875** 198.5966** 171.2019** 157.5448** -322.463** -84.131** -417.076** -671.19 -1319.97**
Score1 -1165.64** -1053.82** -1139.04** -1154.54** -1131.35** -176.911 -75.772 -133.668 1672.525 569.7727**
Score2 263.1256** 214.7522** 251.4231** 246.9607** 284.1307** 73.6651 32.5161** 519.643** 883.9659** -117.922
Score3 236.4344** 206.5417** 230.6621** 229.5655** 232.9979** 58.3425** 19.0849** 70.8619** 33.4127 -786.001**
Score4 83.3711** 119.6494** 87.5449** 92.815** 84.4358** -37.8212** -23.7338** -200.094** -887.039** -85.6539**
Score5 28.1622** 31.6026** 27.6523** 28.9032** 27.6479** 12.5546 -2.9512 -11.4431 -206.502** 203.0517**
Score6 25.1702** 64.0061** 28.6533** 28.5732** 29.4349** -66.5041** -24.1028** -34.2657 -150.604 37.916**
Score7 35.1698** 41.3571** 37.4351** 35.8431** 36.1907** -41.1995** -3.4872 -58.2612** -203.686** 127.6465**
Score8 27.8177** 65.0963** 40.4629** 18.848** 27.5288** -156.733** -28.1978** -158.41** 230.0776** 47.8762**
Score9 50.8879** -1.1484 74.9865** 45.0136** 43.9284** -114.41** 29.0376** -212.146** 57.7143 141.0646**
Score10 24.9834** -88.2682** 36.975** 23.7248** 22.0248** -11.9678 73.9445** -68.8702** 64.8588 -23.7659
Limit3
3+Cycle -989.195** -1136.83** -1104.38** N -1030.51** 706.1175 23.519 769.1358 N -79.5334**
Inactive 152.0291** 385.0957** 235.0581** 194.0832** 172.4272** -591.304** -149.365** -609.972** -1746.87** -2132.62
Score1 -1728.38** -1274.52** -1553.13** -1565.29** -1581.01** -1272.6** -241.526** -803.251 1837.044 1003.571**
Score2 360.9427** 333.9845** 364.7962** 357.4635** 384.9157** -11.5798 23.0242 -373.32** 552.5418** 821.7551
Score3 337.8628** 304.0449** 329.1054** 328.981** 331.3989** 92.2305** 19.3145** 88.534** -81.1016 -721.576**
Score4 142.2967** 175.8483** 145.5521** 149.6669** 143.6979** -13.4745 -22.8672** -171.799** -883.88** -115.249**
Score5 44.3334** 52.0154** 43.5489** 45.5086** 43.7816** 18.8717** -6.1434** -8.2368 -241.706** 188.3631**
Score6 33.2041** 75.3055** 37.3402** 35.8812** 38.0534** -87.7459** -26.5161** -65.6476** -158.238 46.9222**
Score7 44.9916** 66.6265** 46.7044** 45.7435** 46.5086** -34.8524** -13.7581** -39.3326 -134.567 151.9286**
Score8 30.7364** 62.6682** 42.4832** 21.4444** 28.9532** -145.024** -25.0098** -149.923** 180.4596** 63.8178**
Score9 55.1728** 20.6549** 83.491** 49.0906** 51.3765** -154.44** 17.8408** -244.105** -50.9809 118.1039**
Score10 17.3497** -82.2507** 24.025** 17.0127** 16.7889** 2.4999 65.7149** -36.1597** 210.34** 55.0849**
Limit4
3+Cycle -945.672** -1076.64** -1157.37** N -1077.63** 1269.029 -49.8221 2065.578 N -68.3446**
Inactive 134.4958** 293.1784** 198.5781** 157.0243** 150.7184** -431.05** -103.698** -493.223** -874.149 -1300.57
Score1 -2230.47** -1850.13** -2068.79** -2164.99** -2085.45** -1240.88** -183.853 122.4531 7974.574** 701.1201**
Score2 483.1007** 440.6321** 479.216** 462.1288** 501.4871** 41.6681 29.9936 -158.961 1579.645** 685.3529
Score3 456.9509** 398.2886** 446.6615** 443.8943** 451.1081** 120.8149** 36.7053** 301.5618** 314.3507** -885.957**
Score4 218.2107** 243.5684** 214.3208** 221.6059** 213.9816** 76.8602** -21.2658** -78.9762** -1242.85** -266.026**
Score5 63.4668** 66.4545** 60.6767** 64.3198** 61.3303** 44.901** -3.9451 6.353 -339.441** 162.3963**
Score6 40.6956** 87.1991** 44.251** 42.1616** 44.623** -96.6955** -29.1289** -52.4156** 44.5634 42.6131**
Score7 40.8362** 62.3461** 42.3728** 42.384** 42.7358** -41.9802** -13.3732** -11.8836 -175.732 136.3879**
Score8 34.1145** 80.9962** 47.1143** 26.2859** 33.9535** -160.015** -34.6502** -165.107** 2.3579 69.9161**
Score9 62.1984** 43.0225** 91.6405** 61.4656** 62.9238** -149.096** 11.9091** -254.697** 66.133 159.0859**
Score10 17.0265** -71.7853** 21.0372** 17.8274** 18.551** 19.593** 59.2561** -21.063** 243.3034** 74.899**
Limit5
3+Cycle -945.515** -802.499** -882.934** N -932.662** 62.2539 -131.802 -1587.17 N -86.8016**
Inactive 183.1788** 461.8471** 280.2913** 223.2145** 223.3194** -700.818** -177.735** -702.365** -999.518 -737.782
Score1 -2193.28** -1252.13** -2038.77** -2055.69** -2097.34** -992.822 -718.475** -627.634 11552.46** 1141.889**
Score2 519.5173** 653.6486** 576.1555** 563.7293** 560.7166** -385.076** -70.2121 -1304.35** 815.676 1243.851
Score3 341.4394** 244.7057** 316.8096** 316.5162** 325.0376** 237.0486** 56.6535** 477.34** -517.463** 179.9627
Score4 149.6001** 128.5132** 134.478** 139.855** 136.1966** 153.2525** 5.4253 178.16** -660.122** -357.039**
Score5 55.0133** 40.7192** 46.5975** 51.2724** 48.4507** 77.1402** 5.6263** 116.4199** -318.074** -20.1855
Score6 72.7076** 74.1391** 71.069** 72.0926** 72.4376** 17.3414 -1.6671 26.9628 -71.4334 -24.5588
Score7 66.4047** 70.9708** 70.4781** 70.9422** 71.6923** -57.2328** -0.1141 50.942 443.0271** -34.4906
Score8 89.9701** 226.243** 133.0355** 83.2877** 98.7727** -462.907** -95.5751** -497.599** -738.631** -28.4357
Score9 138.1397** 94.0728** 192.7188** 132.454** 132.0767** -363.142** 23.3403** -556.463** -197.945 492.5526**
Score10 53.4816** -128.794** 95.3129** 53.7785** 51.0369** 21.5349 122.3565** -212.903** 339.9258** 4.6902
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Parameter α Parameter β
CPI GDP Int Sto Une CPI GDP Int Sto Une
Limit6
3+Cycle -508.098 -688.78 -1104.25 N -1164.35** 6633.009** -186.757 4107.207 N -181.37**
Inactive 207.3904 535.7143 355.0599** 276.3184 292.3012** -1207.02 -199.97 -976.378 -2151.66 -11904.3**
Score1 -2517.83** -2544.59** -2588.44** -2653.19** -2542.35** 442.7493 -20.6895 2786.287 9051.084** 2738.085**
Score2 668.6921** 604.7199** 703.323** 689.1259** 723.6226** -219.248 72.8644** -2285.17** 661.6692 -1716.2
Score3 560.6524** 491.8027** 539.7969** 543.9694** 544.7303** 208.8659** 37.4567** 158.4942** -699.441** -1010.2**
Score4 261.5233** 312.5654** 260.4673** 268.1331** 259.8994** 43.0642** -37.5938** -123.834** -1676.24** -229.743**
Score5 80.638** 82.9332** 74.2809** 82.8068** 77.1835** 66.4993** -4.5954 72.3217** -656.388** 296.477**
Score6 63.7998** 109.2658** 70.2012** 65.8335** 66.4577** -98.8086** -30.4576** -95.9485** -125.336 67.0196**
Score7 64.897** 96.175** 71.4259** 70.3212** 69.8857** -101.394** -18.0868** -80.4476** -103.021 145.2503**
Score8 76.7843** 166.0883** 104.3113** 62.6419** 81.3003** -354.808** -65.8407** -351.655** -203.387 66.3159**
Score9 117.9139** 75.6676** 159.8568** 115.6049** 114.2267** -233.935** 24.5022** -410.989** -8.8528 378.5472**
Score10 42.095** -94.4886** 66.3592** 41.9652** 40.9738** 10.8063 90.5989** -129.396** 269.0831** -34.0276
Limit7
3+Cycle -830.459 -1163.27 -1365.21** N -1030.38** 2396.046 6.6174 6196.54 N -133.332**
Inactive 220.1053** 427.9145** 271.688** 226.4517** 241.8533** -310.582 -134.478** -352.804 563.027 -6391.13
Score1 -3453.24** -2928.26** -3211.23** -3381.25** -3208.4** -2015.37 -221.142 -1444.06 16612.56** 696.7501**
Score2 900.4301** 966.1416** 934.9342** 898.3457** 944.0526** -198.471 -32.4527 -2554.29** 2307.596** -387.374
Score3 691.8947** 629.6459** 679.1546** 679.4322** 683.547** 132.1378** 37.9557** 258.5684** -104.018 -862.006**
Score4 347.4891** 382.7152** 335.1165** 346.5519** 339.8841** 167.0017** -30.7803** 94.6255** -1433.13** -248.706**
Score5 104.5996** 105.3119** 96.2287** 105.237** 99.5089** 86.1631** -4.5484 93.1708** -647.095** 208.3689**
Score6 87.0896** 132.7649** 92.617** 90.1064** 89.3736** -75.2282** -31.0026** -78.9929** -246.845 54.4705**
Score7 63.2127** 108.763** 71.1618** 69.9407** 68.8862** -129.362** -26.9323** -106.264 -318.264 136.5544**
Score8 90.7943** 180.7055** 113.3235** 76.1858** 93.2992** -366.678** -66.5851** -323.91** -221.327 191.8066**
Score9 118.8952** 125.4346** 166.8602** 115.2208** 116.1713** -233.169** -5.9626 -479.343** 160.2878 357.559**
Score10 46.1196** -100.445** 65.724** 46.896** 46.01** 26.7321** 97.4694** -104.903** 442.2681** 4.5407
Limit8
3+Cycle -2144.76 -2131.94 -2514.97 N -2111.47** -148.928 -3.2807 8205.221 N -159.045**
Inactive 174.0745** 124.4976 130.7941** 140.3386** 149.334** 335.3393 15.4821 186.3951 367.6366 -18398**
Score1 -5127.42** -2611.67** -3939.17** -4096.83** -4081.22** -8674.06** -1096.89** -7325.15 17496.17 -291.721
Score2 1221.021** 1327.336** 1270.985** 1243.177** 1270.172** -353.794 -48.6526 -1082.83 2089.465 6295.343
Score3 831.3344** 730.0231** 805.9993** 819.3484** 811.7843** 260.6189** 59.0617** 394.9048** -1311.31** -224.258
Score4 441.5572** 441.654** 411.8866** 435.2897** 426.7831** 331.0442** -10.7445 460.7792** -1473.03** -366.367**
Score5 135.0847** 133.8592** 120.6261** 129.9514** 127.3387** 129.8528** -4.4628 222.3231** -263.821** 60.3813
Score6 102.7731** 145.8867** 106.3849** 103.6869** 103.6312** -23.9317 -30.5342** -57.9062 31.1209 -0.4084
Score7 87.6932** 122.4062** 93.2632** 92.1609** 92.6017** -96.2078** -19.9921** -47.999 465.6923** 92.3045**
Score8 95.637** 173.5025** 126.9482** 81.9356** 98.1386** -340.62** -56.3397** -357.397** 698.2946** 39.5971
Score9 164.5732** 151.4455** 215.3614** 162.97** 158.1443** -176.962** 7.5662 -498.817** 250.8851 292.9201**
Score10 68.7325** -129.474** 89.1784** 71.074** 71.2833** 58.0314** 132.956** -105.908** 536.7743** -186.929**
Limit9
3+Cycle -997.349 -687.895 -731.143 N -381.319 -1321.46 -13.3359 2009.37 N -215.412**
Inactive 179.9119 485.8094** 308.2664** 254.3207** 207.6774** -689.412 -179.189 -582.995 1425.938 -5376.57
Score1 -6218.56** -4915.09** -5589.38** -5589.55** -5687.66** -4309.35 -576.814 -6077.92 1981.737 1107.2
Score2 1301.003** 1601.852** 1454.13** 1390.38** 1421.578** -881.902** -148.49 -6811.43** 2447.198 2631.335
Score3 1046.631** 966.1418** 1026.628** 1042.182** 1029.964** 222.2956** 45.8896** 86.6749 -1673.78** -177.554
Score4 603.169** 573.3785** 556.3224** 589.7596** 577.9524** 559.5894** 4.0796 691.9489** -1552.15** -311.516**
Score5 202.1713** 212.2478** 185.8749** 202.0496** 194.9607** 149.4958** -12.9216 257.1659** -858.91** -67.364
Score6 145.672** 151.6507** 133.0885** 140.8912** 142.0693** 78.4912** -7.0594 190.7325** 120.3753 90.0317**
Score7 125.9778** 213.753** 145.4574** 141.1333** 141.1483** -283.87** -48.929** -310.901** 204.3843 -72.0838
Score8 137.8173** 246.7808** 180.9571** 122.0906** 139.6815** -424.868** -77.1658** -478.117** 1048.53** 261.1408**
Score9 181.2363** 186.8364** 241.6393** 180.2449** 177.0277** -202.611** -3.5916 -572.244** 225.198 314.7024**
Score10 85.6312** -145.169** 105.5818** 87.6935** 88.2817** 52.7686** 152.7884** -107.837** 485.5899** -165.349**
Limit10
3+Cycle -240.145** -259.441** -253.987** N -255.299** 105.5777** 1.2171 925.3441 N -215.179**
Inactive 73.6662 -74.1425 -55.7597 28.0795 29.0486 613.2376 70.6857 1029.174** -358.868 -121.131
Score1 -9933.37** -8476.72** -9229.76** -9686.91** -9416.96** -6023.89 -776.353 -6874.85 34086.14 -598.258
Score2 2208.515** 2833.378** 2569.097** 2474.082** 2425.416** -2254.66** -281.603 -10402.3** 225.6363 7252.259
Score3 1796.247** 1567.981** 1745.413** 1772.047** 1753.169** 559.0514** 138.9789** 846.7927** -668.273 2337.611
Score4 1292.784** 1022.114** 1146.718** 1314.451** 1224.759** 1819.893** 170.5733** 2311.776** -2182.06** -1170.59**
Score5 473.3263** 433.0826** 396.6362** 457.5807** 442.5904** 656.3879** 11.1738 1228.398** -719.708 -1552.14**
Score6 394.5633** 267.3071** 352.9707** 376.381** 380.0842** 320.2606** 83.797** 594.369** 1498.907** -250.546**
Score7 294.1524** 447.209** 318.5244** 304.8226** 316.841** -491.539** -88.3283** -188.986 1830.378** -595.896**
Score8 229.8247** 355.0325** 281.1884** 214.5434** 232.498** -446.4** -89.6367** -565.364** -48.3109 337.8152**
Score9 288.0819** 259.5032** 347.0945** 285.0907** 274.9195** -210.36** 15.6453 -590.396** -146.499 428.0257**
Score10 153.4814** -129.938** 197.7582** 157.1834** 155.2927** 88.6204 190.1618** -224.685** 810.3713** -249.969**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroeconomic variable and therefore we did
not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.5: Summary of regression estimates - Revolvers
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
Limit1
3+Cycle -608.665** 541.825** 13.3096 N N N N
Inactive 167.8658** -422.192** -13.556 -1026.07** 145.4118** -399.854 534.1021**
Score1 -618.367** 95.5701 -78.853 2258.543** -730.538** 2481.055** **
Score2 164.095** 0.1869 32.0385** 280.561** 219.5362** 77.8121 153.8681
Score3 175.4652** 35.3775** 7.2632** -5.3627 183.1084** -120.418 -419.947**
Score4 118.9694** 71.8018** -21.8699** -624.427** 82.5486** -433.6** -49.5764**
Score5 47.5622** 44.2644** -6.1175 -264.945** 37.6115** -181.116** 74.2642**
Score6 52.8225** 31.8727 -10.7361 -154.47 37.2402** -161.6 21.9561
Score7 26.1025** -76.1248** 8.5149 251.5856 38.0187** 148.1691 4.78
Score8 21.1587 -135.932** 4.6599 383.2693** 25.4402** 257.2657** 24.9192
Score9 4.6298 -138.492** 30.6452** 281.0833** 43.7447** 74.662 98.4003**
Score10 -97.6155** -16.0179 75.9123** 117.7843 13.1861** -149.392 -24.2986
Limit2
3+Cycle -585.009** 208.5566 -37.4409 N N N N
Inactive 189.2889** -207.703** -18.256 -841.548 158.0485** -273.315 -103.952**
Score1 -1060.6** 59.6019 -75.791 1577.996 -1157.45** 1709.482 548.6295**
Score2 220.1287** 79.5819 30.4345** 1005.514** 277.2872** 641.19** 51.2366
Score3 215.9044** 33.9892** 14.2666** 97.4808 233.5655** -74.1046 -732.616**
Score4 142.0171** 66.8011** -30.9698** -900.343** 89.3444** -660.296** -92.3926**
Score5 42.583** 36.1439** -7.823** -223.005** 28.8394** -171.807** 148.5383**
Score6 68.3405** 14.5559 -26.4364** -57.3343 28.9076** 177.3458** 25.7403**
Score7 15.4296 -75.7836** 12.5052** -80.2311 36.1356** -37.5137 144.6918**
Score8 7.5003 -202.21** 12.0991** 452.6161** 25.547** 560.1229** 43.6548**
Score9 3.0382 -131.338** 29.8312** 250.0075** 44.0947** 40.6436 183.6706**
Score10 -87.6937** -50.5872** 75.2592** 405.3528** 22.3513** -120.602 -17.7913
Limit3
3+Cycle -1052.03** 941.7419 59.0208 N N N N
Inactive 165.9347** -186.717 14.7108 -1605.18** 173.8763** -588.027 -86.08**
Score1 -1532.15** -864.562 -137.775 1686.05 -1621.72** 2785.214 934.2601**
Score2 310.8982** -41.6908 33.5048** 569.4752** 381.2785** 321.4003 1113.146**
Score3 326.5779** 78.759** 7.571 53.2953 333.2871** -224.083** -696.407**
Score4 209.1642** 100.6655** -35.9076** -945.157** 148.5349** -692.161** -133.18**
Score5 70.8626** 58.751** -15.3817** -255.294** 45.5443** -204.794** 136.453**
Score6 68.8822** -20.6663 -22.4853** -29.7424 37.3277** 253.8777** 34.4336**
Score7 73.1546** 22.8066 -17.7454** -34.3276 46.5699** 130.9396 175.7676**
Score8 16.475** -194.656** 8.2284** 563.0012** 27.8029** 553.003** 78.0898**
Score9 25.086** -163.284** 18.9033** 129.8123** 51.3849** 5.6192 167.8888**
Score10 -82.3675** -54.6953** 67.2446** 578.201** 16.7471** 25.3674 55.7885**
Limit4
3+Cycle -920.178** 1219.531 -33.3509 N N N N
Inactive 91.852** -60.3289 42.1013 -723.943 150.9966** -162.014 -66.583**
Score1 -2294.13** -1123.34 -12.2761 7764.791** -2203.11** 8635.538** 684.181**
Score2 428.5635** 85.5809 33.7619 1729.388** 485.2536** 1394.35** 1247.61
Score3 418.8322** 85.8355** 24.8266** 477.2646** 450.8351** 36.9563 -806.398**
Score4 318.8417** 249.4466** -54.5668** -1415.21** 221.3421** -1129.59** -263.182**
Score5 95.5524** 91.1487** -18.449** -343.01** 64.3319** -314.978** 78.5357**
Score6 78.9495** -34.572 -24.7287** 255.4603** 43.6417** 558.9888** 25.5303
Score7 63.4335** 7.1216 -13.8836** -72.1157 42.7023** 87.1951 193.5289**
Score8 38.1884** -179.798** -3.9704 526.2762** 33.1843** 528.0651** 79.4172**
Score9 37.1442** -173.356** 16.0788** 289.9013** 63.231** 189.3944** 208.9965**
Score10 -74.0727** -23.8917** 61.4816** 461.6603** 18.5651** -68.8148 98.2221**
Limit5
3+Cycle -769.365** 272.9027 -137.934 N N N N
Inactive 262.6267** -546.564** -35.2317 -1192.37 223.3615** -156.734 -92.2444**
Score1 -1039.71 1045.434 -777.735** 10776.75** -2234.41** 13722.69** 1124.494**
Score2 550.6622** -313.086 -19.8767 481.3653 553.9236** 898.5671 2847.921
Score3 299.1041** 174.3174** 29.957** -151.279 334.4695** -894.162** 250.6417
Score4 199.5949** 248.7282** -26.0238** -899.09** 140.8766** -790.218** -428.32**
Score5 71.8385** 101.6588** -8.4337** -354.92** 51.6435** -365.025** -84.3134**
Score6 93.8858** 58.6397 -14.2119 -68.6091 73.4291** -230.701 -47.1616**
Score7 22.0937 -163.519** 27.3063** 524.6352** 70.0199** 534.808** -58.5782
Score8 63.8511** -508.136** 17.3331** 59.9017 98.0551** 225.4379 30.8688
Score9 101.958** -368.273** 22.211** 105.6775 131.431** -213.279 512.8538**
Score10 -127.401** -32.2552 121.8999** 449.6275** 51.286** -78.4752 -21.8486
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Model A Model B
Intercept CPI GDP Sto Intercept Sto Une
Limit6
3+Cycle -345.834 6524.186 -119.17 N N N N
Inactive 281.1815 -447.246 -4.797 -2477.5 300.7125** -890.979 -185.472**
Score1 -2612.06** 411.0281 5.7844 9056.063** -2629.5** 8454.624** 2683.382**
Score2 449.026** -486.338** 146.0205** 507.7865 718.991** 400.8091 -1138.6
Score3 547.6933** 173.6623** 9.5823 -392.699** 553.5335** -988.743** -983.535**
Score4 395.1878** 292.0996** -73.0854** -1897.89** 267.249** -1369.6** -303.786**
Score5 126.251** 128.5769** -24.374** -696.426** 82.941** -627.037** 184.2939**
Score6 97.2443** -39.3629 -22.7909** 83.7152 65.45** 285.579 34.8309**
Score7 58.6893** -116.512** 3.7285 83.7882 69.7187** 124.7742 171.6415**
Score8 57.8361** -399.848** 11.2345 427.8048** 79.8845** 517.6081** 79.4703**
Score9 81.0031** -236.469** 22.4322** 147.6694 114.1796** -36.3704 420.9147**
Score10 -94.7551** -46.5511** 91.6715** 581.0585** 41.175** -82.9317 -37.6512
Limit7
3+Cycle -1059.57 2982.995 152.5289 N N N N
Inactive 290.804** -252.648 -39.0711 637.402 228.2105** 1283.484 -138.568**
Score1 -3669.69** -1869.2 55.7608 16071.87** -3394.18** 16979.09** 819.8292**
Score2 899.0643** -48.0382 -4.5081 2252.139** 917.2043** 2133.256** 629.9873
Score3 654.2682** 87.2445** 24.9646** 114.9726 686.5436** -325.701 -731.745**
Score4 505.193** 436.8226** -87.6908** -1840.85** 346.8539** -1264.91** -270.143**
Score5 155.9881** 155.6847** -28.3943** -687.085** 105.3363** -628.415** 112.0829**
Score6 136.963** 13.7704 -33.5237** -58.5163 89.0744** 60.8203 25.0912
Score7 67.847** -117.378 -2.6905 -96.0805 68.3755** 302.2479 142.0301**
Score8 64.3109** -436.401** 16.2448 623.919** 92.4551** 604.5043** 223.3428**
Score9 121.2361** -244.844** -2.3455 304.4313** 115.9034** 177.3192 410.5843**
Score10 -101.906** -54.7328** 99.5656** 828.4548** 46.0176** -7.1304 22.2996
Limit8
3+Cycle -2112.39 -192.886 -15.4273 N N N N
Inactive 102.9617** 252.71 32.249 693.1349 145.619** 261.0052 -159.511**
Score1 -5128.89** -8225.29** -78.8903 15676.39 -4336.69** 21487.68** -279.206
Score2 1206.075** -255.791 6.1552 1849.095 1245.819** 2064.93 7816.043**
Score3 792.8551** 162.2731** 28.8046** -880.502** 827.7735** -1592.63** -100.682
Score4 604.8882** 605.2473** -90.224** -2120.31** 434.6698** -1538.63** -448.835**
Score5 195.1599** 216.4419** -35.2534** -350.264** 129.8289** -276.277** -48.7089
Score6 196.7721** 128.3917** -64.5441** 272.0128 102.1154** 200.8641 -14.8143
Score7 102.6552** -85.1462 -10.1239 652.3412** 91.705** 779.48** 108.278**
Score8 52.6418** -459.364** 23.9228** 1401.827** 93.1178** 1581.571** 118.3002**
Score9 152.1814** -196.167** 6.7144 403.7163** 158.1037** 88.4952 429.395**
Score10 -132.997** 0.9267 134.956** 613.3233** 71.4108** -188.107 -177.913**
Limit9
3+Cycle -974.648 -1841.69 -78.05 N N N N
Inactive 79.0348 -723.959 89.6216 1420.622 177.3356 2001.705 -229.429**
Score1 -6214.67** -4277.77 -5.3334 991.7727 -5719.12** 3240.537 1215.797
Score2 1337.244** -722.717 -25.9695 1601.754 1390.65** 2444.817 2838.352
Score3 1024.322** 124.0834 19.8272 -1387.88** 1049.334** -1997.61** -8.3596
Score4 814.595** 913.9354** -117.983** -2594.38** 586.7395** -1836.91** -428.859**
Score5 300.8787** 288.1512** -55.5135** -977.471** 202.4467** -817.594** -201.669**
Score6 246.8666** 238.6387** -69.7213** 374.949 141.8171** 30.0755 47.9862
Score7 112.8593** -320.168** 6.7665 528.5107 138.5816** 1103.714** -69.9198
Score8 109.4955** -548.353** 11.6802 2107.534** 133.0201** 2136.621** 371.7614**
Score9 184.6312** -218.902** -2.9291 382.8187** 176.942** 81.0702 503.2141**
Score10 -148.263** -11.5441 155.0121** 666.4523** 88.3943** -260.525 -157.102**
Limit10
3+Cycle -242.582** 139.4636** 5.3337 N N N N
Inactive -7.5464 308.5877 30.6448 174.8047 32.1094 -181.775 -234.509**
Score1 -11856.8** -9271.27 1099.105 39992.58 -9700.95** 37496.12 -590.779
Score2 2095.061** -2566.44** 85.8759 -2384.6 2415.72** 662.0061 8976.736
Score3 1691.844** 448.9804** 65.4526 516.8665 1765.585** -1212.85 2370.186
Score4 1549.22** 2200.589** -136.945** -4496.65** 1247.104** -4110.39** -1212.58**
Score5 688.9073** 946.6731** -127.631** -1083.39** 451.1442** -940.449** -1798.14**
Score6 414.4702** 371.947** -22.0442 1598.199** 374.2596** 810.889 -293.009**
Score7 280.6083** -528.01** 1.3939 2163.552** 305.5247** 3086.183** -543.039**
Score8 227.0274** -500.162** -1.2231 1129.02** 230.2443** 1152.272** 619.8885**
Score9 256.4719** -217.257** 19.8249 0.0047 274.7839** -366.065 533.0457**
Score10 -133.609** 6.5101 191.2582** 822.6668 155.893** -444.124 -289.206**
”‘**”’ indicates the parameter is significant at 95% level.
”‘N”’ represents the cumulative logistic regression did not find any significant explanatory macroe-
conomic variable and therefore we did not build up the corresponding regression model.
Table C.6: Summary of regression estimates - Model A and Model B
- Revolvers
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Appendix D
HK Data - Optimal Policy
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
3+Cycle 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 3
3+Cycle 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 4
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 5
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
3+Cycle 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 8
3+Cycle 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 9
3+Cycle 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 10
3+Cycle 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.1: Summary of optimal policy for All accounts (Results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6
are presented in Table 5.12)
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
3+Cycle 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 3
3+Cycle 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 4
3+Cycle 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 5
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
163
Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
3+Cycle 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 8
3+Cycle 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 9
3+Cycle 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score3 10 9 10 9 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 10
3+Cycle 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.2: Summary of optimal policy for All accounts (loss equals to the credit limit) and the
results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6 are presented in Table 5.13)
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 3
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 4
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 5
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 8
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 9
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score2 10 9 10 9 9 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Credit limit 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.3: Summary of optimal policy for Transactors (Results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6
are presented in Table 6.11)
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8
Score2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8
Score3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 3
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Score2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Score3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 4
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8
Score2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8
Score3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 5
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8
Score2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8
Score3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 8
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Credit limit 9
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Credit limit 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.4: Summary of optimal policy for Transactors accounts (loss equals to the credit limit)
and the results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6 are presented in Table 6.12)
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
3+Cycle 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 3
3+Cycle 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 3
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 4
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 4
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 5
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
3+Cycle 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 8
3+Cycle 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 9
3+Cycle 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score2 10 9 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Credit limit 10
3+Cycle 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.5: Summary of optimal policy for Revolvers (Results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6 are
presented in Table 6.11)
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 2
3+Cycle 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Score1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 10
Credit limit 3
3+Cycle 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Score1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 10
Credit limit 4
3+Cycle 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
Score1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 10
Credit limit 5
3+Cycle 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Score1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 10
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Expansion Recession
Unconditional
CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB CPI GDP Int Sto Une ModelA ModelB
Credit limit 7
3+Cycle 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Score1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10
Credit limit 8
3+Cycle 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Score1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score3 10 8 10 8 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10
Credit limit 9
3+Cycle 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Inactive 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Score1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score3 10 9 10 9 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Credit limit 10
3+Cycle 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Inactive 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Score10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table D.6: Summary of optimal policy for Revolvers accounts (loss equals to the credit limit)
and the results of Credit Limit 1 and Limit 6 are presented in Table 6.12)
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